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Abstract  
 
 
This study is dedicated to the analysis of the narrative structure of the 
screenplay in relation to Aristotle’s Poetics. This analysis begins with a 
general discussion of the various misconceptions of Aristotelian topoi which 
were gradually created in the course of centuries of applying the Poetics to 
drama and literature.  
 One of the principal concerns of this study has been to trace specific 
misconceptions of screenwriting theorists that discuss the Poetics in relation 
to screenwriting narrative techniques. The discussion of these misconceptions 
has a double aim: firstly, to disengage the Aristotelian narrative system from 
the classical narrative system and secondly, to highlight the potential of the 
Poetics for the specific needs of a screenplay’s narrative. The two 
misconceptions analysed in great detail in this study are mimesis and 
katharsis and there is also a thorough examination of the basic elements of 
the Aristotelian theory on plot structure.  
Chapter I of this study is dedicated to a discussion of mimesis as it has 
been viewed by Aristotelian scholars as well as screenwriting theorists. In 
Chapter I, I have tried to prove that the Aristotelian mimesis is not related to 
idealistic realism but to verisimilitude. I have analysed what the implication of 
this conclusion is in terms of Aristotelian, classical and counter-Aristotelian 
screenplay narrative structures. 
 In Chapter II, I have tried to describe the accurate function of katharsis 
as opposed to the one that Augusto Boal – one of Aristotle’s strongest 
opponents – has attributed to it. I have shown that katharsis is not a means to 
repress the spectator but a means to reach to an emotional relief derived from 
the intellectual clarification of the hero’s hamartia. 
The third chapter of this study is dedicated to the clarification of 
misconceptions regarding central plot structure elements, such as peripeteia, 
anagnorisis and hamartia.  
 By discussing a number of inaccuracies of the Poetics in screenwriting 
texts, by clarifying the meaning of katharsis and mimesis and by analysing 
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key Aristotelian plot structure elements I hope to have contributed with this 
study to a deeper understanding of the potential Poetics has for the dramatic 
needs of the screenplay.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
It might not be far-fetched to say that Aristotle’s Poetics functioned as a guide 
to the ancient Greece tragedians; a guide that still serves as the basis of the 
construction of drama and literary criticism, even though it was written almost 
2,300 years ago. Despite its wide recognition and reception, the Poetics is a 
treatise notoriously difficult to understand partly because of Aristotle’s elliptical 
thought and loose terminology, but primarily because Aristotle’s influence on 
subsequent drama and criticism makes it difficult to isolate his original thought 
from subsequent attempts of implementation or interpretation.    
Various misconceptions and debates on the ‘real’ meaning of the 
Aristotelian topoi were gradually created in the course of centuries of applying 
the Poetics to drama and literature. Around the 1950s, the Poetics was 
discovered by screenwriting theorists and screenwriters, who set out to apply 
central Aristotelian concepts to the needs of screenwriting. It was almost 
inevitable that the application of the Poetics to film would not only adopt the 
pre-existing misinterpretations, but also create new ones.  
The most common misconception with respect to the Aristotelian narrative 
structure is that it is associated directly with the classical or restorative 
narrative structure of the American screenplay; that is, the film form widely 
acknowledged today as the dominant or mainstream cinema. This is a false 
assumption, since the classical Hollywood cinema and – to a lesser extent – 
post-classical Hollywood cinema, drew their plots and narrative from the 
nineteenth century novel and play. Nineteenth century novels and plays have 
been influenced by the Poetics but mainly by partially erroneous 
interpretations of the Poetics.  Equally ‘responsible’ for the restorative three 
act form that became dominant for mainstream films seems to be the Well-
Made Play written by the French playwright Eugene Scribe in the 1820s.  
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The Poetics was used as a tool to decipher the secret language of 
successful screenwriting in the following way: isolated, relatively 
comprehensible Aristotelian concepts such as unity of action, complex plot, 
climax and resolution, reversal of fortune, recognition have been analysed out 
of context and immediately adopted for the development of hybrid 
screenwriting formulae. Highly controversial, problematic and complicated 
concepts such as katharsis, hamartia and peripeteia were oversimplified, 
excessively popularised and thus tragically deprived from their unique 
potential in screenwriting.  
Various screenwriting scholars rewrote the Poetics, consciously or not, 
to construct the perfect screenplay formula and in doing so, placed the 
Aristotelian model in the heart of classical narrative design. And, while the 
rediscovery of the Poetics for the needs of screenwriting did contribute to the 
understanding of the key plot construction ‘secrets’ of the classical narrative, it 
was also used as a scapegoat for all the shortcomings of the classical 
narrative (predictability, simplicity, spectator manipulation and so on). Also, 
associating the Poetics with mainstream cinema automatically entailed that art 
or counter-cinema became, consciously or not, counter-Aristotelian.       
Neo-Aristotelian screenwriting theorists like Syd Field (Screenplay, 
1979) and Robert McKee (Story: Substance, Structure, Style and the 
Principles of Screenwriting, 1999) formed narrative systems based on 
Aristotelian concepts that were changed and reshaped to fit the new 
screenwriting narrative schemata. Other screenwriting texts, such as Aristotle 
in Hollywood: The Anatomy of Successful Storytelling (Ari Hiltunen, 2002) or 
Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the Greatest 
Mind in Western Civilization (Michael Tierno, 2002), borrowed specific 
Aristotelian elements to explain the success of the classical narrative but 
failed to show the fundamental differences of the Aristotelian model with the 
classical film narrative. These differences are exactly what differentiates the 
Poetics from other narrative systems and makes it a unique method, the 
potential of which is far from exhausted in screenwriting. A key objective of 
this study is not only to trace the inaccuracies in the above texts but also to 
illuminate the hidden potential of Aristotle’s system for the art of screenwriting.  
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Robert McKee’s book, Story: Substance, Structure, Style and the 
Principles of Screenwriting, and Syd Field’s Screenplay are directly influenced 
by the Poetics. Nevertheless, both McKee and Field do not claim to have 
found what Aristotle ‘really’ meant and do not attempt to give answers to the 
most controversial issues found in the Poetics (mimesis, katharsis and 
hamartia). Despite the few misconceptions of Aristotelian concepts found in 
both texts, they do not distort Aristotle’s concepts, primarily because they only 
deal with parts of it. This however, is not the case with screenwriting books 
totally dedicated to the analysis and application of the Poetics to the needs of 
a screenplay.  
Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the 
Greatest Mind in Western Civilization was written in 2002 by Michael Tierno, a 
story analyst with Miramax, who observes in the introduction of his book that 
‘the criteria Hollywood executives use to evaluate screenplays are exactly 
those the legendary philosopher Aristotle thought were the nuts and bolts of 
ancient drama more than 2,000 years ago’.1 
Tierno believes that the Poetics is rightfully considered the ‘Bible of 
screenwriting’ and it is useful to screenwriters primarily because Aristotle 
explained why well-structured dramatic works affected audiences the way 
they did.   
The book is addressing the novice writer, and one who has not read 
the Poetics. It aspires to teach the fundamentals of plot structure in 
screenwriting based on the selected parts of Aristotle’s Poetics. The author 
focuses on the concept of imitation, the unity of the dramatic story, the plot in 
relation to character and the kinds of plots. 
Tierno attempts to summarize in the thirty-three chapters of his book 
the most basic Aristotelian concepts of narrative structure and gives movies 
examples to clarify the connection of the Aristotelian ideas to screenwriting 
techniques.   
Although Tierno clarifies in his introduction that this book is not an 
academic study, but an introduction to the Poetics aimed specifically at 
screenwriters, he flies past all basic Aristotelian controversies by giving the 
explanations that best fit his paradigm. He asserts that katharsis has an 
undisputed meaning of emotional purge, he conflates reversal of fortune 
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(metabasis) with peripeteia and fails to bring out the importance of key 
Aristotelian concepts, such as anagnorisis. Nevertheless, his analysis of 
simple versus complex plot and of the proper hero brings a balance to the 
overall simplifications and generalisations in the book.  
The book is an attempt to popularize the Aristotelian theories of 
tragedy. It seems, though, that the popularisation of a theory has to be 
carefully carried out, so that it won’t reach the point of distorting the theory 
itself. Although the author mentions that his book is only a starting point, it is 
hard to believe that when, throughout the book, he says that everything is 
very simple and the reader is one step away from winning an Oscar. In this 
study, I will analyse specific misconceptions found in Aristotle’s Poetics for 
Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the Greatest Mind in Western 
Civilization (action, katharsis in relation to imitation, hamartia).  
Ari Hiltunen’s book, Aristotle in Hollywood: The Anatomy of Successful 
Storytelling (2002), is a serious attempt to analyse the key concepts and logic 
of the Poetics in relation to contemporary drama, film, television and 
multimedia. The author begins with an analysis of what Aristotle means by the 
‘proper pleasure’ and tries to demonstrate how Aristotle’s ideas have been 
and can be applied to create powerful narrative structures for a variety of 
narratives such as the novels, movies, TV series and videogames. In the end 
of the book, the author discerns an anatomy – the anatomy of the ‘proper 
pleasure’ – that can be found in all effective storytelling.  
Hiltunen presents a detailed and overall accurate analysis of key 
Aristotelian plot structure elements. His analysis starts to be confusing when 
he tries to put other theorists’ work in the equation in an attempt to find the 
‘magic formula’ of successful storytelling. Joseph Campbell, Christopher 
Vogler, Syd Field and Aristotle create a synthesis where it becomes difficult to 
distinguish Aristotle’s methodological approach from the rest. The author 
comes to the conclusion that ‘the global success of Hollywood might be even 
more patterned on Aristotle’s principles than has previously been 
understood’2, but he fails to show what differentiates the Poetics from the 
classical narrative structure of Hollywood films.  
While the classical narrative structure of the mainstream film (Archplot 
film3) has been influenced by the Aristotelian narrative system, it –  
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nevertheless – exhibits multileveled differences from it, which the above 
screenwriting books fail to observe. In extreme cases, the Aristotelian system 
is completely equated to the conventional three act structure of the classical 
narrative found in mainstream films.  
One of these cases is Ken Dancyger’s and Jeff Rush’s Alternative 
Screenwriting: Going beyond the Rules (2002). Going beyond the 
conventional three-act structure and exploring more inventive approaches, 
Alternative Scriptwriting challenges readers to be creative with working 
against genre, experimenting with passive rather than active characters, 
focusing on secondary characters and stretching the limits of character 
identification. It deals with mainstream and experimental narrative forms, 
analysing both American and international films. The authors directly attack 
the function of katharsis, which would be acceptable only if katharsis was not 
used favourably throughout the rest of the book. The auspicious intention of 
the authors to decrease contemporary Hollywood monarchy in the film world 
derails and includes the whole tradition of the classical narrative technique, 
most of which is sadly confused with the Aristotelian narrative system. 
A key objective of this study is to trace and analyse basic 
misconceptions found in screenwriting texts that attempt to apply the Poetics 
to the narrative structure of the screenplay. Through this analysis I aim not 
only to show the differences of the Aristotelian system with the classical 
narrative system, but also to explore the potentialities of this system for the 
specific needs of the screenplay’s narrative.   
To point out briefly the differences between the Aristotelian and 
classical narratives, I will outline Roberto Benigni’s film Life is Beautiful 
(1997), which is written according to the basic classical design elements, in 
order to discuss its similarities and differences with the Aristotelian narrative 
system.   
a) Clear beginning that sets up the story and the characters. 
In Act I, Guido falls in love with Dora, decides to elope with her at her 
engagement party, they get married and have a son, Joshua.  
b) Central active protagonist that instantly gains the spectator’s sympathy 
and maintains it throughout the film. 
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Guido is a lovable character who puts up a fight and goes after what he 
wants. He is optimistic, determined and extraordinary.  
c) Inciting incident (First Act Climax) or Point of No Return.  
      At the outbreak of World War II, Guido is caught by the Nazis because  
      he is Jewish. Even though she is not Jewish, Dora insists on going  
      with Guido and Joshua to the concentration camp.  
d) False Solution.  
      Guido convinces Joshua that they are not in a real concentration  
      camp and that it is all a game with a tank as its prize.  
      Momentarily, the problem is solved.  
e) Second Act Climax.  
     Joshua escapes the gas chamber. 
f) Third Act Climax.  
Guido sacrifices his life to save Joshua (catastrophe averted).  
     g)  Resolution, restoration, closed ending.  
Guido becomes a hero and reunites Dora and Joshua just when the 
American tanks break into the camp (All threads of story are resolved).  
 
The main similarities of this narrative with the Aristotelian narrative 
pertain to the concept of complication and unravelling (in non Aristotelian 
terminology: inciting incident, false resolution, second act climax, third act 
climax). But Guido is not an Aristotelian character, because he lacks the most 
fundamental element of the Aristotelian character construction: he has 
notcommitted an hamartia, a tragic mistake due to the protagonist’s false 
reasoning. Guido is not fighting against himself, as it is the case with Oedipus 
Rex. The antagonist in Life is Beautiful is a social (external) turbulence 
caused by World World II. This is a fundamental difference between the two 
systems, because the forces of antagonism are directly related to the kind of 
katharsis experienced by the spectator (A more detailed analysis of katharsis 
will follow in Chapter II of this study). Therefore, the film Life is Beautiful is 
based on a classical narrative design and cannot be classified as an 
Aristotelian film, despite the fact that it is influenced by it.  
The filmic techniques employed in Life is Beautiful, such as the 
distance of framing, camera angles, lighting, editing and so forth, do not 
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contradict, but augment and support the screenplay. This is not the case in 
counter-classical films, which can be based on a classical design narrative, 
but shot with filmic techniques contradicting the linearity of the narrative.   
Counter-cinema aspires to challenge and fragment the classical 
narrative archplot associated with mainstream cinema. Counter-cinema films 
can fall into two categories; the first involves films that contain many elements 
of the classical narrative design, but reduce them and compress them so as to 
deviate from it (miniplot film). Daren Aronofky’s Requiem for a Dream (2000) 
exemplifies a narrative that follows a classical pattern, while at the same time 
deviating from it to some degree. What differentiates this film from a classical 
narrative is that there is not a single central protagonist, but several people 
whose lives change dramatically because of their particular addictions. The 
film progresses in the classical narrative design format in most of its aspects 
except the filmic techniques. Aronofsky uses non-conventional signifiers that 
are not associated with mainstream film, such as montage of extreme short 
shots (hip hop montage), split screen, close-ups, which compose an antithesis 
to the linearity of the screenplay. Requiem for a Dream is a classic case of a 
classical narrative design directed in a non-classical manner.    
Christopher Nolan’s Memento (2000) or Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork 
Orange (1971), fall into the second category of counter-cinema, which 
comprises films that completely reverse and sometimes ridicule the classical 
narrative (antiplot film).  However, as it will be shown in this study, in many 
cases non-conventional narratives necessarily include at least two basic 
Aristotelian elements (empathy and/or anagnorisis [recognition]) so as to 
ensure the spectator’s desired level of involvement. By doing so, these 
ostensibly counter-Aristotelian narratives depend on the very system they 
wish to negate. 
 
In this study I will be using three narrative classifications:  
-Classical Narrative (Archplot) 
-Aristotelian Narrative (Aristotelian plot) 
-Counter-Aristotelian Narrative (Miniplot and Antiplot) 
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These three categories are analysed in detail on pages 11-14, which 
will be used, implemented and commented upon throughout this study.  
I will now briefly discuss the element of the spectator’s identification 
with the protagonist/s in a narrative, so as to exemplify the differences among 
classical, Aristotelian and counter-Aristotelian narrative structure in the 
manner they will be analysed in this study.  
In a classical narrative, there is identification with a single protagonist. 
The spectator shares the protagonist’s experiences and – in most cases – he 
is not omniscient, but has the same knowledge of story events with the 
protagonist. The protagonist is an active character, with good intentions, who 
faces primarily exterior and secondarily interior conflict. The protagonist sets 
out to resolve the conflict and after at least one failure (false resolution), he 
overcomes all obstacles and resolves the problem in a climatic succession 
that necessarily leads to a positive, closed ending. The protagonist manages 
to become a hero or to re-establish his heroism after it has been challenged 
by the problem.  
In the Aristotelian narrative structure, there is identification (in 
Aristotelian terms: empathy arising from pity and fear) with a rather good 
character who, regardless of his good intentions, commits a tragic mistake 
(hamartia) in trying to overcome the obstacles hindering him from achieving 
happiness. Hamartia is an intellectual mistake that leads him to the 
accomplishment of the exact opposite of his intentions (peripeteia). The 
spectator is at a higher level of knowledge than the protagonist, since he is 
omniscient and at all times experiences the tragic irony of the hero’s vain 
efforts to solve the problem. The audience watches the hero taking the path to 
his own downfall and thus experiences a unique feeling of empathy. The 
identification of the spectator with the hero in the Aristotelian structure differs 
significantly from the one in the classical narrative, since in an Aristotelian 
narrative the spectator continues to sympathise with the hero regardless of 
the hideous act he has committed in ignorance. The hero finally resolves the 
problem, but in doing so ceases to be a hero. After realising that the true 
enemy was none other than himself and sees clearly his hamartia, the 
protagonist becomes someone else having gained a truer understanding of 
who he really is.   
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 Aristotle had an ideal protagonist in mind, Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, 
who committed the hamartia of killing his father exactly at the moment when 
he was changing his whole life to avoid this dreadful act. Early in his life, 
Oedipus finds out through an oracle that if he stays in the city of Corinth he 
will kill his father, Polybus, and marry his mother. To avoid the fulfilment of 
this terrible oracle, Oedipus instantly leaves Corinth. In his journey, he meets 
an arrogant old man who sweeps him off his road and beats him over the 
head. This tyrant is his real father, but Oedipus unaware of that, he acts 
impulsively, loses his temper and murders Laius and his whole party. Oedipus 
arrives at the city of Thebes, solves the riddle of the Sphinx and gets married 
to Laius’ s wife, his own mother, Jocasta. Oedipus becomes the new king and 
the oracle is fulfilled.  
 Under his rule Thebes becomes the ‘City of Light’. But, after fifteen 
years of peace and prosperity, the Gods decide to curse the city of Thebes 
because of a terrible pollution brought about by the killer of the former king 
Laius (Oedipus’s hamartia). Crops fail, animals die in the fields and pestilence 
rages. The people plead with their king to help them by finding and killing 
Laius’s murderer, since this is the only way to appease the Gods. 
Determined to track down the murderer of King Laius, Oedipus slowly 
brings his own destruction. Under pressure, he easily loses his temper and he 
refuses to see the truth by the Rule of Three; firstly, by ignoring the wise old 
oracle, Teiresias, who proclaims to him three times that the killer he seeks is 
none other than himself; secondly by accusing Jocasta’s brother, Creon, of 
setting up Teiresias to attack him; and finally by ignoring Jocasta’s warnings 
when she realises the horrible truth and tries to protect him. Oedipus 
becomes ecstatic when a shepherd from Corinth announces that his father, 
Polybus, has died a natural death. No longer does he need to worry about the 
oracle’s prediction. Soon he finds out, from the same shepherd, that he is 
adopted and that his real father was indeed Laius. He now knows who he 
really is, the truth is revealed and the curse is broken. Oedipus rushes into the 
palace to confront Jocasta only to find her swinging from a rope. Oedipus 
takes one of the gold brooches on her dress and drives its points into his 
eyeballs, self-inflicting his blindness.  
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The spectators are aware of Oedipus’s hamartia from the very 
beginning and watch every move he makes, experiencing fear for the 
upcoming revelation of his hideous acts and pity for his vain efforts. The 
spectators watch a man, confronted with a shocking crime, having to go 
through every step of an extremely painful realisation process. They witness 
‘the supreme story in the world of a man having to face up to his own guilt, on 
a cosmic scale. Not only did Oedipus kill his own father, he then married his 
own mother and had four children with her, who are not only his daughters 
and sons, but also his sisters and brothers to whom he has brought a lifelong 
curse. He has caused the death of his mother and wife. His offence against 
the laws of nature could not be more complete’.4 
Sophocles created a protagonist so extraordinary, complex and yet so 
universal that the spectator, any spectator, regardless of his/her socio-cultural 
background, feels a deep kinship with him, and experiences a katharsis of 
such intensity rarely attained in other tragedies. Aristotle’s choice of Oedipus 
Rex as his case study in the Poetics was not accidental. 
Several screenwriters have grasped the meaning of hamartia and 
given birth to characters that committed a tragic mistake repeatedly, achieving 
the exact opposite of their intentions, with irreversible consequences.  
Citizen Kane’s domineering personality (Citizen Kane, Orson Welles,1941), 
Michael’s determination to become his father (The Godfather, Francis Ford 
Coppola, 1972), Edward’s desire to be human (Edward Scissorhands, Tim 
Burton, 1990), Blanch’s obsession with the past (A Streetcar Named Desire, 
Elia Kazan, 1951) and Toni Montana’s ruthless ambition (Scarface, Brian De 
Palma, 1983) approximate the essence of the Aristotelian hamartia.   
In counter-cinema the spectator is distanced from the leading 
protagonist, who is most of the time an anti-hero. In the beginning, the leading 
character/s is/are presented as an essentially less than sympathetic individual 
but then manages to win our empathy. Stereotyped characters of the classical 
narrative are avoided and the process of identification is decelerated. A few 
screenwriters intentionally hinder any level of involvement and identification 
with the protagonist and aim at the effect of estrangement, such as Theo 
Angelopoulos and his protagonist ‘A’ in Ulysses Gaze (1995).    
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Through the analysis of counter-Aristotelian films I intend to show that, 
while they appear to be opposing the Aristotelian method, they borrow very 
powerful Aristotelian techniques to support their narrative dynamics. For 
example, the film The Blair Witch Project (Daniel Myrick and Eduardo 
Sanchez, 1999) is an ostensibly counter-Aristotelian film because a very vital 
Aristotelian element is missing: instead of one single protagonist, the film Blair 
Witch Project has a multiple character narrative structure. Nevertheless, all 
the characters have committed an hamartia, a tragic error of judgement. The 
spectator is witnessing every step of the slow and painful process that the 
characters go through when they realise their terrible mistake. This film 
exemplifies a narrative that appears to be anti-classical because of the use of 
multiple protagonists and unconventional filmic techniques (digital camera 
footage, shock montage and so on), while at the same time it uses one of the 
most powerful techniques in the Aristotelian character delineation, hamartia.  
 
 
 
Classical Narrative Aristotelian Narrative Counter-Aristotelian  
Narrative 
The structured story 
 
Screenplay plays the 
primary role 
The structured story 
 
Screenplay plays the 
primary role 
The found story 
 
Screenplay can play a 
primary or a minimum role 
Causality Causality directed to one 
action 
Coincidence  
 
Palimpsest 
Simplicity Complexity Complexity/Ambiguity 
Linear time Linear time Non-linear time 
Plot-oriented narrative 
 
Plot and character-oriented 
narrative 
 
Plot or character-oriented 
narrative 
 
Character elements 
a) One leading 
protagonist 
b) Active, larger than 
life 
c) Good 
d) Has a 
weakness/flaw that 
can be overcome 
 
 
 
e) Faces a 
challenge/problem/
Character elements  
a) One leading 
protagonist 
b) Active, larger than 
life 
c) Rather good 
d) Commits an 
hamartia that leads 
him/her to a 
hideous action  
 
 
e) Faces a 
challenge/problem/
Character elements   
a) Single or multiple 
protagonists 
b) Passive or active 
protagonist/s 
c) Protagonist as an 
anti-hero 
d) Protagonist has at 
least one character 
element that will 
eventually earn the 
spectator’s 
empathy 
e) Experiences a 
 18 
obstacle of a 
primarily external 
nature 
 
 
f) Tries to become a 
hero-Manages to 
become a hero 
 
 
g) Identification with 
and empathy 
towards the 
protagonist 
 
 
h) Lack of spectator’s 
omniscience 
 
 
i) Interpellation  
 
obstacle of an 
internal nature 
 
 
 
f) Faces a challenge 
that cannot be 
overcome without 
him/her becoming 
an anti-hero  
g) Identification, 
empathy-profound 
kinship with the 
protagonist. 
Emotions of pity 
and fear. 
h) Spectator is 
omniscient- Tragic 
irony effect 
 
i) Interpellation  
 
challenge/problem/
obstacle of a 
primarily internal 
nature 
f) Estrangement with 
the spectator or 
initial estrangement 
and subsequent 
identification and 
empathy 
Narrative transitivity 
 
The flow of action follows a 
clear pattern of cause and 
effect development. 
Verisimilitude is often 
compromised for the 
production of a happy 
ending.  
Narrative transitivity 
 
The flow of action follows a 
strict pattern of cause and 
effect unbreakable till the 
end. Verisimilitude is not 
compromised.  
Narrative intransitivity 
 
The flow of action is 
fragmented. Lack of 
verisimilitude.  
Plot elements  
 
Three Acts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Key elements 
 
Beginning usually not in 
medias res but easily 
deducted from the 
subsequent scenes. 
 
Inciting incident 
Rising Action 
Reversal of Fortune 
False Resolution 
Crisis  
First, Second and  
Third Act climax 
Resolution  
Plot elements 
 
Two divisions 
 
a)Complication 
b)Denouement or 
Unravelling  
 
 
Key elements 
 
Beginning in medias res  
but easily deducted from 
the subsequent scenes. 
 
 
Tragic mistake (hamartia) 
Reversal of Fortune 
Complication  
Unravelling  
Climax leading to 
peripeteia 
and thereafter to 
anagnorisis  
Plot elements 
 
 
 
Low key Complication,  
Minimum/no denouement 
 
 
 
Key elements 
 
Beginning in medias res 
not easily deduced from 
the following scenes 
 
 
Reversed (but present)  
classical and/or Aristotelian 
narrative structure 
elements 
 
Inciting incident 
Reversal of fortune 
Climax 
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Ending 
 
The highest degree of 
closure (all story threads 
resolved), closed ending. 
 
 
 
Catastrophe is averted 
resulting in a happy ending 
with the protagonist in a 
better status than the 
beginning (Deus ex 
machina plot development 
at the end).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ending 
 
High degree of closure 
(the one action is resolved, 
the hero’s destiny is 
unknown), closed ending.  
  
 
Catastrophe is averted 
resulting in an unhappy 
ending with the protagonist 
in a worse status than the 
beginning, but with a better 
understanding of 
him/herself.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ending 
 
Low  degree of closure 
(most story threads are left 
unresolved, the hero’s 
destiny is unknown), 
primarily open ending. 
 
Catastrophe absent. If 
present usually not 
averted.  
Idealistic Realism 
 
Mimesis of ideal events. 
The object of 
representation: reality as it 
should be. 
 
The narrative portrays an 
illusion of reality in terms 
primarily of what should 
happen, not only of what 
could happen.  
Verisimilitude is 
compromised.  
Logical/Probable Realism 
 
Mimesis of probable 
events. Mimesis as Plot. 
The object of 
representation: reality as it 
could be 
The narrative portrays an 
illusion of reality in terms of 
what could happen. 
Probability and necessity 
create verisimilitude that is 
maintained throughout the 
plot structure.  
 
 
Absence of the rule of 
probability and necessity. 
Presence of verisimilitude 
elements that will at some 
level compensate for the 
lack of cause and effect in 
the narrative structure. 
Genre specific narrative 
elements  
 
Style uniformity  
Genre specific narrative 
elements 
 
Style Uniformity  
Cross genre references  
 
Bricolage  
 
Recombinacy  
Simple Diegesis  
 
Non diegetic elements 
(mise-en-scene, montage, 
sound) in coherence with 
narrative structure of the 
screenplay.  
 
 
 
 
Simple Diegesis 
 
Non diegetic elements 
(mise-en-scene, montage, 
sound) in coherence with 
narrative structure of the 
screenplay. Film technique 
in harmony with narrative.  
 
 
 
Multiple Diegesis 
 
Non diegetic elements 
(mise-en-scene, montage, 
sound) contrasting 
/annihilating/ juxtaposing  
the narrative structure of 
the screenplay. Film 
technique surpassing 
narrative.   
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Presence of 
spectacle/special effects 
 
 
 
 
 
Minimum spectacle Absence/presence of 
spectacle 
Katharsis as an emotional 
relief 
Katharsis as an emotional 
and intellectual relief 
Presence/Absence of the 
element of katharsis 
 
 
In this study I intend to:  
 
1) Discuss two basic misconceptions related to the Poetics in order to clarify 
the differences between the Aristotelian narrative and the classical narrative 
structure.  
The first concept analysed will be mimesis (imitation) in relation to the 
represented story of a screenplay narrative. The understanding of the 
accurate meaning of mimesis will demonstrate the non-validity of one main 
argument against the Aristotelian method; namely, that it promotes an 
illusionistic representation of reality.   
To arrive at an accurate meaning of the Aristotelian mimesis it is 
essential that I trace the origin of this misconception so as to base my 
argument on facts and not allegations. This might be a brief diversion from an 
immediate discussion about film, since, as I have mentioned earlier, most of 
the misconceptions regarding the Poetics originated from the application of 
the Aristotelian method to literature and drama. I will also look at how mimesis 
has been interpreted by screenwriting theorists that have attempted to apply 
the Poetics to screenwriting.  
The second concept analysed will be katharsis (tragic pleasure). The 
function of the Aristotelian katharsis has been the foundation of the most 
fierce Aristotelian criticism by Augusto Boal. Boal, a playwright, the founder of 
the People’s Theatre and author of the Theatre of the Oppressed attacks the 
Aristotelian method on the grounds that it encourages the spectator to use the 
emotional rather than the rational part of his reasoning with katharsis 
repressing the spectator’s ability or need to exhibit anti-constitutional 
behaviour outside theatre.  
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I intend to show that Boal’s argument is false by, 
a) analysing the misconceptions surrounding the true function of the 
Aristotelian katharsis; 
b) showing that a precondition for the effect of katharsis is an intellectual 
involvement of the spectator;  
c) showing how these misconceptions lead to Boal’s non-valid argument on 
the repressive function of katharsis;  
d) using Boal’s narrative techniques to point out the striking similarities of his 
proposed system to Aristotle’s narrative system as well as to the classical 
narrative structure; 
 
2) Analyse the key elements of the Aristotelian method of plot construction 
and the dynamics between plot and character in a screenplay in order to 
clarify misconceptions regarding the Aristotelian plot construction in 
contemporary texts that attempt to apply the Poetics in screenwriting. 
Specifically, I will use examples for the books:  Aristotle’s Poetics for 
Screenwriters: Storytelling Secrets from the Greatest Mind in Western 
Civilisation, Aristotle in Hollywood:The Anatomy of Successful Storytelling, 
Alternative Screenwriting:Going beyond the Rules, Story: Substance, 
Structure, Style and the Principles of Screenwriting, Screenplay and so on.  
 
3) Analyse films that appear to be counter-Aristotelian with the intent to trace 
the degree upon which they deviate or depend upon the Poetics. I will 
demonstrate that the effect produced by ostensibly counter-Aristotelian films 
is in fact dependent upon the narrative structure they wish to negate.  
I aim to show that the application of the Aristotelian method cannot be 
a criterion for limiting the possibilities inherent in the method and that its 
potential cannot be exhausted or determined by the way it has been applied 
so far.    
The intention of this study is not to favour the Aristotelian method over 
other narrative techniques. It is my belief that each technique has its own 
value. I do, nevertheless, intend to clarify that the process of applying the 
Poetics in screenwriting has not been always conducted appropriately. This 
misapplication deprives the method from its potential.   
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Finally, it should be noted that many interpreters of the Poetics have 
thought necessary to refer to the concepts analysed in other Aristotelian 
treatises, such as the Rhetoric, the Nicomachean Ethics, but also the Politics, 
the Physics and the Metaphysics. It is true that there are central terms in the 
Poetics that are illuminated by reference specifically to the Ethics (praxis, 
hamartia). I have tried, for the most part, to avoid associating the meaning of 
central concepts of the Aristotelian poetic method with references to other 
works of the philosopher. Selective explanatory analogies do take place in this 
thesis, specifically regarding the clarification of the concepts of praxis (action) 
in an attempt to disengage our contemporary understanding of those terms 
from their accurate meaning in the Poetics. Special care has been taken not 
to deviate from the text itself, since it is my strong belief that, regarding at 
least the focus of the specific study, the philosopher provides more than 
enough information in the Poetics.  
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MIMESIS 
 
 
Mimesis, Aristotle says, is a kind of instinct, which when satisfied produces 
the pleasure of learning. The film is a kind of mimesis as is theatre, poetry, 
dancing or painting. This statement – that all arts are sorts of mimesis – 
seems to be a common, indeed the only common, ground amongst the 
various literary and film theories, since they differ with respect to the objects 
an art should imitate as well as the manner of imitation. Because mimesis 
involves the existence of something ‘original’ that is then represented or 
imitated by means of a ‘copy’, it has been primarily associated with realism. 
The value of the copy is estimated according to its resemblance to the 
original. In other words, the more real the copy is, the more merit is attached 
to it.   
Mimesis as a means of representation has been the apple of discord 
between various schools of narrative film. Neo-realism, Nouvelle Vague, Free 
Cinema, the New German Cinema (Junger Deutscher Film) and even the 
more recent Danish Dogma cinema (Dogma 95) have invoked Platonic ideas 
and later Brechtian argumentation to directly accuse classical cinema of being 
misleading, manipulative and producing an unrealistic and thus idealistic view 
of reality, proclaiming at the same time that they intended to represent the raw 
reality unmasked.  
An idealistic view of reality means that reality is not represented as it is 
or as it could be, but as it should be. This distorted representation creates, in 
turn, an illusion of reality and not a true understanding of it. The basis of this 
argument is that narrative films that promote an illusionistic view of reality are 
harmful to the spectator’s ability to understand reality, since they promote an 
ideal thus beguiling and misleading view of the world. The origin of this 
argument is traced back to Plato’s disqualification of poetry as an art imitating 
not reality, but an imitation of reality thus being nothing else than a copy of a 
copy.    
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With the majority of film and screenwriting theorists associating 
classical narrative with the Aristotelian narrative structure, the accusation of 
producing an idealistic and illusionistic view of reality has also been attributed 
to the Poetics.  
To say that the Aristotelian mimesis proposes a representation of life 
as it should be would mean that the Aristotelian system is a narrative poetic 
method with the primary intent to manipulate the spectator into adopting a 
specific set of ideas or morals.  As it will be shown in this chapter, Aristotelian 
mimesis pertains to what could happen, to probability and necessity, and not 
to what should happen as it is the case with the classical narrative structure. 
The Poetics was also invoked in the neoclassic period to justify a tendency to 
measure the value of art according to its resemblance to the original. 
Neoclassicists demanded that a work of art should demonstrate a strict 
resemblance to the original. But, mimesis for Aristotle moves away from a 
representation of life as it is and focuses on life as it could be, again, 
according to the rules of probability and necessity.  
To understand the precise meaning of the Aristotelian mimesis is very 
important for the process of applying the Poetics to screenwriting for two 
reasons. First, it will clarify existing misconceptions and open new ways of 
applying the Poetics to screenwriting. Second, the object of representation 
(character and story) and the means of representation (plot [screenplay] and 
filmic technique) are the elements that determine the kind of film one wishes 
to create. Mimesis and katharsis are the basic tools in the hands of 
screenwriters who wish to develop an Aristotelian narrative structure. At the 
same time, without a clear delineation of mimesis and katharsis the process of 
categorizing a film as counter-Aristotelian or Aristotelian would be impossible.   
In this Chapter I intend to demonstrate that the Poetics is related not to 
the classical narrative’s idealistic mimesis, but to a logical mimesis, that is an 
imitation produced and developed by following logical patterns. I will show that 
the object of the Aristotelian narrative is a mimesis of what could happen 
according to the rules of probability and necessity and not of what should 
happen. I will also explain why the Aristotelian mimesis is not related to a 
photographic realism.  
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To reach to this conclusion, I intend to discuss briefly the way major 
literary and film theories have viewed mimesis in relation to reality. This is 
important because it will show the inaccuracies that have been created 
through centuries of misconceiving and misinterpreting the Aristotelian term 
mimesis and its relation to realism. I will also address the problem of the 
absence of any detailed reference to mimesis in screenwriting texts that 
discuss the Poetics.  
In this chapter I will try to determine what can be Aristotelian and 
counter-Aristotelian in terms of both the objects represented (story and 
character) and the means of representation (plot [screenplay] and film 
technique). In this study the means of representation fall into two categories, 
a) the primary means of representation or the screenplay, and the secondary 
means of representation or the filmic techniques (editing, mise-en-scene and 
so on).  
Mimesis presents us with one of the most elusive aspects of the 
Poetics in terms of translation and meaning. Paul Woodruff in Aristotle on 
Mimesis puts it quite accurately:  
 
Mimesis and its Greek cognates defy translation. Besides ‘imitation’ we find in 
English such renderings as ‘image-making’, ‘imitation’, ‘representation’, 
‘reproduction’, ‘expression’, ‘fiction’, ‘emulation’, ‘make-believe’, and so forth. As any 
of these would beg important questions of interpretation, we shall have to be content 
with transliteration.1  
 
Even at the time that the Poetics was written, there was controversy 
over the true purpose of poetic mimesis. Aristophanes (456 BC-386 BC), the 
comic dramatist, thought that along with pleasing, the dramatist should be a 
teacher of morality and a political adviser. Strabo (63/64 BC), the Greek 
historian and philosopher, agreed with the idea that poetry is the first lesson 
that the state must teach a child and exclaimed the superiority of poetry to 
philosophy on the grounds that the latter addressed a few, whereas the 
former addressed the many. This is completely opposed to the Greek poet 
Eratosthenes (276 BC-194 BC) who asserted that the function of the poem is 
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to charm the spirit of its listeners, never to instruct them. More radical than all, 
Plato thought that there was no place for poets in his perfect Republic 
because the poets imitate the world and the world imitates the Ideas. The 
poets, therefore, become the imitators of imitation. According to Plato ‘since 
that which is real does not change and since the mutable sensible world 
around us is not real, but a representation of the real, then the artist who 
imitates (whether poet, painter, musician) represents not the forms, but the 
imitation of the forms, the sensible’.2 Poetry, for Plato, is twice removed from 
the Idea of the things in nature and, being an imitation twice removed from the 
Idea of things, poetry is false. 
 Aristotle’s deviation from the Platonic idea of poetry’s function proves 
that what he was talking about was not a photographic realism within the 
poetic work. Aristotle’s ‘version’ of mimesis is a form of signification, but not 
one which posits a relation of ‘copy’ to the ‘original’.   
In the essay Mimesis and Diegesis: Foundations of Aesthetic Theory in 
Plato and Aristotle, John T. Kirby gives us a very important analysis of the 
basic differences between Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories of poetics.  
According to Plato’s analysis of diegesis (the narrative) and mimesis:    
 
Diegesis can be of two kinds 
 
1)   diegesis with mimesis 
2) diegesis without mimesis 
 
Diegesis with mimesis (1) is subdivided in: 
 
a) diegesis that is pure mimesis (tragedy, comedy) and  
b)   diegesis that includes some mimesis (epic)3 
 
 
Diegesis without mimesis is pure diegesis, something that can be said to 
be the case for the Dithyramb. Aristotle deviates from Plato’s theory in that he 
did actually approach the issue of mimesis from a totally different point of 
view.  Leaving aside the reality of imitation, Aristotle begins Poetics with a 
defence of poetry on the grounds that ‘the instinct of imitation is implanted in 
man from childhood, one difference between him/her and other animals being 
that he/she is the most imitative of living creatures and through imitation 
learns his/her earliest lessons; and no less universal is the pleasure felt in 
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things imitated’.4 Aristotle thus ‘shifts out of the original realm of enquiry 
entirely. He reverses the genus/differentiae distinction originally posited by 
Plato in the Republic. There, diegesis was the genus and the presence and 
absence of mimesis were its differentiae. In the Poetics, mimesis becomes 
the genus, the topic of diairesis (division). Nor is this all Aristotle does to 
controvert the Platonic diairesis: he supplies entirely new differentiae, namely 
the medium, object and mode of imitation’.5   
Below there is an outline of mimesis as presented in Aristotle’s Poetics 
that has been composed with the help of Kirby’s essay as well as F.L. Lucas’s 
summary of the Poetics in the book Tragedy: Serious Drama in Relation to 
Aristotle’s Poetics. This outline gives a clearer account of Aristotle’s reasoning 
regarding mimesis and it also demonstrates the type of characters that should 
be imitated as well as the manner in which they are imitated. For example, in 
the Objects of Imitation part of the outline, one can easily see that a tragedy 
should imitate a man ‘larger than life’. On the other hand, characters of a 
comedy have to appear worse than ordinary people. 
These arts are distinguished according to  
 
a) The Medium of Imitation: rhythm, melody, language 
 
In Poetry the medium is rhythm + language 
In Dance the medium is rhythm 
In Choral Lyric is rhythm + melody + language 
In Music the medium is rhythm + melody 
 
 
b) The Objects of Imitation 
 
Higher or lower types of objects imitated (Basic distinction between Tragedy and 
Comedy). 
 
Tragedy: men finer than they are (βελτίωνας) 
Comedy: men meaner than they are (χείρονας) 
               men as they are (ομοίους καθ’ημάς) 
 
c) The Manner of Imitation  
 
Poetry can have the form of  
 
- Narrative - dramatic narrative (pure narrative [including lyric poetry]) 
- Acting (pure drama) 
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Throughout the vast history of art criticism, when the Aristotelian term 
mimesis was taken into account as the primary orientation of a literary work, it 
has been used to refer to a very wide range of notions from the most 
uncompromising realism to the most remote idealism (The Poetics, ironically, 
was invoked to justify two opposite conceptions of poetry – high idealist 
allegory and naturalistic fable). The different ways of using verisimilitude 
shows that realism or the desire to be referential to reality is always present 
and is endlessly renewed and rediscovered.  
It has been said that the popularity of the Poetics among scholars and 
poets in the 16th and 17th centuries was chiefly due to an accident. They 
happened to discover it when they were feeling the need to have a coherent 
tradition to work with so as to interpret the great Greek poets, but also to have 
a high standard by which to judge themselves and each other and to have a 
way to emulate or even surpass the great literature of antiquity. It seems that 
the same thing must have happened with screenwriting. Although 
screenwriting had largely inherited the Poetics from playwriting, the 
rediscovery of Aristotle by screenwriting scholars and writers reflected a 
strong need to find formulas for successful screenwriting and/or to understand 
the reasons why some films were successful while others were not.  
Along with other central concepts of the Poetics, the interpretation of 
mimesis has been ventured by the Renaissance scholars of the classics 
(humanists) who contributed to the new learning by discovering and 
disseminating a great number of Greek manuscripts. But the rediscovery of 
the Poetics during the Renaissance also involved the obscuring of some 
central concepts, which is due to the altering of the orientations in examining 
Aristotle’s poetic method so as to fit in one or another critic’s theoretical 
frame. It is interesting to see that this is a phenomenon repeated in modern 
times as well. In most screenwriting texts that draw on the Poetics, the 
concept of mimesis is barely mentioned, regardless of the fact that it is the 
cornerstone of the Aristotelian theory. On the contrary, such texts easily adopt 
more comprehensible Aristotelian concepts that fit in their theoretic frame, 
such as reversal of fortune, empathy, pathos, complication and denouement.  
Early in the 16th century Italian scholars followed Aristotle’s guidance in 
writing tragedies and produced a large body of theoretical work, which – 
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misinterpreted and based on unverified beliefs as to the real meaning of 
Aristotle’s theory – were subsequently taken over wholesale by English 
writers. One of the examples of misinterpretation was the three unities of time, 
place and action, upon which later on Shakespeare’s plays were regarded 
‘not true to life’.  Aristotle only insisted on the unity of action. Nowhere in the 
Poetics does Aristotle advise the poet to adhere to a rule of the unity of place 
and time.  
In Apologie for Poetry, Sir Philip Sidney speaks of poetry as ‘an arte of 
imitation, for so Aristotle termeth it in the word mimesis, that is to say a 
representing, counterfetting, or figuring foorth-to speak metaphorically, a 
speaking picture: with this end, to teach and delight.’6 
 Aristotle’s probable could, becomes in Sydney should. The object of 
mimesis assumes a moral purpose, that which will please in order to teach. 
As Meyer Howard Abrams points out:  
 
This pragmatic point of view of poetry and its genres looks at the work of art as a 
means to an end, an instrument for getting something done, and tends to judge its 
value according to its success in achieving that aim, to ground the classification and 
anatomy of poems in large part on the special effects each kind and component is 
most competent to achieve; to derive the norms of the poetic art and canons of 
critical appraisal from the needs and legitimate demands of the audience to whom is 
addressed.7   
 
Such a point of view is reminiscent of Horace’s Ars Poetica which 
spoke of the poets’ task to teach (prodesse), to please (delectare) but also to 
move (movere). Nowhere in the Poetics does Aristotle mention that the object 
of mimesis has a moral purpose. In fact, the only basic rule Aristotle insists on 
is the rule of probability and the necessity of the incidents composing a plot, 
since only by maintaining this rule can verisimilitude be achieved.  
Neoclassical traditionalism dictated an idea of poetry as an imitation of 
human life. Poetry was to be the ‘mirror held up to nature’. The interpretations 
varied. One tendency was to value the mimetic level of the arts according to 
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their medium.  Thomas Twining in translating and interpreting the Poetics 
came to the conclusion that: 
 
Only works in which the resemblance between copy and object is both immediate 
and obvious can be described as imitative in a strict sense. Dramatic poetry therefore 
in which we mimic speech by speech is the only kind of poetry which is properly 
imitation; music must be struck from the list of imitative arts.8  
 
This, however, does not agree with one of Aristotle’s key assumptions, 
that ‘Epic poetry and tragedy, Comedy also and Dithyrambic poetry, and the 
music of the flute and of the lyre in most of their forms, are all in their general 
conceptions modes of imitation’.9 Photographic realism was not in the realm 
of Aristotle’s poetic method. As I will show later on, the idea that the only 
imitative works are the ones in which the resemblance between copy and 
object is both immediate and obvious is reminiscent of Siegfied Kracauer’s 
realist film theory and is totally opposed to the Aristotelian theory.  
Post renaissance and neoclassical critics viewed mimesis as an 
important poetic element, also one that is oriented more to the effects 
produced on the audience. The focus in these eras, nevertheless, was shifting 
more towards the direction of pleasure itself rather than pleasure as a means 
of teaching. The imitation of nature was the general means of achieving this 
end and it is something that could be accomplished with the guidance of 
critically established rules. The main approach to mimesis during the 
neoclassic period is reflected in John Dryden’s words:  
 
Having thus shewn that imitation pleases, and why it pleases in both these arts, it 
follows that some rules of imitation are necessary to obtain the end; for without rules 
there can be no art, any more that there can be a house without a door to conduct 
you into it.10  
 
This point of view approaches more the general Aristotelian method 
since it says that literary works can provide a source of rules for poetics. A 
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fundamental deviation from Aristotle, though, is the view of pleasure as an 
end and not as a means. The telos (goal) of the Aristotelian tragedy is 
katharsis, the intellectual clarification and emotional relief of the characters 
and the spectators. One of the functions of katharsis is pleasure, but it is not 
the aim of poetry to please.    
Richard Hurd, who interpreted Ars Poetica as well as other Horace’s 
works, spoke of universal poetry ‘as an art whose end is the maximum 
possible pleasure’.11 Hurd writes that ‘for the name of poem will belong to 
every composition, whose primary end is to please, provided it will be so 
constructed as to afford all the pleasure, which is kind or sort will permit’.12  
Again, we are getting closer to the Aristotelian notion of dramatic 
qualities particular to the specific kinds of poetry. Hurd’s kind or sort is closely 
allied to the distinction Aristotle made referring to the poems differing from 
one another in terms of medium, object and manner of imitation. Up to this 
point, the connection between mimesis and plot eluded the interpreters of 
Poetics. 
The focus on the literary effects on audience led to the focus on the 
creator of these effects. Samuel Johnson in his Preface to Shakespeare 
praises Shakespeare’s artistic excellence and his ability to combine the 
demands of his contemporary audience with the demands of a general 
audience, the common readers of all times. It is therefore, ‘not the belle 
nature, but the general nature that he turns the mirror to’.13 However, ‘the 
creator’s artistic genius’, explains Johnson, ‘does not compensate for the 
shortcomings in writing without any moral purpose’.14 
Around 1800, the mimetic orientation shifts to the poet’s genius and 
creative imagination. And although the Poetics enters a second phase of 
popularity, especially after Coleridge’s re-interpretation of some Aristotelian 
terms in Biographia Literaria, during the Romantic period poetry is not 
primarily a mirror of men in action, but a mirror of the poet’s own feelings. The 
rules of poesis belong to the realm of the creator’s imagination. The cause of 
poetry is effective; poetic imitation takes the form of the poet’s expression of 
his/her internal experiences. Poetry is not a mimesis of human actions and 
does not aim at a moral lesson. Poetry is the imitation or internal 
representation of the creator’s internal motion. Neither does it aim at 
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producing effects on the audience, as it was held at the neoclassic period. 
The process of eliciting effects on the audience is now viewed as a criterion 
not of the value of art but of its disqualification as being ‘rhetoric’. As Shelley 
has said, ‘the Poet is nightingale who sits in darkness and sings to cheer its 
own solitude with sweet sounds’.15 The audience is one; the poet him/herself. 
The previous idea of poetry as imitating something external, such as nature, is 
viewed as simplistic. Instead, symbolic representation of what exists in the 
poet’s life is what constitutes true art. The shift of focus to the creator is 
reminiscent of auteurism as it emerged from the pages of Cahiers du Cinema 
around the 1950s.   
Modern literary theory has explored the idea that literature cannot in 
any way be ‘true to life’ or imitate reality, since the idea of the existence of a 
single objective reality has been called into question. From the structuralists’ 
view, for example, a literary work is a mode of writing (ecriture) structured by 
a play of various purely literary codes and conventions that generate a literary 
effect. This literary effect, though, has no truth-value or any reference to 
reality outside the text itself. In 1921, Roman Jakobson wrote in his essay 
Realism in Art that ‘while in painting and in other visual arts the illusion of an 
objective and absolute faithfulness to reality is conceivable, ‘natural’ (in 
Plato’s terminology), verisimilitude in a verbal expression or in a literary 
description obviously makes no sense whatever’.16 
Literary realism is a tissue of conventions and therefore has nothing to 
do with reality. Modern literary theory avoided any reference to reality, but 
somehow depended on it as it is the case for many narrative films that avoid, 
for example, the linear narrative structure, but somehow depend on it in order 
to be comprehended by the spectator.   
The philosopher Tzvetan Todorov, in his introduction to the 11th issue 
of Communications, describes a story that happened in Sicily in 500 BC. In a 
courtroom, the judges had to decide on a case where it was impossible to 
know what really happened so they decided according to the story that gave 
the bigger impression of truth. Upon that, Todorov comments that in this case, 
the laws of persuasiveness became dominant over the laws of truth, but the 
persuasive or the vraisemblance, has no relation to reality.17 
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 For Todorov, ‘verisimilitude is the mask in which the laws of the text 
are dressed up, a mask which we are supposed to take for a relation with 
reality. Poets are liars, wearing masks to deceive us’.18 This kind of thinking 
ignores the possibility that the relation to the real can be direct (factual truth) 
or indirect (what is probable or likely - verisimilitude). It also sounds peculiarly 
Platonic. It is reminiscent of the notion that the function of mimesis is to create 
an illusion of reality which, in turn, will harm our logistikon, which is our 
capacity to measure, number and weigh that which is real and undistorted. 
 Probability is the missing factor from this kind of reasoning and its 
importance was plain to Aristotle almost 2,000 years ago. For Aristotle, a 
believable probable impossibility (in tragedy) is preferable to an unbelievable 
improbable possibility, something that stands in the core of the meaning of 
verisimilitude and its use in the Poetics. Verisimilitude is the aim of the 
Aristotelian narrative and not a photographic realism. The reference to reality 
is crucial. It is the approximation to the real, the probable or likely element in 
an improbability that makes it credible. The poet, as well as the reader and 
the spectator, are aware of the ‘mask’ of realism. In fact, what disappoints the 
spectators is the breaking of the rules of probability and necessity so that the 
spectators find themselves no longer willing to suspend their disbelief.   
  For Aristotle, the object of imitation is not the Platonic Ideas and is not 
objects of raw reality. Mimesis is imitation of human actions, an imitation that 
transcends acting (as a performance) and has to do with the structure of 
actions, with the plot. 
One of the reasons for the misinterpretations and confusion related to 
mimesis is that the meaning of the Aristotelian action – which is to be imitated 
– is not clear. Aristotle says that ‘for even dancing imitates character, emotion, 
and action by rhythmical movement’.19 
Emotion and action are a periphrasis for the word μύθος (myth), which 
in ancient Greek bears the meaning of plot. So, emotion and action is actually 
plot. Confusion arises when, in other parts of the Poetics, Aristotle refers to 
action alone and not to emotion and action together.  For example, in the 
definition of tragedy he says ‘έστιν ουν τραγωδία μίμησης πραξεως 
σπουδαίας και τελείας’.20 (Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is 
serious and complete’21).  
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Action (praxis), for Aristotle, comprises not only what a person did, but 
the whole working out of the action and the consequences of his/her actions, 
that is, what has happened to the person after he has acted. It also comprises 
character, since character reflects the intent and the intrinsic life of the person 
that acts. Character is of course the basis of action, since it determines the 
quality of the action, but the end of mimesis is the action itself. The 
Aristotelian insistence on actions seems to agree with the maxim for 
screenwriters that character is action and that our impressions of a character 
are given by his/her actions, more than what he/she says or what is said 
about him/her. 
 
Η γαρ τραγωδία μιμησης εστιν ουκ ανθρώπων αλλα πράξεως και βίου, και η 
ευδαιμονια και κακοδαιμονία εν πράξει εστίν, και το τελος πράξης τις εστίν, ου 
ποιότης. 22 
 
Tragedy then is the imitation, not of men, but of an action and of life, and life consists 
in action, and its end is a mode of action, not a quality. 23  
 
 
In the above extract, even though it is not very clear from the 
translation, Aristotle refers to the concepts of good fortune (ευδαιμονία) and 
misfortune (κακοδαιμονία).  S. H. Butcher’s translation of the Greek words 
ευδαιμονία and κακοδαιμονία is just life as one can see from the underlined 
words. It is very important to understand what Aristotle means when he states 
that good fortune and misfortune consist in action. With the help of one of the 
most recognized Greek interpreters of the Poetics, I. Sikoutris, the exact 
meaning of the words good fortune and misfortune used in the extract is made 
possible.  
Ευδαιμονία was regarded, not only by Aristotle, an action or energeia 
of a psyche in virtue or in a state of virtue.  Ευδαιμονια is an action and not a 
psychological state, as it is believed today. Ευδαιμονία and κακοδαιμονία –  
which is translated by Butcher as life – can happen only through action. 
Sikoutris explains that what Aristotle means by using and its end is that the 
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higher end of existence and every action is good fortune. Finally, the quality of 
virtue is not by itself good fortune, because it is possible for one to have a 
virtue that is not a benefit to the person and cannot induce happiness or good 
fortune unless this virtue is put in use, unless – in other words – the virtue 
becomes action.24  
Rephrasing Butcher’s translation leads to the following definition of 
what a tragedy should imitate: Tragedy then is an imitation, not of men, but of 
action and life, and good fortune and misfortune happen in action and those 
are the ends of life if they are in the form of an action and not of a quality.  
Plot imitates action, because only through action is a character’s inner 
self revealed, at least in drama. The screenwriter who chooses to follow the 
Aristotelian narrative system, chooses from the incessant flow and chaotic 
form of reality, the pieces of action that best show and prove the one action 
(main action) or premise of the film. These pieces of action (scenes) will be 
interconnected by the rule of probability and necessity.   
It is important to clarify that in this study I will be using the adjective 
one to describe action (one action) instead of the adjective main (main action) 
in an attempt to stay as close as possible to the text of the Poetics. The 
adjective ‘main’ implies the existence of other actions, contrary to the 
Aristotelian narrative method.  
Syd Field’s book Screenplay: The Foundations of Screenwriting is one 
of the first screenwriting books that applied the Poetics to the art of   
screenwriting and – contrary to other similar books – it captures an important 
element of the Aristotelian object of mimesis. Field writes that ‘Aristotle says 
in his Poetics: Life consists in action and its end is a mode of action, not a 
quality. That means that your character has to be active, has to be doing 
things, causing things to happen, not just reacting all the time’.25  
The object of mimesis in an Aristotelian screenplay could not be the 
actions of a character such as ‘A’ in Ulysses’s Gaze (Theo Angelopoulos, 
1995). ‘A’ may be on a quest to find an undeveloped film from 1905, but in the 
process he is being submerged into a dreamlike journey around the Balkans 
where he follows life as it happens and sometimes does not even wish to 
react to it. The Aristotelian character needs to be active, because only through 
action can the spectator follow the logical steps that will lead to katharsis. The 
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proper mimesis is the only road to katharsis in a tragedy and these two 
concepts cannot be viewed separately. Inaction is a form of action of course, 
but a character’s inaction usually prevents the spectator from understanding 
the character’s motives. Thus a passive character, such as ‘A’ is counter-
Aristotelian.    
In Aristotle in Hollywood: The Anatomy of Successful Storytelling Ari 
Hiltunen accurately observes that the Aristotelian mimesis involves ‘taking on 
the characteristics of something else in order to arrive at a true understanding 
of it’.26 In writing the Poetics, Aristotle decided to base his narrative method on 
the relationship between mimesis and katharsis. Mimesis was the cornerstone 
that initiated the entire discussion on plot structure and character delineation. 
But most screenwriting texts prefer to leave the mimetic quality of a 
screenplay out the equation and examine katharsis on its own, while other 
texts such as Screenplay or Story: Substance, Structure, Style and the 
Principles of Screenwriting, do not even refer to mimesis. In his 130 pages 
book, Hiltunen dedicates just a paragraph to the analysis of mimesis. He 
writes: 
 
One of Aristotle’s important concepts of drama is mimesis which is the taking on of 
the characteristics of something else in order to arrive at a true understanding of it. It 
could be said that Oedipus Rex is about giving an aesthetic form to the basic human 
tragedy, the essence of which is that of moira, or fate, that plays a trick on the hero’s 
good intentions.27  
 
Oedipus Rex is indeed about giving an aesthetic form to a central 
human tragedy: the decisions characters make and the actions they take to 
achieve happiness tragically become the key reasons of achieving the exact 
opposite of their intentions - misfortune (peripeteia). But that is hardly related 
to moira. In fact, the whole point of tragedy is to clearly show – through a well 
structured plot – all the steps that lead to a logical mistake, an hamartia, that 
brings about unhappiness.  
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According to the Poetics, mimesis of a man’s existence is not to be 
done mechanically by the poet. The object of imitation for the poet is not the 
objective reality that lies in front of his/her eyes, but the already observed 
reality, which is processed in his/her mind freed from unimportant and 
arbitrary elements.  In other words,  
 
Stories or situations such as we meet in the real world except that they are more 
consistent, being free from both the inert superficialities that signify nothing, and the 
occasional contradictory happening  that appear for the moment to invalidate general 
truths. 28 
  
This selected reality is plot, something that differentiates the  
Aristotelian method from realist film theory that views the use of plot as a ‘tool’ 
that hinders realism. Plot for realist theory is the tool by which the screenwriter 
selects parts of reality thus not all of reality. The importance of this ‘selected 
reality’ in the Aristotelian mimetic process is one of the reasons, as it will be 
demonstrated in Chapter III of this study, that Aristotle gives emphasis to plot. 
It is important to understand that to select parts of reality (Aristotelian 
narrative) is different from idealizing reality (classical narrative) or from 
annihilating, distorting or defamiliarising reality (counter-Aristotelian narrative). 
In Akira Kurosawa’s Ikiru (To Live, 1952), the screenwriter Shinobu 
Hashimoto, has constructed the plot in such a way as to demonstrate a logical 
coherence in the units of action that led the dying civil servant, Kanji 
Watanabe, to realise the emptiness of his life and find a new goal in his 
remaining time; to patiently push through a project of turning a city dump into 
a playground for children. The specific screenplay has an extraordinary plot 
structure, giving the impression that no scene has been selected accidentally. 
Ikiru is the ideal example of what Aristotle meant when he insisted on the 
criterion of indispensability for the plot events. The plot should be structured in 
such a way that if one were to take out a scene, the meaning of the whole 
would be harmed and mimesis would not have been achieved.   
In Ikiru what moves the audience is the protagonist’s change and not that this 
change takes place quickly (in 143 minutes or in a few months of screenplay 
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time). Due to the plot’s verisimilitude, the audience does not wonder about the 
believability of the rapid change in the hero’s life. The realism gives way to the 
illusion of realism, the screenplay becomes believable and thus realistic. The 
audience travels along with the protagonist to understand and experience the 
process of his change. The ‘selected reality’ of Ikiru has successfully imitated 
the one action selected by the screenwriter.   
In now returning to the types of characters imitated, it should be noted 
the object of the Aristotelian mimesis is not the downfall of a villain. Aristotle 
explains that ‘a plot of this kind would, doubtless, satisfy the moral sense, but 
it would inspire neither pity nor fear’. The Aristotelian mimesis does not aim at 
offering moral instructions to the spectator.          
 The actions that should be imitated are the actions of a rather good 
character, who has an extraordinary element (εξαιρετικόν) which is the 
extension and the depth of the important and the essential, the whole 
(εννιαίος). What is important and essential is that which will not only make the 
spectator curious or excited, but that which will arouse the feeling of a deeper 
psychological connection or συγγένεια (kinship) with the hero. This 
extraordinary element will move action forward to its wholeness or 
completeness. So from the extraordinary (not common) we proceed to the 
common element in all human beings, to the universal.   
Something is whole when it is presented in its essential form, the form 
that corresponds more clearly and vividly to the nature of the represented 
object, after it has been freed from any obscuring accidental element. 
Wholeness has to do with the logical clarity, logical coherence (unity) and 
logical necessity, elements that compose the Aristotelian rule of probability 
and necessity. The action imitated is the one that is likely to happen, the one 
that could have happened (logical not moral necessity).   
The whole should not be confused with the general, with the average of 
the empirical reality. The average – when it comes to human attributes – does 
not necessarily contain the important or essential, rather the peripheral and 
the inessential. There are, for example, many average women tortured by 
jealousy, but they do not all of them kill their children, like Medea. The general 
trait of jealousy as it is found in the average type of the jealous woman, under 
the right circumstances of probability and necessity can lead to the extreme 
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reaction of revenge through murder, and not any murder (the husband, 
herself, the lover), but the murder of the woman’s children. Mimesis then, in 
the Aristotelian use of it, sets out by means of the plot, to show why the 
specific character Medea, as opposed to any jealous woman, committed 
these hideous crimes. There is no morality in Aristotle’s system, but only an 
analysis of all the logical steps that could lead to the most illogical, extreme 
and immoral actions.    
It is not everyday that an intelligent and charismatic king kills his father 
and marries his mother, especially when his intentions were to do the exact 
opposite, to protect them. But in the case of Oedipus, the plot reveals that, 
under the right circumstances (selected plot scenes) such parricide and incest 
could happen. A different selection of scenes would probably not have the 
same effect because each scene is a logical step that when ignored, results in 
a non sequitur. Because the Poetics presents a narrative structure that relies 
primarily on logic and not chance, it cannot be considered as promoting an 
ideal sense of reality that portrays how things should be.   
In Chapter XIII, Aristotle analyses in greater detail the characters of 
whose actions are to be imitated. First, Aristotle writes a tragedy should not 
imitate decent people passing from good fortune to misfortune. The adjective 
used in the Greek text is επιεικείς, which here bears the meaning of not only 
decent or virtuous, but also χρηστός, that is a person that has not committed 
an hamartia (a tragic mistake), a flawless, a completely innocent human 
being.  Depicting the passing from good fortune to misfortune of a person who 
has not committed an hamartia would not be pitiful and fearful, but rather 
μιαρόν. (The adjective μιαρόν has been translated either as ‘disgusting’ [Potts] 
or ‘shocking’ [Butcher]). Fate or chance is something that does not concern 
Aristotle’s epistemological analysis. What falls upon the person is his own 
tragic mistake and not fate. If the purpose of mimesis was to ‘preach’ the 
spectator then an immoral character becoming progressively unhappy and 
punished for his immorality would be perfect for the role.  
Chris Gardner, the protagonist in the Pursuit of Happiness (Gabriele 
Muccino, 2006), even though larger than life has not committed an hamartia.  
His social background was the primary reason for his unhappiness. But Chris 
surpasses all obstacles and manages to move from rags to riches. He is the 
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ideal character for the classical screenplay narrative. He is an active 
protagonist in the pursuit of a desire in direct conflict with the people around 
him. By contrast, the object of imitation for an Aristotelian screenplay would 
be the selected actions of an active protagonist who in the pursuit of 
happiness commits an hamartia (a tragic mistake) that is in direct conflict with 
his own desire and then with the desires of the people around him.   
I have shown so far that the power of the Aristotelian mimesis is not 
only related to the mimema, the object of imitation, but also to the manner of 
mimesis, that is, the manner in which the plot imitates action. To make this 
point clearer I shall borrow Paul Woodruff’s reasoning, which I believe is the 
single most accurate analysis of mimesis so far:   
 
Mimesis in Aristotle then cannot be anything like imitation, which in modern usage 
implies the existence of something real which is imitated. We speak of imitation 
flowers and fake flamingos, but not of imitation goblins or fake fairies, because there 
are no goblins or fairies. Again, mimesis in Aristotle cannot be the same as fiction. 
The comic poet does indeed produce fiction – he makes up events and characters 
(the word for doing that is simply poiein); but then he accomplishes a mimesis which 
has as its object precisely the fiction that he has made up. If mimesis were fiction 
then it would make no sense to say that it can take fiction as its object. But if fiction is 
the making up of people and events, and if that is what a poet does, then what in the 
world could mimesis be? What role is left for mimesis if fiction is prior to it? Aristotle’s 
way of speaking implies that there is a difference between simply making up actions 
and, and producing a mimesis of actions that have been made up. The difference is 
that mimesis affects us, while simply making things up – without mimesis – does not. 
To produce a mimesis of a fiction is to give to that fiction the power of engaging our 
attention and our emotions almost as if it were real.29 
 
 
I have argued so far that Aristotelian mimesis is not a realistic  
(photographic) representation of objects. Neither is it a reproduction of 
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emotions by unrealistic means, but by the selection of probable events, which 
is the plot. The object of mimesis is the action of a rather good character with 
an extraordinary element who nevertheless commits an hamartia. Mimesis is 
realized by means of the proper selection of mimemata which will lead to 
katharsis. Mimesis is not related to an idealistic representation of reality as it 
is the case with the classical narrative, but to a representation of a probable 
and thus convincing reality. Also, I have shown that the purpose of the 
Aristotelian mimesis is not to moralise the spectator.   
I wish now to discuss the secondary means of representation (filmic 
technique) for film in relation to the Poetics. So important was for Aristotle that 
the poet achieves verisimilitude by means of the plot that he considered any 
attempt of achieving verisimilitude by means of the ‘spectacle’ an inferior form 
of art. Aristotle put little emphasis on aspects such as the ‘spectacular’: 
 
The Spectacle has, indeed, an emotional attraction of its own, but, of all the parts 
[plot, character, diction, thought, spectacle, song] it is the least artistic and connected 
least with the art of poetry. For the power of Tragedy, we maybe sure, is felt even 
apart from representation and actors. Besides, the production of spectacular effects 
depends more on the art of the stage machinist than on that of the poet.30  
 
Although the kind and quality of spectacle in ancient Greek tragedy 
differs greatly from the advanced special effects used in film today, ‘spectacle’ 
would have had the same meaning for Aristotle as it has for us. For the 
Aristotelian mimesis what reproduces life’s emotions is more important than 
that which produces sense-impressions, like the ‘spectacle’. Thus an 
Aristotelian film would put less emphasis on realism derived from filmic 
techniques and setting and more emphasis on verisimilitude derived from the 
screenplay’s plot. The Aristotelian realism is linked primarily to plot events 
causally interrelated and therefore convincing, rather than a realistic scene 
that is shot, for example, on location.     
The illusion of realism in film is inevitable, even in narrative structures 
that purposely avoid realism in either their screenplay or their filmic 
techniques. Jacques Tati’s Traffic (1972) or Playtime (1967) aim at distorting 
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reality and challenging realism. But, even in surrealistic films, especially in the 
case of later screenwriters work, such as Michael Gondry’s Eternal Sunshine 
of the Spotless Mind (2004) or Spike Jonze’s Being John Malkovich (1999), 
there is a plot that takes the role of compensating at some level for the 
unrealistic direction methods. The fact that these films are unusual or non-
conventional in their filmic techniques does not exclude them from the 
Aristotelian paradigm. Especially in Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind the 
line of action embodies one of the most distinctly Aristotelian elements. Both 
the central characters, Joel and Clementine, in their attempt to become 
happier by forgetting each other, they commit the hamartia of erasing all the 
memories of their relationship. But their wrong decision results in the exact 
opposite of their intention (peripeteia). Excluding the film’s conventional happy 
ending that is reminiscent of the classical narrative, the film Eternal Sunshine 
of the Spotless Mind is directly influenced by the Aristotelian narrative 
method.  
All arts possess a distinct rationale of their own. But the illusion of 
realism is inseparably bound up with all forms of art and especially with the 
cinema. What differentiates the various narrative techniques from each other 
is the degree and the manner in which they imitate reality. The Aristotelian 
method chooses a mimesis that is more related to the structure of the plot 
than the realism of the setting.     
The illusion of realism is closely allied to the very essence of cinema, 
perhaps to a greater degree than that of theatre due to the uniquely 
‘unrealistic’ elements of this medium. In cinema, everything is larger than life 
and everything is depicted on a big screen. But the illusion of reality is a 
precondition the audience accepts provided that the narrative and the 
camera/editing techniques do not become self-reflexive. The spectator 
willingly suspends his/her disbelief as long as the writer plays by the rules (of 
verisimilitude). It is important to realise that even self-conscious cinema, such 
as Francois Truffaut’s The 400 Blows (1959) is not composed accidentally. 
The creation of meaning presupposes a reference to something, a reference 
to reality and reason, even if the one action presented in the narrative is 
completely unrealistic, as it is the case in the fantasy or horror genres.   
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The Aristotelian narrative structure depends on a mimesis not guided 
by idealistic realism that would portray an ideal version of a constructed 
reality, but by a logical version of a constructed reality. In the classical 
narrative, the story is primarily about what should happen in an ideal world, 
rather than what could happen in real world; good conquers evil, David 
somehow manages to beat Goliath, ordinary people become heroes, the poor 
go from rags to riches. Logical believability, verisimilitude, or simply what 
could happen – not what actually happens or should happen – is the object of 
the Aristotelian mimesis. On the contrary, a counter-Aristotelian narrative 
structure pertains to a mimesis of a) raw reality freed from dramatic qualities, 
a mere recording of what actually happens regardless of any rules of 
probability and necessity; b) what does not happen ‘out there’ but in the 
character’s inner world; c) a non-linear mimesis of reality conveyed with the 
episodic narrative structure; d) a representation of multiple realities and 
countless variations of the above four categories – all of them aiming at 
challenging the spectator’s expectations.    
To achieve logical mimesis, the Aristotelian poetic structure involves 
selecting a part of reality and not the whole of it. Therefore it is not and it does 
not aspire to be a ‘true’ or accurate representation of raw reality.  As I have 
said earlier in this Chapter, plot is the selection of the important incidents in a 
story. The incidents’ importance is determined by the degree of relevance 
they have in relation to the one action (premise) represented by the 
screenwriter. Only by a proper plot can the Aristotelian mimesis be realised, 
that is why the plot has the primary role in the Aristotelian method.   
I now wish to continue the discussion of the Aristotelian mimesis by  
juxtaposing it with the purpose of mimesis in film as it has been formed by the 
realist and the formalist film tradition. I will then analyse the neo-realist film 
Bicycle Thieves (Vittorio De Sica ,1948) from an Aristotelian point of view.    
Realist film theory ostensibly opposes the Aristotelian theory in that its 
tenets are based not on a structured story, but on a found story. It is not, for 
example, the intention of counter-Aristotelian films, such as the neo-realist 
Rome, Open City (Roberto Rossellini, 1945) or La Strada (Federico Fellini, 
1945) to create an illusion of reality, but to depict  reality as it is. These films 
aspire to ‘guide’ and not manipulate the audience to an understanding of 
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reality. Neo-realists avoid neatly plotted stories in favour of loose structures 
that evolve organically. Their filmic techniques are minimal with avoidance of 
artifice in editing, camera movement and lighting in order to achieve a ‘style-
less’ style. On the other hand, the formalist tradition in cinema aspires to draw 
the audiences’ attention to the cinematic technique, to the medium of the 
mimesis itself and not to the object of mimesis alone, in order to give birth to 
the true life of cinema. Alain Renais’s Last Year in Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 
1961) is an example of formalist film that overtly use the language of cinema 
(editing, shot composition and so on.) so as to emphasize the graphical and 
not the diegetic qualities of the film.    
The tradition of realism in film can be viewed more clearly through the 
light of the formalist film theory, from which it almost naturally developed by 
way of reaction. Formalist film theory can be said to have started from Hugo 
Munsterberg and his book The Photoplay: A Psychological Study (1916), the 
first and also most direct study in film theory. Munsterberg described all 
cinematic properties as mental. According to his theory, techniques such as 
the close-up and the various camera angles do not only exist because of the 
lenses and the cameras that make them technically possible, but also 
because our mind works this way. Our thoughts are doing ‘close-ups’, for 
example, when they want to pay attention to something. The motion picture, in 
the same way, should not be a mere recording of motion in the world, but an 
organized recording of the way humans’ mind create a meaningful reality. For 
Munsterberg, the mind is not separated from emotions, because emotions 
occupy the highest mental level. Emotions are in fact complete mental events. 
And if mental events are expressed, in film, by the technical aspects of the 
film, the emotions are expressed by the story itself, the story which is ‘the 
highest unit or ingredient available to this narrative art, and the one which 
directs all the lower processes of film’.31  ‘The photoplay’, explains 
Munsterberg, ‘tells us a human story by overcoming the forms of the outer 
world, namely space, time and causality and by adjusting the events to the 
form of the inner world, namely attention, memory, imagination and 
emotion…[These events] reach complete isolation from the practical world 
through the perfect unity of plot and pictorial appearance’.32 
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Munsterberg’s theory, while giving emphasis to the plot, differs from 
Aristotelian narratology in two ways. First, he believed that all material are 
suitable for a film, even the most violent and prurient, as long as they reach 
their proper conclusion, releasing the energies they have aroused.  Aristotle 
was very specific in demarcating the object of mimesis and the characters that 
best fit in carrying out the one action of the plot. Secondly, Munsterberg 
placed the filmic technique and plot on the same level, whereas in the 
Aristotelian method the ‘spectacle’ was inferior to plot. Strikingly relevant to 
the Aristotelian notion of katharsis is Munsterberg’s belief that emotions are 
complete mental events. As it will be discussed in Chapter II of this study, 
katharsis is a state that is brought about only after the proper mental 
processes have allowed the emotional part of the spectator to be expressed.  
While Munsterberg’s theory revolves around the psychological 
processes of the spectator, Rudolf Arnheim in his book Film as Art (1923) 
stated that what must constitute the film’s material is all the elements that 
make it, not the illusion of reality, but the elements that make it less than a 
perfect illusion of reality. Arnheim moves beyond the plot and examines all the 
elements of the medium (cinema) that are potentially non-real, for example, 
‘the reduction of a sense of depth, lighting and the absence of colour, the 
framing of the image, the absence of space-time continuum due to editing and 
the absence of inputs from other senses’.33 For Arnheim, then, film art stands 
between representation of the real and distortion of the real. The artist has to 
suppress the ‘natural’ capacity of the medium to represent reality in order to 
make it artistic. It follows that the object of the representation comes second. 
The artist focuses on the medium of the representation.   
Sergei Eisenstein was also uncomfortable with the idea that cinema is 
a simple representation or recording of reality. He believed that ‘there is no 
such thing as bare reality directly apprehensible. The filmmakers’ task, the 
task of the artist, is to apprehend the true form of an event or natural  
phenomenon and then utilize that form in the construction of his art work’.34 
The subject matter is not out there, but it will be discovered through the 
form of the medium. Eisenstein focused on the dynamic and unifying concept 
of montage. The shot is a bit of reality, an almost lifeless bit of reality that 
needs an ‘animating principle’ in order to become cinema. This ‘animating 
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principle’ is montage. Aristotle bases his theory on the same principle of 
apprehending the true form of an event, but he differs in the proposed way of 
achieving it. For Aristotle, the true form of an action is realised by the narrative 
structure (the screenplay’s plot). Eisenstein puts emphasis on the narrative 
structure created by technique (montage) and not by the screenplay.  
Bela Balaz was a theorist who, even though embracing formalism as a 
way to discover the distinctive quality of the art of cinema, shifted his focus 
onto the filmic subject. As J. Dudley Andrew points out in The Major Film 
Theories,  
 
So great was Balaz’s respect for the proper selection of cinematic subjects that he 
gives to the film script itself the stature of an independent work of art. Just as we 
consider Shakespeare’s plays fully realized even when they are not produced, so 
Balaz felt that the complete film script could, on occasion, be read as a full 
transformation of reality.35 
 
This is reminiscent of Aristotle’s statement that tragedy should be 
equally cathartic even when not performed on stage, but simply read. With 
Balaz the screenplay starts to gain its deserved value.   
While recognizing the conventional and formalist nature of film 
techniques and while he insisted that cinematic inventions are used for their 
formalist rather than their realistic potential, Balaz asked for ‘strange angles 
only to the extent that the spectator can still orient him/herself in the picture 
and differentiate the familiar from the strange’. He believed that subjective 
shots, including entire dream sequences, should be allowed as long as ‘such 
narrative and visual distortion is set against an orderly plot which is 
commented upon or advanced’.36 
  In the formalist theory plot has a secondary role, but in realist film 
theory plot has a minimum role or at least this was the intent or belief of the 
filmmakers of the time. The film has a ‘found story’, a story that naturally 
emerges from the film process. The subject matter of cinema is the 
photographable world, the reality which seems to give itself naturally to the 
medium.   
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Siegfried Kracauer in Theory of Film states that films come into their 
own when they record and reveal physical reality. The true film-maker is ‘a 
man who sets out to tell a story but, in shooting it, is so overwhelmed by his 
innate desire to cover all of physical reality, that he ventures even deeper into 
the jungle of material phenomena. The film is equipped to capture the flow of 
life and the ideal form of film structure is an episodic one which allows this to 
be both suggested and represented’.37 According to Kracauer the creativity of 
the film maker is limited to his/her ability to ‘let nature in and penetrate it’. The 
filmmaker has the minimum role possible and the screenwriter does not even 
need to exist.  
A more serious challenge to the formalist theory is the work of Andre 
Bazin, who embraced the use of the filmic technique (camera angles, lighting, 
editing) as long as this use was aiming at naturalistic techniques. All this has 
the basic goal of letting the spectator find his own reality in the reality 
presented. According to realist film theory, realist cinema does not manipulate 
the spectator, rather it gives him/her space to choose /her own interpretation 
of the filmic object or event.    
Both the formalist and realist theories of mimesis and reality contradict 
the Aristotelian method. The formalist theory focuses on the medium of 
mimesis and not the filmic object and the story, so mimesis is realized solely 
by means of technique. The neorealist film, on the other hand, does not 
attempt to guide the audience in an immediate and explicit way. Rather it 
seems to help them find a meaning by probing reality without offering 
solutions to the problems or the situations represented. The filmic techniques 
do not contradict the story and the ultimate goal of the neo-realist director is 
not to draw attention to the means of mimesis. Most films are shot in actual 
locations – usually exteriors – with no studio sites. Editing, camerawork and 
lighting are almost invisible to achieve a documentary visual style and the 
actors are non-professionals even for primary roles. Finally, a recurrent theme 
of neo-realist films is poverty, not because this theme was more dramatic than 
others, but because poverty actually reflected one of the most important social 
problems at the time. One of the basic tenets of neo-realism is that the object 
of mimesis is not the exceptional, but the normal.   
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 The realist film tradition annihilates the importance of verisimilitude on 
the grounds that it manipulates the spectators, depriving them from the 
opportunity to discover reality. So, the realists propose a mimesis that is 
ostensibly opposed to the Aristotelian mimesis.  
I will now analyse Vittorio De Sica’s neo realist film Labri di Biciclette 
(Bicycle Thieves) in order to trace the Aristotelian elements in an ostensibly 
counter-Aristotelian film.  I will show that Bicycle Thieves is a film that adheres 
to the tenets of the Aristotelian mimesis by representing a convincing illusion 
of reality by means of a well-structured plot.     
The black and white film Bicycle Thieves was based on a script written 
by seven people, a uniquely large group of writers. The story revolves around 
a stolen bicycle, an idea taken by Luigi Bartolini’s novel. All the other 
elements had to be re-written and especially the characterisation. According 
to one of the main screenwriters, Cesare Zavattini, Bicycles Thieves, as a 
neo-realist film, ‘is the exact opposite of the plotted film, that is, the film in 
which one event produces the other in a causal chain, until the happy ending 
is reached’.38  
The plot of Bicycle Thieves appears initially to be simple, but is imbued 
with most of the elements of a complex Aristotelian plot. According to 
Aristotle, any plot, simple or complex, must adhere to the rule of probability 
and necessity. Each scene has to be causally connected to the next. A plot 
should imitate a rather good character coming from good fortune to misfortune 
due to his tragic mistake (hamartia). Also, what makes a plot complex is the 
presence of the element of peripeteia which is the state in which the character 
produces the exact opposite result of what he intended to do.    
The rule of probability and necessity characterizes the narrative 
structure of Bicycle Thieves screenplay. Even if Zavattini’s intention was – as 
he stated – to produce the ‘exact opposite of the plotted film, that is the film in 
which one event produces the other in a causal chain, until the happy ending 
is reached’39, the screenplay’s events are all causally interrelated. Each scene 
is connected causally to the next in such a way that if we were to take out one 
scene, the meaning of the whole would be compromised. All the events that 
led Antonio’s act of stealing the bicycle were logical thus convincing. The 
protagonist has to first use all possible ways of regaining his stolen bicycle in 
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order to resort to the act of theft himself. It is vital that the act of theft is 
justified, or the one action of the film (despair drives people to crime) would be 
jeopardised along with the spectator’s empathy for the character. In order to 
prove the one action of Bicycle Thieves, Zavatti represented all the logical 
steps that could lead an honest man to crime. Before resorting to theft Antonio 
a) went to the police station to report the theft 
b) went to the housing project to find Biaocco 
c) went to Piazza Vittorio to search for the bike 
d) went to the church to find the witness 
e) went to the fortune teller 
f) chased the thief 
 
Zavatti knew that he would not have the spectators’ empathy towards 
Antonio unless he showed that his protagonist has exhausted all options 
before the theft.     
Antonio is not an Aristotelian character. He is not extraordinary and he 
did not commit an hamartia in the strict Aristotelian sense. His clumsiness – 
not paying attention to his bike when putting the poster up – is a small mistake 
and cannot be compared to the tragic mistake that an Aristotelian character 
commits. He does have, though, the necessary character elements that make 
the audience identify with him and experience the pity and fear emotions. In 
fact, the premise of Bicycle Thieves would have been impossible to prove with 
a protagonist that was not sympathetic.    
The protagonist is an active character, who passes from misfortune 
(absence of bicycle) to good fortune (gaining the bicycle) and then misfortune 
again (loosing his bicycle and forced to steal a new one). So, not only does 
the plot of Bicycle Thieves have the basic Aristotelian element of Reversal of 
Fortune (transition from fortune to misfortune), it also has peripeteia; by 
stealing the bicycle, Antonio produces the exact opposite result of what he 
intended to do.   
The secondary means of representation (filmic techniques) of Bicycle 
Thieves does not contradict the primary means of representation (plot). There 
are only a few close-ups, but most of the film is shot in long takes in order to 
show what seems like life unfolding. There are no striking camera  
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movements, no complicated and interchanging lighting techniques, no 
conspicuous montage construction. The basic aim is not to make the 
audience aware of the medium of mimesis (technique), but of the object of 
mimesis; the story of Antonio and his bicycle.  The approach of not drawing 
attention to the medium of mimesis is purely Aristotelian. As I have mentioned 
before, the ‘spectacle’ is considered by Aristotle an inferior form of stimulating 
the spectators’ interest. The aim of the Aristotelian film is that the filmic 
techniques are in harmony with the narrative, as it is the case with Bicycle 
Thieves. 
Bicycle Thieves is based on the rules of probability and necessity 
(verisimilitude). We are presented with a simple, logically probable story. We 
are convinced that under the right circumstances, a good and decent 
character as Antonio could become a criminal. The right circumstances are 
presented by the selection of the right scenes, the scenes that carry us to the 
logical conclusion of the one action selected by the screenwriter. It is true that 
another poor person could have other choices in real life. But, this specific 
character had no other choice so we are convinced.   
The audience and the characters do not experience pure katharsis. 
According to Aristotle, katharsis is an intellectual and emotional clarification of 
the protagonist and the spectator. In Bicycle Thieves, the spectator clearly 
sees the reasons why poverty leads to crime. Intellectually, the spectator is 
satisfied. There are no doubts of the reasons that led Antonio to resort to 
theft. But because the element of hamartia is missing in its pure Aristotelian 
form, katharsis cannot be achieved. In the last scene we see father and son 
holding each other’s hand and we feel that love, understanding, forgiveness 
and partnership could overcome the ordeals of the characters we have 
identified with. But there is no irreversible, tragic change brought about from 
some anagnorisis (recognition) of the protagonist’s hamartia. Thus, a pure 
Aristotelian katharsis is not possible in this specific film. Finally, the writers 
avoided the simplistic idealistic representation of the happy ending that 
characterizes the classical narrative design.   
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KATHARSIS 
 
 
Katharsis has been one of the most celebrated concepts in literature, theatre 
and film. There is a certain attraction to this term, an attraction perhaps 
attributed to the fact that there is still uncertainty of its exact meaning.  
One can only be sure that there are five widely accepted interpretations of 
katharsis, each of them explaining it as a moral, medical, structural, emotional 
or intellectual phenomenon.  
In the previous Chapter, I have examined the definition of tragedy in 
order to discuss and clarify the concept of mimesis. In this Chapter, I will be 
focusing on the last sentence of Aristotle’s definition of tragedy: ‘by means of 
pity and fear effecting its purgation (katharsis) of these emotions’, and 
specifically on the word katharsis. There will be a discussion about the 
controversy over the true meaning of katharsis, as well as the polemic it has 
received from the founder of the People’s Theatre, Augusto Boal, in the book 
Theatre of the Oppressed. By analysing the two major misinterpretations of 
katharsis (purgation and purification theories) I will conclude with a more 
accurate description of the Aristotelian katharsis. This will illuminate the true 
function of katharsis in an Aristotelian narrative as opposed to the classical 
and counter-Aristotelian narrative structures. Finally, I will give examples of 
inaccurate descriptions of katharsis in contemporary screenwriting texts.  
Aristotle’s definition of tragedy is:  
 
 
Έστιν ουν τραγωδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας και τελείας μέγεθος εχούσης, 
ηδυσμένο λόγω χωρίς εκάστω των ειδων εν τοις μορίοις, δρώντων και ου δι’ 
απαγγελίας, δι’ ελέου και φόβου περαίνουσα την των τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσn.1 
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Tragedy then, is an imitation of an action of high importance, complete and of some 
amplitude; in language enhanced by distinct and varying beauties; acted not 
narrated; by means of pity and fear effecting its purgation of these emotions.2 
 
The last sentence of Aristotle’s definition (by means of pity and fear 
effecting its purgation of these emotions) has resisted interpretation due to the 
use of the word katharsis, but also the words παθημάτων (emotions), των 
τοιούτων (these), περαίνουσα (by means of) that are open to various 
interpretations themselves. The interpretation of katharsis is further hindered 
by the absence of a coherent detailed explanation of the term in the Poetics. 
Aristotle explains all other elements of poetics that are included in the 
definition of tragedy and, even though he states in the Politics than he intends 
to discuss the meaning of katharsis in the Poetics, he fails to do so.    
Regarding this omission S. H. Butcher observes the lack of a katharsis 
explanation in Poetics. A. Rostangi believes that Aristotle did give an 
explanation of katharsis in a treatise written earlier than Poetics, in the book 
Περί Ποιητών.3 A. Gudeman believes that there is a missing part of the 
Poetics, in which Aristotle analysed the meaning of katharsis.4  
Gerald F. Else infers that Aristotle’s explanation of katharsis in the 
Poetics would have been much different from his initial understanding of it in 
Politics5   and thus any explanatory comparisons between katharsis in music 
and katharsis in poetics is inaccurate. Carnes Lord believes that we cannot 
assume that there was a part of the Poetics missing, since when Aristotle 
referred to katharsis in Politics he was discussing the political and ethical 
functions of katharsis or music in general, a point of view that diverts attention 
from the preoccupation of the Poetics.6  
However challenging it may be, the clarification of the true function of 
the Aristotelian katharsis is vital to the study of the screenplay’s narrative. The 
reason is that the function of katharsis is directly related to the purpose and 
the effect of film on the spectator. For example, to accept that the function of 
the Aristotelian katharsis is to teach a set of moral values to the audience 
would make a film like David Lynch’s Blue Velvet entirely counter-Aristotelian. 
A sexually deviant character such as Dorothy Vallens (Isabella Rosellini) 
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cannot easily produce the feeling of empathy, which is an important ingredient 
of katharsis. Accepting, on the other hand that katharsis’ function is not 
related to teaching the spectator any moral values but that it aims at 
exercising his/her reasoning would make the specific film a very good 
example of the Aristotelian katharsis.     
If katharsis were a purely emotional phenomenon then the Aristotelian 
narrative method would not depend on spectators’ intellectual involvement. 
Giving katharsis a purely emotional function would mean that many classical 
narrative films are Aristotelian, since the classic narrative structure depends 
primarily on the spectators’ emotional rather than mental involvement. But, as 
I will argue in this chapter, to experience the Aristotelian katharsis the 
spectator needs firstly to be intellectually involved and secondly to be 
emotionally involved. Mental involvement is a precondition for emotional 
involvement and for katharsis to be achieved.   
To accept that the function of katharsis is purely emotional would entail 
that the Aristotelian method manipulates the spectator. When a spectator is 
making a decision based on emotions rather than reason, he can easily be 
convinced. In this sense, a film could become a very powerful weapon of 
propaganda.   
One of the Poetics’ opponents, Augusto Boal, bases his case against 
the Poetics on the emotional function of katharsis. Boal labels the Aristotelian 
method as idealist poetics, describes it as a repressive system and contrasts 
it with his own poetics, the poetics of the oppressed. According to Boal, 
Aristotle’s method is repressive because besides the emotional relief that it 
produces, katharsis also satisfies and mitigates the spectators’ need for 
action. Boal asserts that after having experienced katharsis in theatre, the 
spectator no longer feels the urge to take action in real life. In the book 
Theatre of the Oppressed  Boal sets out to prove that ‘Aristotle constructs the 
first extremely powerful poetic-political system for intimidation of the spectator, 
for elimination of the bad or illegal tendencies of the audience’.7 ‘The system 
is’, Boal observes, ‘fully utilized, not only in conventional theatre, but in the TV 
soap operas and in Western films as well: movies, theatre and television 
united, through a common basis in Aristotelian poetics, for repression of the 
people’.8   
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I am going to examine the logical steps Boal takes to arrive at this 
conclusion. Boal starts his discussion by analysing the concept of mimesis  
and pointing out the difference between our contemporary understanding of 
mimesis as imitation of nature and as a raw copying and reproduction of 
reality. He explains that the Aristotelian philosophy of mimesis is not related to 
a process of copying an original, but is associated with a ‘re-creation’. Poetry 
does not imitate nature, but ‘re-creates the creative principle of created 
things’.9   Boal then states that according to Aristotle ‘this is the purpose of art 
and science: to correct the faults of nature by using suggestions of nature 
itself’. Indeed, Aristotle mentions in his Physics that art partly completes what 
nature cannot bring to finish, and partly imitates her. To clarify further the 
notion of mimesis, Boal does not refer to what Aristotle says in the Poetics 
itself, rather turns to the philosophical realm from which Aristotle’s philosophy 
grew. This diversion from the Poetics is the beginning of Boal’s false 
reasoning. He proceeds to form his own definition of what Aristotle meant 
when he defined tragedy. Aristotle’s definition is:  
 
Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious, complete and of a certain 
magnitude; in language embellished with each kind of artistic ornament, the several 
kinds being found in separate parts of the play; in the form of action not of narrative; 
through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these emotions.10 
 
Boal’s definition is ‘Tragedy imitates the actions of man’s rational soul, 
his passions turned into habits, in his search for happiness, which consists in 
virtuous behavior, whose supreme good is justice and whose maximum 
expression is the Constitution.’11   
This definition is derived from an analysis of Aristotelian concepts as 
discussed in the Nicomachaean Ethics. Approximately in the same way that 
Aristotle proceeds with his reasoning in the Ethics, Boal explains what 
Aristotle meant by action (praxis). He differentiates between faculties, 
passions and habits to arrive at the conclusion that the actions worthy of 
imitation are the habitual passions, not the faculties. ‘But to what end is a 
passion exerted, what is the purpose of man?’ asks Boal. ‘Happiness’ he 
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answers, just like Aristotle answered in Ethics. Following Aristotle’s reasoning, 
he eliminates the first degree of happiness as pertaining to the material goods 
that are a common aim and source of happiness for both humans and 
animals. Then, he eliminates the second degree of happiness as a state 
necessitating the approval of others to be realized and he arrives at the 
superior level of happiness: the virtuous exercise of the rational soul. Boal 
then concludes: ‘Since the virtuous exercise of the rational soul is the object 
of a tragedy and since from other passages in the Ethics we see that Aristotle 
believed that the greatest virtue is the political good, tragedy imitates the 
political good which is justice.’12 Basing his rationale on Aristotle’s view that 
we must examine empirically the real, existing inequalities and base our 
criteria for equality on them, he falsely assumes that this leads us to accept as 
just (as in ‘equitable’ or ‘rightful’) the already existing inequalities. Boal 
concludes, ‘For Aristotle, therefore, justice is already contained in reality itself 
as it is. He does not consider the possibility of transforming the already 
existing inequalities, but simply accepts them’.13 The intentional or 
unintentional false step in Boal’s reasoning is that he ‘jumps’ from Aristotle’s 
empirical examination of the real, to Aristotle’s assumed acceptance of the 
real. This is not evident in the Aristotelian argument and Boal’s assertion 
appears to be false.    
Boal’s conclusion contradicts Aristotle’s argument, which Boal himself 
had previously used as a step in his reasoning, namely that the aim of art is to 
correct nature. The subsequent Chapters of Theatre of the Oppressed portray 
Aristotle as believing that the constitution as it is is the maximum expression 
of the supreme good which is justice and therefore happiness consists in 
obeying the law. This is another false step in Boal’s syllogism. Aristotle’s idea 
is that those who do not agree with the law might not be satisfied, but should 
at least remain passive, explains Boal. And then he asks once more: How can 
they remain passive? Boal says that there are many ways of repressing 
rebelliousness: politics, bureaucracy, habits, customs and Greek tragedy. The 
fundamental aspect of the tragedy is its repressive function in the Aristotelian 
system of tragedy. According to Boal’s perspective, the coercive system of 
Aristotle works as follows:  
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First stage: The action begins. The tragic hero exhibits a trait, which even 
though appearing to be an hamartia – a tragic flaw – contributes to his/her 
happiness. Through identification and empathy the spectator’s hamartia is 
stimulated. The character follows the path of the hero until a change in his/her 
fortune comes. The hero and the character start moving from happiness to 
misfortune. 
Second stage: With the risk of distancing the spectator from the character 
after peripeteia occurs, the system employs recognition or anagnorisis. The 
protagonist accepts his/her error, hoping that the spectator will also accept as 
bad his/her own hamartia. The spectator has the great advantage of having 
erred only vicariously: he does not really pay for it. The spectator recognizes 
his/her own error, his/her own hamartia, his/her own anti-constitutional flaw.  
Third stage: Aristotle demands that tragedy should have a catastrophe, a 
terrible, unhappy ending, so the spectator will keep in mind the terrible 
consequences of committing the error, not just vicariously but in actuality. The 
spectator, terrified by the spectacle of the catastrophe, is purified of his/her 
hamartia.   
For Boal, katharsis and the repose it produces, takes away from the 
character and thus from the empathetic spectator the ability to act. To prove 
the inaccuracy of Boal’s argument I intend to a) examine the existing theories 
on the function of katharsis to prove that its function is different from the 
repressive function Boal has attributed to it and, b) analyse Boal’s narrative 
system in order to show that his method has many Aristotelian characteristics. 
I will also argue that if his allegation against the Poetics (katharsis has a 
repressive function) were true, then his proposed narrative method would be 
much more dangerous than the Aristotelian one.  
As mentioned at the beginning of this Chapter, there are five main 
interpretations of the function of katharsis, but two of them have received 
most attention: the purification theory and the purgation theory. Such has 
been the controversy about these two interpretations that they are both 
accepted. The Oxford Concise Dictionary of Literary Terms, defines katharsis 
in a way so as not to exclude any of them:  
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Katharsis: The effect of ‘purgation’ or ‘purification’ achieved by tragic drama, 
according to Aristotle’s argument in the Poetics. Aristotle wrote that a tragedy should 
succeed ‘in arousing pity and fear in such a way as to accomplish a katharsis of such 
emotions).14  
 
The Merriam Webster Dictionary also accepts both theories: a) 
purification or purgation of the emotions (as pity and fear) primarily through art 
and b) a purification or purgation that brings about spiritual renewal or release 
from tension.15 The same can be observed in M. H. Abrams’ Glossary of 
Literary terms where it is written than ‘Precisely how to interpret Aristotle’s 
katharsis – which in Greek language signifies ‘purgation’ in a physiological, 
medical sense or ‘clarification’ or both is much disputed.16  
The view that katharsis functions as a form of moral purification, a 
correction or refinement of the feeling of pity and fear has been held primarily 
by the 18th century German Aesthetician Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. It is a 
view that has been embraced by Butcher and Rostagni and it has revived in a 
purer form by Humphry House.17 According to the purification theory, the 
theatre serves as a vehicle for the purification of our pity and fear since 
through katharsis these feelings are allayed and ennobled. The main 
argument used by the proponents of this theory comes not from the Poetics 
itself, but from the Nicomachean Ethics.   
In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle states that the nature of moral 
virtue is to aim at a mean between excess and deficiency. In Ethics, katharsis 
is the process of training the person to respond with the proper amount of pity 
and fear, under the proper conditions, towards the proper objects. Since both 
pity and fear are analysed in Ethics, Ethics becomes a bridge to Poetics 
where pity and fear are regarded as basic tragic emotions. Building on this 
connection between the Ethics and the Poetics, the purification theory 
proponents argue that katharsis in Poetics must be the same with the one in 
Ethics. 
House in his study Aristotle’s Poetics: A Course of Eight Lectures uses 
the following passage from Aristotle’s Ethics to support the purification theory: 
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If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well by looking to the intermediate and 
judging its works by this standard and if further virtue is more exact and better than 
any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the 
intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and 
actions, and in these there is excess, defect and the intermediate. For instance, both 
fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and 
pain may be felt both too much and too little and, in both cases, not well; but to feel 
them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, 
with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and 
this is characteristic of virtue.18 
 
Based on this extract from the Ethics, House concludes:  
 
 
The result of katharsis is an emotional balance and equilibrium and it may well be 
called a state of emotional health. The worst mistake we can fall into, in considering 
this theory of katharsis, is to think of the emotions of pity and fear in some abstract 
way irrespective of the objects to which they are directed, or by which they are 
aroused. Aristotle’s whole doctrine only makes sense if we realize that the proper 
development and balance of the emotions depend upon the habitual direction of 
them towards worthy objects.19  
 
 
But in discussing music Aristotle clearly contrasts the kind of music that 
is educational with the kind that is cathartic. Therefore, it seems that for 
Aristotle, serious drama may in general improve the quality and direction of 
our pity and fear, but its strictly cathartic effect does not have a moral 
connotation. House is basing his whole theory not on the Poetics, but on 
selected extracts from the Ethics and Politics. It seems that House puts 
emphasis on one aspect of katharsis that is not emphasised by Aristotle 
himself. The moral effects of drama and the educational aspect of a tragedy 
might not be directly related to katharsis, although they are a part of the whole 
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process. House assumes that the calmative effect on the audience is not 
intellectual but emotional, an argument that is used also by Boal to support his 
allegation against the Aristotelian method.    
In discussing the essential pleasure of tragedy, Aristotle does not 
discuss at all any moral conditioning of the audience’s emotions. He says that 
it is the task of the poet to provide pleasure by means of the mimesis of pity 
and fear. On mimetic pleasure Aristotle does say a lot in the Poetics. As Leon 
Golden observes in his essay The Clarification Theory of Katharsis,  
 
Mimesis for Aristotle is an intellectual process involving learning and inference by 
which we move from a perception of particulars to the knowledge of individuals. No 
moral conditions of any kind are set by Aristotle on this learning process that is 
described in the Poetics. We, therefore, must reject the moral interpretation of 
katharsis both because there is no evidence for it in the Poetics itself, and because it 
stands isolated from the central mimetic pleasure attributed by Aristotle to all art 
forms, including of course, tragedy.20 
Equally unfounded seems to be the purgation theory, which views 
katharsis as a metaphor derived from Greek medicine and signifying the 
purgation of pity and fear from the audience. This view is traced back to the 
ancient Greek theory of homeopathic medicine and was revived by 19th 
century theorists, the most influential of them being Jakob Bernays.   
According to the purgation theory there is strong evidence that 
katharsis means purgation, but not in the modern sense that bears the 
meaning of that which can be found in any medical dictionary as ‘the 
evacuation of the bowels with the aid of a purgative or cathartic’. In the older, 
wider English sense, katharsis meant a sort of purgation which included 
partial removal of excess ‘humours’. This theory has its roots in the School of 
Hippocrates where it was believed that the physical and mental health of the 
body depended on a balance or symmetry of these humours. Pity was 
associated with excess of wetness (tears) and fear with excess of cold (chills). 
Gorgias, a Greek pre-socratic philosopher (483-376 BC) had compared words 
with drugs that can remove the body’s humours. The connection of mental 
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states and physical states was thus deemed to be quite strong. This theory 
assumes that the mental states were open to medical treatment as well.  
To support his interpretation, Bernays turns to Aristotle’s Politics where 
music is connected to katharsis as a relief of overcharged feeling. 
 
 
Music is to be studied for the sake of many benefits and not of one only. It is to be 
studied with a view to education, with a view to katharsis – we use this term without 
explanation for now; when we come to speak of poetry, we shall give a clearer 
account of it – and thirdly with a view to the right use of leisure and for relaxation and 
rest after exertion…For every feeling that affects some souls violently affects all souls 
more or less; the difference is only one of degree. Take pity and fear, for example, or 
again enthusiasm. Some people are liable to become possessed by the later 
emotion, but we see that when they have made use of the melodies which feel the 
soul with orgiastic feeling , they are brought back by these sacred melodies to a 
normal condition, as if they had been medically treated and undergone a katharsis. 
Those who are subject to the emotions of pity and fear and the feelings generally will 
necessarily be affected in the same way; and so will other men in exact proportion to 
their susceptibility to such emotions. All experience a certain katharsis and pleasant 
relief. In the same manner, melodies give innocent joy to men.21  
 
Bernays asserts that the purgative function of katharsis of certain types 
of music as described in the Politics, must be same we are to expect from the 
katharsis of tragedy. He assumes that as it is the case with souls 
overpowered by religious ecstasy, so with tragedy an audience overcharged 
with fear and pity undergoes a kind of katharsis, a purgation or – as F. L. 
Lucas suggests – a ‘healthy relief’. 22 
In the Poetics, however, Aristotle does not say anything about a 
restoration of atrophy or excess of pity and fear that should undergo any 
purgation. Bernays assumes that evidence from the Politics can be applied to 
the solution of the problem in Poetics. As Golden Leon observes: 
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Bernays’ unargued assumption that the meaning of katharsis in the Poetics must be 
the same as its meaning in the Politics represents a grave methodological error 
because it fails to take account of the individuality of the works concerned and the 
specific context from which the term appears’.23    
Perhaps the strongest argument against the purgation theory 
supported by Bernays comes, paradoxically, from the Politics. Golden 
observes: 
In Politics Aristotle tells us that he will speak of katharsis generally now but that he 
will tell us more precisely what he means by this term in the Poetics. Now, a few lines 
later, he tells us that some highly emotional people, after they have been exposed to 
violent melodies, react as if they have received ‘medical treatment’ and ‘purgation’. If 
Aristotle’s concept of katharsis were limited to medical purgation, there would be little 
reason for him to advise the reader to await a more precise discussion of the term in 
the Poetics. As Flashar has elaborately documented, katharsis, in the sense of 
medigal purgation would have been an easily and commonly understood term that 
would not require additional explanation.24 
 The inaccurate view that pity and fear should undergo a process of 
purgation may have roots in the past but it is still accepted by contemporary 
screenwriting theorists. Kevin Boon in the article Poetics and the Screenplay: 
Revisiting Aristotle writes that ‘Aristotle’s explanation for the appeal of tragedy 
is that well-crafted tragedy results in a purgation of pity and fear. To put it in 
the popular idiom, by watching dramas that excite pity and fear in us, we 
effectively get them out of our system’.25  
Another argument that weakens both the purification and the purgation 
theories is that pity and fear are not the only tragic emotions, they are only the 
basic two tragic emotions. The first and only passage that Aristotle mentions  
katharsis is the definition of tragedy in Chapter VI (through pity and fear 
effecting the proper purgation of these emotions). The translations of the 
definition found in both the two most popular translators of the text – Butcher  
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and L.J. Potts – fail to convey the crucial importance of the word τοιούτων by 
translating it as these emotions and not as such emotions. By translating 
τοιούτων correctly with the word such one can see that Aristotle did not refer 
only to the emotions of pity and fear, but probably included adjacent emotions. 
The nature of the emotions of pity and fear are mentioned mainly in Chapter 
XIII of the Poetics as ‘the distinctive mark of tragic imitation’ and are therefore 
regarded as conducive towards the distinctive tragic pleasure. This, however, 
does not exclude the existence of other feelings such as grief, weakness, 
contempt, blame. The emotional aspect of the cathartic function is not to be 
limited to only the emotions of pity and fear. Why then the emphasis on pity 
and fear and the use of them nearly always as a pair?  
 An accurate understanding of katharsis’ function is impossible without 
answering first the above question. Pity and fear are directly related to the 
kind of katharsis achieved in a classical narrative film as opposed to the 
Aristotelian narrative film. I will argue that the emotions of pity and fear, in the 
Aristotelian sense, are not enough for katharsis to occur. Katharsis cannot be 
brought about without the spectator’s mental involvement. In Chapter XIII 
Aristotle states: 
  
The change of fortune presented must not be the spectacle of a virtuous man 
brought from prosperity to adversity: for this moves neither pity not fear; it merely 
shocks us. Nor again, that of a bad man passing from adversity to prosperity, for 
nothing can be more alien to the spirit of tragedy: it possesses no single tragic  
quality; it neither satisfies the moral sense nor calls forth pity or fear. Nor again 
should the downfall of the utter villain be exhibited. A plot of this kind would, 
doubtless, satisfy the moral sense but it would inspire neither pity nor fear; for pity is 
aroused by unmerited misfortune, fear by the misfortune of a man like ourselves. 
There remains the character between the two extremes – that  of a man who is not 
eminently good and just, yet whose misfortune is brought about not by vice or 
depravity but by some error or frailty.26  
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Why wouldn’t the passage of a virtuous man from good fortune to 
misfortune produce such feelings to us? Because an eminently good and just 
man, a character possessing no flaws, would not be one ‘like ourselves’ and 
would not produce empathy. His downfall would be due not to a mistake but to 
an accident and the accidental is shocking but not tragic. In the case of the 
hero-villain, the spectator misses the element of unmerited misfortune 
necessary for pity, since he feels that the hero did deserve the calamities that 
fell upon them. Again, the spectator will not identify with the character. The 
downfall of a villain satisfies our sense of justice, but does not produce any 
sort of empathy.  
Pity and fear are very closely allied to one another. Fear, says Aristotle, 
is ‘a kind of pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some destructive or 
painful evil in the future’, but one that ‘when it happens to or threatens others, 
causes us to feel pity’.27 Referring to pity, he explains: 
 
Pity is a sort of pain at an evident evil of a destructive or painful kind in the case of 
somebody who does not deserve it, the evil being one which might expect to happen 
to ourselves or to some of our friends, and this at a time when it is said to be near at 
hand.28 
 
The only way that we might expect the disaster to happen to ourselves 
is that the character is ‘like ourselves’, hence Aristotle’s insistence on a 
character not eminently good, but rather good. It is important to understand 
that Aristotle’s treatment of pity is not as an altruistic emotion. We cannot feel 
pity without being afraid for ourselves. ‘The character’, said Aristotle ‘should 
be lifelike; this is distinct from making the character good and appropriate’. 29 
The relationship of the dramatis personae to the spectator has to be 
balanced. The characters cannot be too removed from the spectator. That 
would jeopardise the emergence of empathy by annihilating the common 
emotional ground between spectator and character. But the tragic hero has to 
be close enough so that the spectator can experience fear.   
Through the tragic plot, tragedy arouses these emotions of fear and 
pity. Fear and pity as ‘species’ of pain are not elements to be extinguished. 
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Therefore, the purgation and purification theories that speak of katharsis’ 
power to purge away or purify the painful elements do not make sense.     
Why would a controlled release of emotions in tragedy prevent their 
being expressed in real life? It seems that not only it does not prevent them, 
but it could also feed them. Freud himself used the term katharsis, until he 
found that the release of emotions is not enough without the analysis of 
repressions. It seems that there is a missing element in the equation of 
katharsis. Pity and fear are not enough for katharsis to occur.   
Celie Johnson in Steven Spielberg’s film The Color Purple (1985), 
however sympathetic, still cannot be considered a character that produces the 
tragic emotions of pity and fear in the Aristotelian and not the contemporary 
sense of these emotions. Celie’s tragic life and her inability to rebel against it 
is not due to her own hamartia (tragic error of judgement), but to the cruel 
living conditions any African American woman was destined to have in the 
early 1900s in the United States of America. The spectator is convinced that 
because of her social background, Celie has no other choice than to endure 
her husband’s abuse. Thus the emotions of pity and fear that the spectator 
experiences in the classical narrative of The Color Purple are not related to 
the Aristotelian fear and pity that the spectator experiences when he is aware 
of the character’s own hamartia. 
Celie is not a rather good active character, but an eminently good, 
passive character who gets undeserved misfortune. More importantly, she is 
not achieving the opposite of her intentions (peripeteia) and the spectator 
cannot experience the tragic irony. The unconvincing ending of her escape 
and a chance to live ‘happily ever after’ is the typical ending of the classic 
narrative structure. The effect on the spectator is some variation of emotional 
relief and thus different from the Aristotelian function of katharsis.  
Even in the case of an Aristotelian character, there are chances that 
katharsis won’t be experienced by the spectator. An example of a counter-
Aristotelian katharsis even if the character is Aristotelian can be found in The 
Pianist (Roman Polanski, 2002). The protagonist, Szpilman is a rather good 
man, but not an eminently good one because he was not active in the 
revolutionary action initiated by Jews in response to the German invasion to 
Poland. Szpilman not idealised. He is depicted as being finer than common 
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people because he is a charismatic pianist, but he is not heroic. He is a sharp-
eyed, remote, solitary man, who – though liked by the people to whom he 
relates – does not seem close to anybody, including his family, although he 
feels loyalty toward them. He is not an activist, but he is not willing to betray 
his beliefs either.       
The plot of The Pianist imitates a serious action (war and its  
consequences) and a complete one (clear beginning, middle and end). The 
plot has unity of action by focusing on one action: the tortures that a Jew had 
to undergo in War World II. There is narrative linearity with clear motivation of 
a series of causes and effects without significant digressions or delays caused 
by irrelevant actions. Verisimilitude is achieved because the scenes and 
sequences are causally connected and the rule of probability and necessity is 
not violated. The film is plot-oriented with the characterization closely 
interwoven. Its high degree of closure resolves all lines of action. It also 
incorporates in the narrative the element of the inevitable and the unexpected. 
According to Aristotle, (chapter IX) the best tragic effects depend on the 
combination of the inevitable (probable and necessary) and the unexpected 
(element of surprise). Szpilman undergoes inevitable tortures but he is also 
unexpectedly rescued by the German officer.  
Even though the spectator experiences pity and fear for Szpilman and 
the plot has some Aristotelian elements, katharsis is not possible in this 
ostensibly Aristotelian film. The Pianist lacks one of the most essential 
Aristotelian plot construction elements, peripeteia.  Peripeteia seems to occur 
when the German officer discovers Szpilman and decides not to kill him but to 
do the exact opposite, to save him. But peripeteia should be the state where 
the protagonist himself is led to misfortune, having achieved – because of his 
hamartia – the opposite of his intentions. Szpilman has not committed an 
hamartia. Szpilman was a victim of a war and he was just trying to survive. 
Without hamartia, peripeteia is impossible. And without peripeteia there 
cannot be anagnorisis, the recognition of hamartia. Therefore, katharsis is not 
possible.   
In Run Lola Run (Tom Tykwer, 1998), the protagonist, Lola, is a 
character that produces the emotions of pity and fear. However, katharsis in 
the Aristotelian sense of it cannot be brought about in Run Lola Run.   
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Lola is trying to save her loved one, Manni, from being murdered by a 
drug dealer. In the whole 76 minutes of the film the spectator sees a woman 
running endlessly, robbing a bank, climbing onto ambulances, recovering from 
a car accident, robbing a supermarket, gambling – doing everything humanly 
possible to save the man she loves. Also, Lola is adopted, her mother is an 
alcoholic and her father does not love her. All she has is Manni and the 
spectator has no choice but to experience the emotions of pity and fear for 
her.    
Lola is not an eminently good character, because she does not hesitate 
to break the law in order to save Manni. At the same time, Lola appears to be 
better than a common woman. She is brave, she is courageous, she just does 
not give up. But Lola has not committed an hamartia. The spectator thus 
experiences the climax of emotions that characterizes a classical narrative 
structure. But to arrive at a climax of pity and fear is not the same as to 
experience an Aristotelian katharsis.    
In the above examples, the spectator feels pity and fear for the 
protagonist. But this is not enough for katharsis to occur. 
The dead end and the confusion associated with the interpretation of 
katharsis has to do with overemphasizing emotion (pity, fear and adjacent 
emotions) and failing to put the intellect into our equation.   
I have argued that both the two major approaches to the interpretation 
of katharsis (purification and purgation theories) are dependent on evidence 
outside the Poetics. And, as it has been demonstrated, any cross-reference or 
other external evidence supporting the one or the other theory should follow 
somehow the interpretation derived from the Poetics itself and should not 
precede it. Boal’s interpretation is derived from his allusion to the Politics and 
Ethics and the same allusion is used by those who believe that katharsis is 
purification and/or purgation of the spectators’ emotions.    
Both interpretations take for granted that the katharsis formula, 
whatever it actually means, has necessarily to do with the emotional reaction 
of the spectator. H. Otte and Else offer us a structural interpretation of 
katharsis and they differ from other scholars in that they base their arguments 
on evidence from the Poetics without needing any external justifications. For 
Otte the purification related to katharsis does not have to do with the emotions 
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of the audience, but with purifying the events of the plot. With Otte’s 
observation katharsis is at last seen as a vital element of plot construction and 
not simply as the aim of the tragic experience.    
Else, in Aristotle’s Poetics: The Argument takes Otte’s theory a step 
further and attributes katharsis to an element within the play itself. Katharsis 
signifies the purgation of the guilt attached to the hero’s tragic act, through the 
demonstration by the course of the drama that the hero performed his/her 
hamartia without knowledge of its nature. His theory examines a katharsis as 
attained from the plot of the tragedy.  
The theories I have analysed so far have some common 
characteristics: the two tragic emotions, pity and fear, are taken to denote the 
spectator’s emotions. It is the spectator who experiences pity and fear and 
thereafter is purged or purified.   
There are two points to be made here. The first pertains to the 
alternative translations offered for the concepts of έλεος (pity) and φόβος 
(fear) as they are structured in the definition of the tragedy. Some interpreters 
have translated έλεος and φόβος as ‘pathetic and fearful incidents’. (δι’ 
ελεεινών or οικτρών και  φοβερών παθημάτων). Indeed, it is not unreasonable 
to be uneasy with the first interpretation as it poses the following question: 
How it is possible to assume that fear and pity can be purged of themselves? 
This does not agree with Aristotle’s theory. Else points out,  
 
The reason why the notion of pity and fear being purged by pity and fear has 
persisted is that no other agency has been visible in the sentence, through which the 
katharsis could be brought about. It is natural to refer παθηματων (incidents) to ελέου 
και φόβου (pity and fear) since the latter stand so near.30 
 
Else re-interprets pity and fear as pitiful and fearful incidents, as a 
praxis painful (παθος δε εστι πραξις φθαρτική ή οδυνηρά) and not as 
emotions. Pathos as it is explained in Aristotle’s definition of tragedy does 
have an emotional quality but it is not an emotion itself. In Chapter XI Aristotle 
makes clear that pathos or the scene of suffering is ‘a destructive or painful 
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action, such as death on the stage, bodily agony, wounds and the like’. 
Pathos is a praxis (action) not an emotion.   
Strong evidence for Else’s interpretation is to be found in the Poetics 
itself where Aristotle clarifies exactly what he means by τοιούτων παθημάτων 
(such incidents). In Chapter XIV, Aristotle states:   
 
Let us then determine what are the circumstances, which strike us as terrible or 
pitiful. Actions capable of this effect must happen between persons who are either 
friends or enemies or indifferent to one another. If an enemy kills an enemy, there is 
nothing to excite pity either in the act or the intention (proairesis) - except so far as 
the suffering is in itself pitiful. So again with indifferent persons. But when the tragic 
incident occurs between those who are near or dear to one another-if, for example, a 
brother kills, or intends to kill, a brother, a son his father, a mother her son, a son his 
mother, or any other deed of the kind is done-these are the situations to be looked for 
by the poet.31  
 
It is clear now what Aristotle meant by such incidents.  Pathos is an 
important part of the play, but the kind of incidents that are capable of 
producing the pathos that stimulates pity and the fear are specific and they 
involve murders intentional or not among blood relations. The presupposition 
of παθημάτων to stand for pity and fear and not pitiful and fearful incidents 
does not seem as plausible as before.   
Most theorists agree that katharsis has to do with a change of feeling 
that tragedy causes in the spectator. But, as Else observes, the meaning of 
περαινουσα, (through pity and fear effecting the proper purgation of these 
emotions- δι’ελέου και φόβου περαίνουσα την των τοιούτων παθημάτων 
κάθαρσιν) has not received much attention. The word carries the meaning of 
something that takes a while to be completed, or something that is 
progressively completed (περαίνω means bring to completion). As mentioned 
earlier, most of the Poetics interpreters come to the conclusion that katharsis 
as the emotional change occurring in tragedy, is achieved by means of pity 
and fear. However, it should be noted that the preposition δια (δι’ελέου και 
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φόβου περαίνουσα – through pity and fear) when it is accompanied by the 
genitive can mean: a) the place where one exits from and b) duration. The 
meaning of causality (because of pity and fear effecting) has been attributed 
to the word in contemporary Greek, but does not have the same meaning in 
ancient Greek. In ancient Greek the meaning of the preposition δια is through 
or in the course of the feelings of fear and pity as experienced throughout the 
tragedy through the structure of the plot events.32 
If the word παθημάτων means incidents or actions rather than 
emotions, then katharsis must be related to some sort of purification, not 
purgation. The incidents or events cannot be purged from the play. The 
purification, however, will not be of the kind already analysed. It will not be the 
moral refinement of the feeling of pity and fear, but it will refer to the 
purification of the tragic act of the hero by the demonstration that its motive 
was not polluted (μιαρόν). Oedipus’s tragic act of killing his father and 
marrying his mother is ‘purified’ when the spectator realises through the plot 
that his intentions were pure and he in fact committed these tragic acts while 
trying to protect his family.  
I have argued so far that katharsis is neither a purgation, nor a 
purification of the emotions of pity and fear. Katharsis is related to the 
clarification/purification of the protagonist’s tragic act by showing that his/her 
intention was not ‘polluted’. This conclusion is the first step in disengaging the 
Aristotelian katharsis from the repressive nature Boal has attributed to it, 
because it shows that katharsis is not a means to intimidate the spectator by 
means of the emotions of fear and pity. To complete my argument that 
katharsis is a more intellectual process than Boal presents it, I need to take a 
closer look at the dyad hamartia/anagnorisis (tragic mistake/recognition).  
According to Aristotle, the best tragedy is the one that employs a 
complex plot, that is, one that the action changes with peripeteia, anagnorisis, 
and not simply with reversal of fortune. The complex plot is founded on an 
hamartia, a tragic mistake of the intellect. This hamartia has to do with a crime 
towards a family member and not with unconstitutional behaviour as Boal 
asserts. Hamartia is the cornerstone of the complex plot. But the dramatic 
potential inherent in the hamartia is not carried forward without anagnorisis.   
 75 
Pathos then, becomes tragic when it involves close relatives, when it is 
based on an hamartia (pathos would actually not be performed without the 
existence of hamartia) which will be discovered by means of anagnorisis later 
in the tragic plot. Anagnorisis is essential for the purification of the 
protagonist’s tragic acts.  
Hamartia, Aristotle writes, must occur between those who are near or 
dear to one another; hamartia must involve family. I intend to briefly discuss 
the reasons for this preoccupation, if not obsession of ancient Greeks (even in 
the 4th century) with the concept of pollution derived from spilling kindred 
blood and with the means of purification of that act. By this discussion I will 
show that the spectator/citizen in ancient Greece was given more power than 
Boal assumes.   
In Laws, Plato adopts the recognized Attic division into murders 
εκούσιοι (voluntary), ακούσιοι (involuntary), δίκαιοι (just). I will focus on the 
wilful-voluntary murders and specifically on the most heinous of all, the wilful 
murder of a close blood-kin (εν ταις φιλίαιας). It is interesting to note that the 
deliberate killing of any blood-relative is so fearful that even Plato hesitates to 
legislate about it. Plato says that ‘there is no other possible purification of the 
common blood that has been defiled, and the pollution cannot be washed out 
until the guilty soul has paid for murder with murder, like with like, and so 
appeased and stilled the wrath of the whole clan.’33 
The offender is to be killed and his/her body thrown naked outside the 
city at a crossroads, his/her head stoned and then finally thrown outside the 
city’s borders, unburied. More specifically, the crime of parricide and matricide 
constitute especially monstrous crimes that cannot even be put in the realm of 
crimes committed in anger. So, whereas the killing of a brother by a brother in 
anger, in war or any circumstances that involve self-defence is treated as a 
regular homicide, parricide and matricide find no excuse.34 
The mere pronouncement that a homicide has been δικαιος (just) or 
accidental, was enough to assure the agent as καθαρός (clean): there was no 
further requirement for religious purification. It is important to note that the 
people were given considerable power. If the doer was forgiven by his/her 
victim he would be regarded as καθαρός and he would be at once exempt 
from the necessity to be purified. In parricide or matricide if the victim (mother 
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or father) ‘before he dies, of his/her own free will releases the doer from the 
murder the latter is clean after undergoing the purification procedures required 
for those committing an involuntary crime’.35 The individual could act of his 
own accord in the capacity of the court of law. The dying person, not only 
could forgive his son/daughter but had the power to nullify the blood-pollution.  
Boal fails to observe that the judges in tragedy are the Athenian 
citizens, people that have been given the power to judge, but will not pass 
legal judgement without thinking that even men like themselves can commit 
an hamartia and be involved in the most monstrous of crimes. The 
philanthropon (humane) is an essential element of tragedy. Are these 
spectators using their reason for this judgement, or are they, as Boal asserts, 
victims of their emotions manipulated and forced to repress their anti-
constitutional behaviour?   
How is it possible that the modern spectator can feel pity for a criminal 
and drug dealer (Scarface, Brian De Palma, 1983), despise the police when it 
riddles the bodies of two ‘evil’ bank robbers with bullets (Bonnie and Clyde, 
Arthur Penn, 1967), come to admire a  secret service agent working as a 
‘stool pigeon’ (The Lives of Others, Florian Henckel von Donnersmarck, 
2006), anticipate the moment a woman kills the father of her child (Kill Bill 
Vols. 1 and 2, Quentin Tanantino, 2003/2004) or feel pity when a ruthless 
mafia chief finally dies (Godfather: Part III, Francis Ford Coppola, 1990)? It is 
possible because the spectator has decided that the above protagonists are 
worthy of his/her empathy and not because he was ‘tricked’ into pitying them.   
Empathy for Boal is a ‘terrible weapon’, an insidious mechanism that 
consists of two people – the spectator and the character – and makes one of 
those two people (the spectator) surrender to the other (the character) his/her 
power to make decisions. But this is totally opposed to the power that the 
spectator is given in Greek tragedy. There is strong evidence to support the 
idea that the tragic emotions involve an element of judgement, contrary to 
Boal’s beliefs. Boal’s view of the Aristotelian dramatic method is reminiscent 
of Plato’s view of poetry and especially the theatre that it excited and fed the 
emotions, that is the ‘irrational part’ of the soul.  
Aristotle believed that man qua man must have in him/her the power to 
reason, to govern and the power to act. And what reason governs is not itself, 
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but desire and the feeling (αρχη δ’ ο λογισμός ου λογισμού αλλ’ ορέξεως και 
παθημάτων). There are two kinds of virtue in man, the intellectual and the 
moral, the former belonging to the rational part of the soul per se, the latter to 
the part which is irrational but by its nature is obedient to the part possessing 
reason.36 So, the soul of man is made up partly by reason and partly by 
something which, even though is irrational, it is amenable to reason. The 
feelings thus are potentially rational, capable of being subjected to reason, 
capable of ‘listening’ to reason. And so, contrary to Plato and contrary to 
Boal’s claim, the life of feeling is brought into direct contact with reason. Else 
accurately writes that ‘from now on, we can be talking about rational aspects 
of feeling or emotional employments of reason (practical and moral reason) 
depending on the point of view’.37  
It is possible to feel pity and fear and empathise with characters who 
have committed hideous crimes, such as Sophocle’s Oedipus, Euripides’ 
Medea or Shakespeare’s Richard because there is something deeper than 
feelings, there is some sort of mental process, a judgement involved to allow 
for empathy and katharsis to occur.   
 Aristotle’s definitions of pity and fear show that fear is a state of mental 
pain or discomfort caused by the imagination of an impending danger which 
will be destructive or painful. Not all evils are to be feared. The fear has to 
appear close at hand and entail major pain or damage. These are 
prerequisites to our being afraid. It is clear that a judgement is involved.  
With pity, the spectator understands that there is a threat of pain or 
destruction to somebody who does not deserve it, someone ‘like ourselves’. 
Here, there are two judgements prerequisite to this kind of pity: a) that the 
hero is ‘like ourselves’ and b) that the hero does not deserve this misfortune. 
These judgements are not after effects of the spectator’s feelings, they are the 
prerequisites of it. As Else observes, the conditions which must be satisfied 
before the spectator’s psyche (the rational element in his/her soul) will allow 
the emotions to be felt’. 38  
In Godfather: Part III (Francis Ford Coppola, 1990) we see an aging 
Michael Corleone who has recognized the mistakes of the past (anagnorisis 
of hamartia) and is trying to remove himself from the violent underworld. But, 
unlike the classical narrative structure, the Aristotelian structure of Godfather 
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III does not allow for an unrealistic happy ending. Michael’s anagnorisis of his 
hamartia is followed by his pathos (death). The spectator has made the 
decision that Michael has repented and thus he is able (the spectator) to 
empathise with him. The same mental process occurs in Kill Bill Vol I (Quentin 
Tanantino, 2003). In the beginning of the film we are introduced to ‘The Bride’ 
who kills Vernita Green while her daughter is in the house. The motives 
behind this hideous act and the ones to follow are progressively revealed in 
the five Chapters of the screenplay and primarily in Chapter 2 where we see 
‘The Bride’ in the hospital. Scene by scene, the spectator makes the decision 
to take ‘The Bride’s’ side and to anticipate the moment that she will finally take 
her revenge.    
The spectator makes the decision that the hero’s hamartia was not 
intentional and only after making this decision can the spectator experience 
katharsis. As demonstrated in the previous Chapter and in the present 
analysis of katharsis, Aristotle does not suggest in any way that mimesis is 
related to purification or purgation. On the contrary, Aristotle does explicitly 
define mimesis as an intellectually pleasant learning experience. Therefore, 
only katharsis, in the sense of an ‘intellectual clarification’, could provide an 
explanation that is in harmony with the meaning of mimesis and with the 
general argument of the Poetics. Also, this is the only approach that seems to 
agree with Aristotle’s insistence on keeping the rule of probability and 
necessity. Any false step in the plot’s logical coherence hinders verisimilitude, 
stops the proper mimetic process and thus the proper cathartic experience.    
I have argued that the most plausible explanation of katharsis is Else’s 
idea of intellectual clarification. Taking Else’s theory to be true, then Boal’s 
argument is seen in a different light. Tragedy’s audience cannot be passive. A 
passive audience would not have been able to experience katharsis, since 
empathy presupposes a mental involvement. How could Boal’s alleged 
repression work without katharsis? It couldn’t.     
I now wish to develop this into a discussion of Boal’s own experiments 
and arrive at a set of conclusions regarding the narrative structure of his 
method.  
Boal was a part of a national literacy campaign (Operation 
Alfabetizacion Integral [ALFIN]) initiated and organized by the revolutionary 
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government of Peru in 1973. The ALFIN project had the aim of teaching 
literacy in all possible discourses and especially the artistic ones, such as the 
theatre, photography, puppetry, films and journalism. Boal, as an active 
member of the attempt to utilise theatre as a language, tried to show in 
practical ways how the theatre can be placed at the service of the oppressed 
so they can learn to express themselves, to discover new concepts, but 
primarily to rehearse for action.  
Boal juxtaposes his system to Aristotle’s idealist poetics and to Brecht’s 
Marxist poetics. According to Boal, Aristotle proposes a poetics in which the 
spectator delegates power to the dramatic character so that the latter may act 
and think for him/her. Brecht, on the other hand, proposes a poetics in which 
the spectator delegates power to the character who acts in his/her place but 
the spectator reserves the right to think for him/herself, often in opposition to 
the character. In the first case, Boal asserts, a katharsis occurs. In the 
second, an awakening of the critical consciousness occurs. But Boal’s 
poetics, the poetics of the oppressed, focuses on the action itself: the 
spectator delegates no power to the character either to act or to think in 
his/her place. On the contrary, the spectator assumes the leading role, 
changes the dramatic action, tries out solutions and discusses plans for 
change. This way, the spectator trains him/herself for action. In this case, 
according to Boal, ‘perhaps the theatre is not revolutionary in itself, but it is 
surely a rehearsal for revolution. The liberated spectator as a whole person 
launches into action. No matter that the motion is fictional; what matters is that 
it is action! The theatre is a weapon and it is the people who should yield it’.39 
Boal’s Theatre as Language is divided in three parts: simultaneous 
dramaturgy, image theatre and forum theatre. Each of these represents a 
different degree of direct participation of the spectator in the performance. The 
spectator is encouraged to intervene in the action, abandoning his/her place 
as an ‘object’ and assuming fully the role of subject.   
Whereas simultaneous dramaturgy is an invitation made to the 
spectator to intervene without necessitating his/her physical presence on 
stage, in the forum theatre the participant has to intervene decisively in the 
dramatic action and change it. The procedure is as follows: First, the 
participants are asked to tell a story containing a political or social problem 
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that has a difficult solution. Then a ten to fifteen minute skit portraying that 
problem and the solution intended for discussion is improvised or rehearsed 
and subsequently presented. When the skit is over, the participants are asked 
if they agree with what was presented. At least some will say no. At this point, 
it is explained that the scene will be performed once more, exactly as it was 
initially. But now, any participant in the audience has the right to replace any 
actor and lead the action in the direction that seems to him/her more 
appropriate. The displaced actor stands aside, but remains ready to take part 
again at the moment that the participant feels that his/her own intervention 
has finished. The other actors have to face the newly created situation, 
responding instantly to all the possibilities that it might present.  
The participants who choose to intervene must continue the physical 
actions of the replaced actors; they are not allowed to come on the stage and 
just talk. They must carry out the same type of work or activities performed by 
the actors who were in their place. The spectator becomes the actor.  
Boal gives us an example of the forum theatre play: 
 
An eighteen-year-old man worked in the city of Chimbote, one the world’s most 
important fishing ports. Her boss was a ruthless exploiter forcing his employees to 
work from 8 in the morning to 8 at night, or vice versa; twelve consecutive hours of 
work. Thus, the story problem was how to combat this exploitation. 
 Each participant had a proposal. One of the proposals, for example, was the 
initiation of the “operation Turtle”, which consists in working very slowly, especially 
when the boss is not looking. One young man had a brilliant idea: to work faster and 
build the machines with so much fish that it would break with the excessive weight, 
requiring 2 or 3 hours to fix it. During this time, the workers could rest. When this was 
rehearsed, the outcome was that the boss would arrange to fix the machine and even 
though the workers would get some rest, the problem was not permanently but only 
temporarily fixed.  
There were other proposals as well: to start a strike, throw a bomb at the 
machine, start a union etc. Then the technique of Forum Theater took place. The 
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scene would be staged exactly as it had been the first time, but now each spectator-
participant would have the right to intervene and act out his proposal. After much 
disagreement and trying out proposals, the third attempt which has found all in 
agreement was the forming of a small union for the purpose of negotiating the 
workers’ demands, politicizing the unemployed and the employed citizens.40 
 
In the forum theatre, Boal concludes, no idea is imposed: the audience 
has the opportunity to try out all its ideas, to rehearse all possibilities and to 
verify them in theatrical practice. Boal notes that:  
 
The truth of the matter is that the spectator-actor practices a real act even though he 
does it in a fictional manner. While he rehearses throwing the bomb on stage, he is 
concretely rehearsing the way a bomb is thrown. Acting out his attempt to organize a 
strike, he is concretely organizing a strike. Within limits, the experience is a concrete 
one. Here the cathartic effect is entirely avoided. We are used to plays in which the 
characters make the revolution on stage and the spectators in their seats feel 
themselves to be triumphant revolutionaries. Why make a revolution in reality if we 
have already made it in the theatre? But that does not happen here: the rehearsal 
stimulates the practice of the act in reality. Forum Theatre instead of taking 
something away from the spectator, evokes in him a desire to practice in reality the 
act he has rehearsed in the theatre. The practice of these theatrical forms creates a 
sort of uneasy sense of incompleteness that seeks fulfillment in real action.41 
 
I would like now to examine the narrative structure of Boal’s example of 
a Forum Theatre story. Abbreviating the solutions presented would result in 
the following:  
 
The worker in the fish factory cannot physically endure the working hours 
forced by his boss (empathy-identification, complication, crisis). 
He tries various ways of dealing with the problem (unravelling):   
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1) He contrives a way to stop the machine and rest for a while (false 
resolution). 
2) He thinks of throwing a bomb (false resolution). 
3) He decides to go on a strike but he is immediately replaced, since 
there is so much unemployment (false resolution). 
4) He finally decides to form a small union and gradually fight politically 
and actively for his rights (climax, resolution/positive ending).  
 
The narrative structure of the story has many Aristotelian elements and it 
concurrently follows the classical narrative structure crisis-climax-resolution. 
The narrative dynamics of the selected story depend to great extent on the 
Aristotelian element of empathy. The audience recognizes this character and 
identifies with him/her. The worker is not an idealised character, he is one ‘like 
ourselves’, one that we can identify with and develop interest for. In the 
proposed ending, the character becomes extraordinary by selecting the long-
term and more correct solution, something reminiscent of the typical happy 
ending of the classic narrative structure. Boal’s system is an amalgam of 
Aristotelian and classical narrative structures as it is used – more or less – in 
mainstream cinema today.  
To achieve and ensure the effect of identification, Boal uses 
stereotypical characters, such as the underpaid worker in the factory. Boal 
does not touch the specific issue in Theatre of the Oppressed.  However, in 
an interview at the University of Nebraska in March 1996 when he was asked  
about stereotypes by Douglas L. Paterson and Mark Weinberg he said that  
the use of stereotypes is almost inevitable.42 
 Augusto Boal does not seem to have a problem with the Aristotelian 
narrative structure or with the classical narrative structure, as long as this 
structure is composed and performed by the spectator. That seems to be the 
core of his polemic against the Aristotelian method: he accuses the 
Aristotelian method instead of accusing the ways in which the method is 
actually used.    
Boal assumes that the cathartic effect is avoided entirely by his system. 
He asserts that we are used to Aristotelian plays in which the protagonist 
makes the revolution for us on stage and we – the spectators – feel like 
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triumphant revolutionaries without ‘moving a finger’. We do nothave to 
because the character revolts on our behalf. The Aristotelian system and 
specifically katharsis, Boal writes, prevents us from taking action in real life.   
But as I have demonstrated in this Chapter, katharsis necessitates the 
intellectual involvement of the spectator. This means that the spectator cannot 
be passive. On the contrary, he is actively thinking and he decides that, 
despite the character’s mistake (hamartia), he can experience empathy (for 
the character) and katharsis. Without the involvement of the spectator’s 
intellect, the mimetic purpose is hindered and the cathartic process is not 
realized.  
I will take Boal’s assertion (katharsis is dangerous because it prevents 
the spectator from taking action in real life) to be true to prove that, if it where 
true, Boal’s system is more dangerous to the spectator than the Aristotelian 
system.  
If it is true that the spectator identifies with the character and is sort of 
‘tricked’ by him/her to act on his/her behalf, and if this is such a strong 
influence on the spectator so as to repress any need for him/her to act in real 
life, then the actual acting out of the revolutionary impulses by the spectator 
on stage might relieve the spectator more and produce a deeper and more 
intense katharsis. This katharsis will make the spectator feel that he has 
achieved something greater than just viewing. Pretending to be a hero who 
takes action instead of just viewing a hero would, in turn, mitigate and reduce 
the spectator’s inner desire to revolt in real life.  
Boal contradicts his own system when he asks ‘Why make a revolution 
in reality if we have already made it in the theatre?’. He answers: ‘But that 
does not happen here: the rehearsal stimulates the practice of the act in  
reality ’. Boal argues that the cathartic effect is avoided by his poetics, but he 
does not offer solid arguments to support this statement besides his sincere 
belief that ‘this does not happen here’. But this is a statement, not an 
argument.  
With Boal’s system, the worker-spectator might feel katharsis (in Boal’s 
use of the term) after forming the small union on stage. The spectator is 
taking part in the ‘realization’ (on stage) of a solution in his life, a solution he 
materialized only on stage, but in fact has experienced as ‘real’. The 
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spectator’s anti-constitutional behavior is mitigated without having to 
jeopardize anything in real life.  
Boal contends that the practice of his poetics creates an uneasy sense 
of incompleteness that seeks fulfillment in real action. But it makes more 
sense that this uneasy sense of incompleteness might be actually reduced by 
acting it out on stage. One could even assume that this uneasy sense of the 
unfulfilled action is stronger when the spectator does not get the chance to act 
it out and leaves the theatre not contended.   
I have argued that Boal’s basic argument against katharsis and the 
Aristotelian poetic method is false. I have also shown that if we take it to be 
true, then his own system becomes more dangerous than the Aristotelian. I 
have demonstrated that amongst the various interpretations of katharsis, the 
most plausible is katharsis as a process of emotional relief that would not 
have come about without a preceding intellectual clarification of the 
protagonist’s hamartia. 
I wish now to turn this discussion to the examination of katharsis as it is 
interpreted by contemporary screenwriting books. There are various textbooks 
applying the Aristotelian katharsis in the narrative structure of the screenplay 
that offer a simplistic explanation of katharsis as related only to pity and fear 
and not to the protagonist’s hamartia.   
In Aristotle in Hollywood, Ari Hiltunen, states that: 
 
 
Aristotle might well have adapted the medical term catharsis to relate to the way the 
audience experiences the intense anxiety of impending fear which creates the same 
physiological response - the pulse and breathing become rapid and the pupils dilate -
as when we are aware of a real threat directed towards us…We could say that if 
witnessing moral injustice produces pity and fear, witnessing the re-establishment of 
moral justice produces pleasure. The more intense the injustice, the greater the 
pleasure when moral justice occurs at the end of the drama. Catharsis is therefore, 
an emotionally pleasurable experience that is also morally satisfying. 43 
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Michael Tierno in Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters, explains 
katharsis as follows:  
 
 
In the final moments of a movie, the audience experiences the moment that allows 
them to purge themselves of pity and fear built up through the plot structure. Through 
this ‘catharsis’, the audience releases not just the emotions the movie has stirred up 
in them, but they also dump other psychic garbage they’ve been carrying around.44 
 
Such descriptions are confusing and inaccurate since they present 
katharsis as a mystical state occurring unexpectedly at the end of the film. As 
I have shown in this chapter, katharsis is not related to a moral justice 
(Hiltunen’s interpretation) and it is not related to purging pity and fear of 
themselves (Tierno’s interpretation).   
Much of the confusion around katharsis is also related to the fact that 
at some cases the climax and/or pathos are confused with katharsis. In The 
Writer’s Journey: Mythic Structure for Storytellers and Screenwriters, 
Christopher Vogler writes, 
 
Catharsis works best through physical expression of emotions such as laughter and 
crying. Sentimental stories can bring an audience to a catharsis of tears by pushing 
their emotion to a climax. The death of a beloved character like the doomed young 
woman in Love Story, may be the climatic moment. Such characters are inevitably 
“resurrected” in the hearts and memories of those who loved them.45  
 
But Vogler just borrows the Aristotelian term katharsis. He does not 
claim that he describes katharsis as discussed in the Poetics.   
Katharsis is a process that necessitates all the Aristotelian 
preconditions of the complex tragedy. Since katharsis is an intellectual 
clarification that leads to an emotional relief the screenwriter should pay 
attention to the construction of the plot, so as to not jeopardize the rule of 
probability and necessity. The screenwriter should make clear that the 
protagonist’s hamartia is not an intentional mistake, but an unintentional tragic 
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deed that produced the exact opposite of the intended result (peripeteia). The 
structure of the plot cannot include peripeteia without anagnorisis, since an 
essential part of katharsis is the recognition of the mistake. Emotional relief 
will then occur, and it will not occur with a great and witty twist at the end of 
the screenplay as Tierno implies. It will occur as the natural continuation of 
the preceding elements of the plot’s structure. In short, only by following all 
the Aristotelian narrative structure steps can one assume that a film is 
cathartic. In this sense, many films influenced by the Aristotelian method 
cannot be considered purely Aristotelian unless they follow all the rules of the 
complex plot as they are analysed in the Poetics.    
  It is highly unlikely that the Aristotelian system, or any other system for 
that matter, would make an audience revolt, as Boal wishes to believe, but it 
can be used towards that aim as other systems or methods can.   
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PLOT 
 
 
 
My aim in this Chapter is to discuss the Aristotelian unity of plot in relation to 
its functional effects as they have been analysed in the katharsis Chapter of 
this study. This analysis aims at an accurate way of applying the Aristotelian 
rules of plot construction (hamartia, peripeteia and anagnorisis) and unity of 
plot to screenwriting. Before discussing the issue of unity of plot, I will 
investigate two widely spread misinterpretations of the Poetics, a) the 
Aristotelian rule for the beginning, middle and end of a narrative and, b) the 
so-called rule of the three unities. Finally, I will argue that the polemic the 
Poetics has received on the grounds that Aristotle favoured plot over 
character is unfounded and false.  
Aristotle dedicates the biggest part of the Poetics to discuss the 
complexities of plot structure and divides his discussion into four different 
sections: 
  
a) the structure and the unity of the plot 
b) the kinds and classifications of the plot 
c) the basic plot elements (peripeteia, anagnorisis) 
d) the plot as a functional organization that achieves tragedy’s proper 
pleasure: the katharsis of pitiful and fearful incidents caused by the 
protagonist’s hamartia. 
 
In Chapter VII, Aristotle clearly states that he is going to discuss the plot’s 
structure, since plot πρώτον και μέγιστον της τραγωδίας εστίν (is the first and 
chief consideration in tragedy 1). Aristotle starts his analysis of the plot by 
repeating a phrase from the definition of tragedy. According to S. H. Butcher’s 
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translation this phrase is: ’Tragedy is an imitation of an action that is 
complete, and whole, and of a certain magnitude; for there may be a whole 
that is wanting in magnitude. A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle 
and an end.2  
The sentence ‘A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end’ 
while appearing initially a simplistic view of a given, almost self-evident 
explanation, implies more. The analysis of what a proper beginning, middle 
and end are is of crucial importance for screenwriting since it is usually one of 
the principal means of determining whether a film is based on a classical, 
Aristotelian or counter-Aristotelian narrative structure. When the spectator 
sees Mark Renton and Spud pursued by two store detectives and hears 
Mark’s voice-over ‘Choose life. Choose a job. Choose a career. Choose a 
family’, he knows that this is not the opening scene of a classic narrative film. 
Trainspotting (Danny Boyle, 1996) opens in medias res, yet there could not 
have been a more appropriate opening scene for the one action of this non-
conventional film. By contrast, in the classical narrative of Life is Beautiful  
the spectator is gradually involved in the line of action. In the beginning of the 
film there is the following voice-over: ‘This is a simple story but not an easy 
one to tell. Like a fable, there is sorrow, and like a fable, it is full of wonder 
and happiness’.   
The voice-over is followed by a title card (Arezzo, Italy, 1919) that 
informs the spectator as to when and where the story will take place. It 
remains to see what a proper beginning, middle and end are for the 
Aristotelian screenplay.   
The beginning is that which does not itself follow anything by causal 
necessity, Aristotle writes, but after which something naturally is or comes to 
be. The middle is that which follows something and which some other thing 
follows. The end, contrary to the beginning, is that which itself naturally 
follows something, either by necessity or as a rule, but has nothing following 
it. Aristotle concludes his reasoning by clarifying that ‘A well-constructed plot, 
therefore, cannot either begin or end at any point one likes’.3 
It follows that in an Aristotelian narrative, the selection of the proper 
beginning is not to be organized haphazardly (οπόθεν έτυχεν). It is of course 
reasonable to assume that some incidents did precede the beginning of a 
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tragedy. These preceding incidents, however, will not be necessary elements 
of the plot and of the one action selected by the screenwriter. By necessary I 
mean that their absence from the plot will not impair or weaken its logical 
continuity. Euripides’s Medea begins with Medea already aware of Jason’s 
betrayal. The play opens with Medea grieving for her loss and with her elderly 
nurse fearing and foreshadowing what she might do to herself and her 
children. Sophocles’s Oedipus Rex does not open with Oedipus killing his 
father or when Oedipus solves the Sphinx’s Riddle. In fact, much of the myth 
of Oedipus Rex takes place before the opening scene of the play. The play 
opens in medias res with the Theban chorus crying out to Oedipus for 
salvation from the plague that the gods have sent in response to Laius’ death. 
This is the proper beginning for the one action of the tragedy Oedipus Rex 
that Sophocles selected from the entire myth of Oedipus. Robert McKee 
rightly observes that ‘because lifelong Spines are rare, we take Aristotle’s 
advice to begin in medias res, ‘in the midst of things’. After locating the date of 
the climatic event of the protagonists’ life, we begin as close in time to it as 
possible’.4  
The Aristotelian screenplay, then, can start at any moment that can be 
the proper beginning for the specific unitary and cohesive action (one action) 
selected by the screenwriter, provided that this beginning does not hinder the 
spectator from understanding the plot. In Irreversible (Gaspar Noe, 2002) the 
opening scene starts with what we later learn is the concluding episode of the 
screenplay. In Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) events unfold in two 
separate alternate narratives and thus there are two beginnings – one in 
colour and the other in black and white. Both films, and especially Irreversible, 
have a counter-Aristotelian beginning.   
The end, Aristotle writes, has to be inevitable or probable. It follows 
that there should not be any room left for doubt about how probable and thus 
how believable an end is. Contrary to the often imperative happy ending of the 
classic narrative structure, the Aristotelian ending is based strictly on 
plausibility.   
The causal relationship of the units of the action should be strong 
enough so as to suspend the spectators’ disbelief till the last minute. This 
does not necessarily mean that the spectator has to be aware of what 
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happens to the protagonist after the end of the film. In the case of Oedipus 
Rex, the spectator knows at the end that Oedipus is a different man from what 
he was in the beginning of the tragedy. And this is all the spectator needs to 
know. The Aristotelian ending therefore is not like the classical narrative 
ending that demands all threads of action to be resolved at the end and the 
hero’s future destiny to be known. Neither is it the open haphazard ending 
that characterises counter-cinema, but one that clearly shows that the 
protagonist has realised his/her hamartia and will lead his/her life in a different 
manner. Exactly how and where the protagonist will be is of little importance 
for the Aristotelian narrative structure.  
The Aristotelian beginning, middle and end have been widely 
misunderstood. An example is Lajos Egri’s bestseller The Art of Dramatic 
Writing Egri attacks Aristotle’s tenets by saying: 
 
No doubt you have heard the old adage ‘every story must have a beginning, a middle 
and an end’. Any writer who has the naivete to take this advice seriously is bound to 
run into trouble. You may protest that this is a too literal interpretation of Aristotle. 
Perhaps it is, but many plays met their Waterloo for the very reason that their 
authors, consciously or otherwise, obeyed this Aristotelian dictum. You may argue 
that Aristotle meant that even the ‘middle’ must have a beginning and an end. 
Perhaps, but if that is what he wanted to say, he certainly could have expressed 
himself more clearly than he did.5 
 
But, nowhere in the Poetics did Aristotle say that ‘every story must 
have a beginning, a middle and an end’, as Egri asserts. In fact, Aristotle said 
‘A whole is that which has a beginning, a middle and an end’ and dedicated a 
whole Chapter (VII) for the discussion of the criteria for selecting the proper 
beginning, middle and end in relation to the plot’s magnitude and to the causal 
relationships of incidents. Egri chose a sentence that does not exist in the 
original text or in any of the countable translations of the text.  
In Alternative Screenwriting, Ken Dancyger and Jeff Rush argue that, 
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The basic screenwriting texts introduce some variation of three act form, which is 
claimed to be the basis for every mainstream American screenplay. The three-act 
form is derived from Aristotle’s broad notion that all dramas have a beginning, a 
middle and an end and that these parts are in some proportion to one another. 
Unfortunately, this formulation is so general that it tells us very little (Afterall, was 
Aristotle completely serious when he said, ‘A middle is that which is itself after some 
other thing and after which there is something else?’).6  
 
Nowhere in the Poetics does Aristotle stipulate three acts. As I have 
discussed in the Chapter I, the idea held by many screenwriters that the 
Poetics preaches a three-act structure as a template for a dramatic story is 
unfounded. The three act division is in fact derived from Syd Field’s paradigm, 
who – in his study Screenplay: The Foundations of Screenwriting – took 
Aristotle’s basic two divisions, complication and unraveling or denouement 
and came up with the three act film structure. The three acts commonly found 
in mainstream or Hollywood films are also derived from the French playwright 
Eugene Scribe and the book The Well-Made Play written in 1820. Aristotle 
talks about two divisions of the dramatic story, complication and denouement, 
not about a three act structure:  
 
Every tragedy falls into two parts – Complication and Unravelling or Denouement. 
Incidents extraneous to the action are frequently combined with a portion of the 
action proper, to form the Complication; the rest is the Unravelling. By the 
Complication I mean all that extends from the beginning of the action to the part 
which marks the turning point to good or bad fortune.  The Unravelling is that which 
extends from the beginning of the change till the end.7 
 
The Aristotelian screenplay does not need to be divided in three acts. 
Aristotle insisted on complication and unravelling to put emphasis on the kind  
of action that ought to be selected by the poet. The poet should choose 
events that compose the complication of the narrative’s one action and events 
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that lead to the denouement of this action. This division is like a compass and 
aims at guiding the poet to use only incidents in his/her plot that are related to 
complication and denouement.  
Dancyger and Rush take an isolated phrase from the Poetics (A middle 
is that which is itself after some other thing and after which there is something 
else) without considering the preceding argument in which Aristotle explains 
in detail the criteria for selecting the proper beginning and end.     
In Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters, Michael Tierno correctly 
observes that Aristotle’s idea of a clear beginning, middle and end is not 
related to the three-act structure template that was formed by screenwriting 
theorists. But in trying to decipher what a beginning, middle and end are for 
Aristotle, he comes up with a set of terms (first and second cause of action) 
which – interesting as they may be – are not related to the content in the 
Poetics. He writes: 
 
It is the plot’s action that has a beginning, middle and end…The beginning of 
the plot action cannot be caused by something outside it. It starts up by itself. It’s a 
self-initiated action, a virtual ‘big bang’ that sets the entire plot in motion, that can be 
committed by either the protagonist or antagonist, and that is an act of pure will…In 
Dead Poets Society, Mr. Keating shows his students old photos of now deceased 
students and tells them ‘seize the day’, urging them to take action before it is too late 
and to follow their dreams. Nothing in the plot has cause Keating to challenge his 
students in this way. Because this kind of inciting incident is not caused by anything 
else in the plot, yet sets the entire plot in motion, I call it a ‘first cause of action’. It is 
important to understand that the first cause of action must occur after the movie 
begins, not in the back story.8 
 
He goes on to connect his term of ‘first cause of action’ to Aristotle’s 
prologue.  
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To give writers some space to work with before the first cause of action kicks 
the plot off, Aristotle offers us a tool called the ‘prologue’. A prologue connects the 
back story part of the complication (e.g. what happened to the hero before we meet 
him) to the ‘front story’ (story after the movie starts) and otherwise sets the stage 
before the first cause of action happens.9 
 
In The Whole Picture, Richard Walter writes 
 
According to Aristotle, the well-structured story contains a beginning, a middle 
and an end. But, an examination of successful tales reveals that these three parts 
are not at all equal. Beginnings are short. Endings even more so. It is the middle that 
occupies the bulk of any well-made tale.10 
 
Nowhere in the Poetics does Aristotle stipulate that the beginning, 
middle or end should be of equal length. 
I have come to the conclusion that a narrative that has a beginning 
which cannot stand on its own could be considered alien to Aristotelian ideas. 
It is clear from Chapter VII of the Poetics that the beginning should be one 
that can start the plot in a way that the second scene is logically connected to 
the first and the scenes preceding the opening of the film are easily 
understood or do not need – for the narrative structure of the selected one 
action – to be understood because the spectator can follow the story even if 
they are absent. One could then say that the opening scene of the Dead 
Poets Society (Peter Weir, 1989) or The Pianist is Aristotelian, whereas the 
opening scene of the film Memento is not. In Dead Poets Society the 
spectator does not need to know what happened before the opening scene of 
the film because the spectator can follow the story without needing 
background information. In Memento, on the other hand, the spectator is 
confused and bewildered and cannot understand any of the preceding events. 
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The uniqueness of the narrative is exactly this: the spectator travels along 
with Leonard to solve the riddle of his life.   
Finally, the beginning of the Aristotelian narrative could be in medias 
res as long as the chosen beginning adheres to the aforementioned criteria.    
The action must be carried through to its end. Tragedy represents ‘one 
action that is whole and complete and has beginning, middle and end’. As 
Rudiger Bittner points out: ‘Complete makes a claim implicit in wholeness: no 
loose threads should be left’. 11 Obviously, the spectator does not cease to 
suspend his disbelief right at the end of the play. The feeling that the story is 
‘real’ remains if the end has satisfied the spectator by being logically probable 
and thus potentially true. In this sense, one can say that an open ending that 
has not resolved the one action, leaving it incomplete, is not considered to be 
Aristotelian.  
The Aristotelian closed ending is, nevertheless, different from the one 
that characterises counter-cinema or the classical narrative structures. The 
end of Oedipus Rex is one that has indeed resolved all story threads: the 
guilty is found, Thebes is saved and Oedipus has achieved his goal. He has 
saved his city and he knows who he is. What will become of him is something 
unresolved, because it is not of primary importance for this specific tragedy. It 
is more or less predictable that he will never be the same. The one action of 
Sophocles’ tragedy is carried to its probable and necessary conclusion, but 
the spectator does not know what becomes to the protagonist. There is a hint, 
but not a certainty.   
On the contrary, in the classical narrative structure we get the chance 
to experience the protagonist’s finding his/her ‘true self’ but also we get a 
glimpse of his/her better, new life, as it is the case with the film Das Lieben 
den Anderen (The Lives of Others). In the final scene of this film Wiesler sees 
that Dreyman published the novel Sonata for a Good Man and has dedicated 
it to him. The spectator witnesses Wiesler’s new life and the recognition he 
has received from the people he helped.  
It is interesting to note that some films appear to be open-ended 
whereas they are really close-ended, such as one of the first French New 
Wave films, The 400 Blows (Francois Truffaut, 1959). The story is about the 
life of an unwanted single child, Antoine Doinel, who is being mistreated by 
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his mother and step father. He has problems at school and he runs away. 
Antoine is put into an observation centre for young offenders. He manages to 
escape and the film ends with a marvellous freeze frame of the protagonist at 
the seashore.     
The one action of the story is ‘Antoine’s escape’. This action is 
resolved and thus the ending of the film is closed. Nevertheless, the spectator 
is unsure of Antoine’s future but he feels satisfied in the end. For the narrative 
structure of the specific screenplay the knowledge of Antoine’s future is 
unnecessary. What counts is that he managed to escape. Thus the end of the 
film has fulfilled its maker’s aim. This film exemplifies the Aristotelian closed 
ending, which has a high degree of closure and does not show the 
protagonist’s new life. The same can hold true for the Wim Wenders’ film 
Paris, Texas (Wim Wenders, 1984). At its climax, father and son are 
reconciled. Other relationships (husband/wife, mother/son) are left 
unresolved, but their importance is minimal and does not hinder the spectator 
from having a sense of a closure because the one action of the film is exactly 
this: the father and son reconciliation. 
I now wish to develop this into a discussion of another important 
misinterpretation of the Poetics – the rule of the three unities.  
The rule of the three unities – time, place and action – has been 
wrongfully attributed to the Poetics. The unity of action demands that a play 
should only have one main action. The unity of place demands that a play 
should cover a single physical place and should not attempt to compress 
geography, nor should the stage represent more than one place. Finally, the 
unity of time demands that the action in the play should take place for not 
more than 24 hours.    
To clarify this misconception and show that Aristotle insisted only on 
unity of action is vital to the process of applying the Poetics to the narrative 
structure of screenplay. If the rule of the three unities is true, then the 
application of the Poetics must be limited to the needs of playwriting rather 
than screenwriting. Cinema’s major advantage over theatre is exactly this: 
that there can be unlimited variations of and/or experimentations with place 
and time due to the medium’s flexibility. Cinema is receptive to countable 
filmic techniques.  
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 The only unity Aristotle endorsed was the unity of action. F. L. Lucas in 
Tragedy: Serious Drama in relation to Aristotle’s Poetics, observes:  
 
The interest of the Three Unities is mainly historical, but a brief outline of their 
development provides among other things a very clear, and unfavourable, example 
of the influence of critics on creative arts. Two main reasons were adduced in 
support of this strange trinity, both false – that Aristotle had enjoyed them; and that 
without them a play would be, not inferior in artistic form, but incredible. It was the 
name, above all, of realism that was invoked to defend a rule responsible in practice 
for some of the most fantastically unreal situations in drama. Aristotle had in fact 
insisted only that the action must have in fact an artistic unity, free from  
irrelevances.12 
 
I. Sikoutsis, attributes this misconception to the fact that great writers 
such as Corneille and Racine have followed such a set of rules. Sikoutris 
traces the origin of this misconception to Aristotle’s Chapter V where he 
remarks: 
 
Epic poetry agrees with Tragedy in so far as it is an imitation in verse of characters of 
a higher type. They differ, in that epic poetry admits but one kind of meter, and is 
narrative in form. They differ, again, in their length: for tragedy endeavours, as far as 
possible, to confine itself to a single revolution of the sun, or but slightly to exceed 
this limit; whereas the Epic action has no limits of time.13 
 
Aristotle here refers to what used to be practised in ancient tragedy (in 
relation to the tragedy of Aristotle’s time). His interpreters, however, took this 
comment as a rule not of what used to be practised, but as a rule of what 
ought to be practised in tragedy in general. An example is Corneille’s 
translation of the above extract, where he uses the word ought to (doit) to 
translate the word endeavours.  
Even less unsupported by the content in Poetics is the rule of unity of 
place – a misconception that seems to have started from the Italian interpreter 
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of Aristotle, Lodovico Castelvetro. Castelvetro’s rule was that all the actions of 
the plot should take place in a single place.  
Lucas observes that Horace insisted, like Aristotle, on unity of action 
only. He traces the beginning of the misconception to the Renaissance. Lucas 
observes:   
 
Trissino’s Poetica (1529-49) and Cintio (1554) reasserted the Unity of Time: 
Robertelli (1548) narrowed it to twelve hours (“no work is done at night”), while others 
as arbitrarily limited the epic to one year. Scaliger (1561) cut down the allowance still 
further from six to eight hours; but the phrase, ‘les Unites Scaligeriennes’ is a 
misnomer; and the real discredit of formulating the “Three Unities” seems to belong 
to Castelvetro (1570). The idea now spread like a plague, that no intelligent person’s 
imagination could lend credence to a play that was so unreal as to represent more 
than one place or one day. Sidney preached it; Jonson praised himself for practising 
it in Volpone. Milton agreed; but Dryden brought respectful objections to the 
cramping effects of such rules, and they always sat uneasily on English shoulders. It 
only remained, as far as the English stage was concerned, for Johnson to sweep 
what was left of the unities into the wastepaper basket, in the preface to his 
Shakespeare…As an aid to illusion they [the three Unities] were never worth what 
they cost in other ways; how needless they are for illusion, the cinema has further 
shown.14 
 
In The Philosophy of Fine Art, Hegel discusses the misconception of 
unity of place observing that ‘the inalterability of one exclusive locale of the 
action proposed belongs to the type of those rigid rules which the French in 
particular have deduced from classic tragedy and the critique of Aristotle 
thereupon’.15 
Humphry House has the same opinion and writes that ‘about the unity 
of place, Aristotle nowhere says anything to the effect that the stage should 
represent only one place throughout the course of the action’.16 
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Even though the misconception regarding the three unities has been 
clarified, contemporary screenwriting theorists still maintain it. In the book 
Screenplay.The Foundations of Screenwriting, Field opens a discussion about 
the duration of a feature film by saying that ‘Aristotle talked about the three 
unities of dramatic action: time, place and action’.17 
I have argued that the rule of three unities attributed to the Poetics is 
unfounded. It remains to discuss the only rule of unity that is accurate, the 
unity of action. 
Aristotle devotes five whole Chapters of the Poetics (VII-XI) to discuss 
the structure and the unity of the plot. In Chapter VII he begins his 
investigation with the formal cause of the plot’s structure – its order and 
magnitude – so he can then proceed to the examination of the most important 
point of his treatise: the kind of incidents that are to be chosen to form the 
plot.  
 The question of which incidents are to be included in the plot and 
which do not have the necessary dramatic quality to be a part of the ‘whole’ is 
of crucial importance to Aristotle and to this study. To answer the question of 
which scenes or units of action are to be selected to create the one action 
(and thus the unity of action) I have to first refer briefly to the Aristotelian 
concept of action in general.  
According to Aristotle, the core of action is a mental activity – a 
motivation that slowly works its way outwards. But action is not only the 
motive to do something, but the whole working out of the motive to an end 
(successful or not). As it has been demonstrated in Chapter I, the object of 
imitation in dramatic writing is connected to this kind of action. Poetry tries to 
imitate something more than a physical act. It imitates the ‘movement of 
spirit’, that is the whole process from the motivation to the action itself.    
Taxi Driver (Martin Scorsese, 1976) exemplifies this ‘movement of 
spirit’. The selected units of action in this screenplay represent accurately the 
gradual increase of Travis’ movement of spirit, the subtle but acute change in 
his mental state before he proceeds to action. The screenplay abides by the 
Aristotelian narrative structure because the actions that reflect Travis’ mental 
change are included in the structure of events. The action is shown and the 
spectator can understand to a great extend Travis’s motives. In the set-up of 
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David Fincher’s Fight Club (David Fincher, 1999), all the units of action in the 
narrator’s life prepare the spectator for the action that follows. The 
protagonist’s motives are clear and his actions, however extreme, are 
comprehensible to the spectator. A protagonist that does not express in action 
this ‘movement of spirit’ would be counter-Aristotelian, as ‘A’ in Ulysses’ Gaze 
is.     
The Aristotelian concept of action, then, should not be connected only 
to a bodily activity. This comes as a result, this will be only the reflection of the 
inward action and that reflection should be brought about only when the 
inward activity has arrived at a point of having to be expressed. This is 
basically what modern textbooks of screenwriting refer to as the need to 
foreshadow conflict. The selection of scenes that fail to show the movement of 
spirit as the preparation for action, but focus only on the action itself often 
produce the so-called jumping conflict.   
To clarify the way of selecting or discarding the units of action, Aristotle 
uses two ways. Firstly, he distinguishes the unity of action from the unity of 
protagonist, and secondly he states that all units of action have to be 
interconnected with the rule of probability and necessity.    
In Chapter VIII Aristotle states that ‘the Unity of the Plot does not 
consist, as some suppose, in having one man as its subject’.18 Unity of plot 
means that the plot is built around one action and not the actions of one hero. 
There are many actions performed by one man. In fact there is ‘an infinity of 
things (that) befall that one man, some of which it is impossible to reduce to 
Unity. And in like manner there are many actions of one man which cannot be 
made to form one action’.19 
The incidents that are to form the tragedy’s plot are selected according 
to two criteria; a) that they have a nexus of cause and effect amongst them 
(rule of probability and necessity); b) that this connection is necessary for, or it 
necessarily leads to, the existence of one and only action in the play.   
This nexus, this necessary and probable connection, is of course 
dictated by the one action. Since tragedy is not history, the dramatist will not 
be interested in the biographical elements or actions of the protagonist. 
Instead, he will use history to select the incidents that are connected to the 
main action that he aspires to represent via the plot. As S. Ramfos points out,  
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Biography handles and exposes the aggregate or the larger part of the incidents in a 
man’s life; The Poetics focus on the praxis that produces the tragic change 
(reversal). The consequences of the difference in question (the difference between 
poetry and history) is obvious: drama does not follow the natural course of a life’s 
incidents, neither does it start at any accidental point. The beginning of a drama is 
always the praxis that will cause the tragic charge (reversal) in the hero’s life 
regardless of the other incidents related to the first praxis…In drama what stands out 
is the spirituality or the inwardness of the incident…From an essentially physical and 
historical figure, the man is transformed into a purely intellectual-spiritual figure, 
inasmuch as the ‘fate’ revealed by the dramatic incidents has to do with their 
inwardness and not with them as such.20 
 
The units of action selected to represent the one action of a tragedy 
should have a specific thematic resemblance with each other. In cinematic 
terms, this means that the plot’s scenes are selected according to their 
potential of proving the narrative’s premise.  
In the beginning of Chapter VIII, Aristotle discusses in detail the events 
that are appropriate or inappropriate to the one action.    
 
In writing an Odyssey, he (Homer) did not make the poem cover all that befell the 
hero – it befell him for instance, to get wounded on Parnassus and also to feign 
madness at the time of the call to arms, but the two incidents had no probable or 
necessary connection with one another – instead of doing that he took an action with 
a unity of the kind we are describing as the subject of the Odyssey as also of the 
Iliad.21 
  
In discussing the issue of plot in narrative, Robert Scholes and Robert 
Kellogg in The Nature of the Narrative observe that, 
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In narratives which are fictional in plotting as well as in spirit, the tendency is either to 
focus on a single episode in the hero’s life or a single sequence of episodes…The 
plot of the Iliad focuses on one episode in the hero’s life, just as his characterisation 
focuses on one element of his psyche; and the subject is the same in both – anger. 
The plot of the Iliad is the story of Achilles getting angry – the how and why of it – 
and of the appeasement of his anger – the how and why of that…’.22 
If every action in a story bears several meanings then the writer should 
select those actions whose meanings are most closely related towards the 
one action of the plot. In the Iliad, Homer selected the units of action that 
would best exemplify and prove the one action, that is ‘Achilles getting angry 
– the how and why of it – and of the appeasement of his anger – the how and 
why of that’. 
If there are, for example, twenty potential scenes that can reveal a 
character’s final ‘movement of spirit’ from sanity to insanity (Taxi Driver) then 
the screenwriter ought to choose those scenes that best reveal the 
character’s state of mind in relation to the film’s one action. In Taxi Driver, 
Paul Schrader decided to choose one scene that best reveals the final 
transition in Travis’ mental state. In one of the most memorable scenes in film 
history, Travis glares at himself in the mirror and repeats conversations in 
which he threatens and repetitively challenges imaginary victims. In this scene 
it is clear what happens in Travis’ mind, but it is also clear exactly what his 
intentions are for future action. This would not be the case if the screenwriter 
has chosen a scene that could have several meaning, such as Travis buying 
a gun.  
R. Bittner accurately describes the boundaries of the meaning each 
unit of action has by using the expression limits of meaning which determine 
each unity of action. Borrowing the phrase limits of meaning one could say 
that a screenwriter is achieving the unity of action when he is able to construct 
a narrative structure made up of scenes that are characterized by the same 
limits of meaning. In other words, by selecting scenes whose meaning does 
not diverge from the one action. If the screenwriter tries to keep the 
Aristotelian rule of unity of action between the scenes then he would be less 
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likely to get carried away by creating scenes unrelated to the one action, 
something that happens often in an effort to achieve characterisation or when 
the screenwriter overuses the technique of flashback.    
Aristotle gives another practical rule that simplifies the above. In 
Chapter VIII he writes: 
 
The truth is that, just as in the other imitative arts one imitation is always of one thing, 
so in poetry the story, as an imitation of action, must represent one action, a 
complete whole with its several incidents so closely connected that the transposal or 
withdrawal of any of them will disjoin and dislocate the whole. For that which makes 
no perceptible difference by its presence or absence is no real part of the whole.23 
 
This rule is that if the plot seems to be coherent without a scene, then 
the scene can be simply taken off. Conversely, if by taking out one scene the 
plot’s unity seems to be destroyed, then the specific scene is indispensable. 
The problem is that this very important and practical criterion of 
indispensability has rarely enjoyed the attention it really should be given. 
The one action of Taxi Driver is the gradual dehumanization of Travis. 
The scenes selected are thematically connected to that and only single action. 
Every scene’s limits of meaning leads to the one action and each scene 
comes as a result of the previous one in a way that if one scene was to be 
taken out, then there wouldn’t be logical coherence.       
The rule of one action cannot stand on its own. It has to go with the 
existence of a causal relationship between the scenes. For the unity of action 
to be achieved, the rule of one action cannot be viewed separately from the 
rule of probability and necessity in an Aristotelian narrative.  
Unity of action necessitates complete lack of the element of chance. 
Aristotle almost excludes chance from the processes of poetic creation. 
Chance is contrary to the fundamental qualities of probability (το εικός) and 
necessity (το αναγκαίον), which Aristotle time and again insists should be the 
primary material of each and every part of the plot in a tragedy. Well-
constructed plots cannot begin or end at a chance point. Each unit of action is 
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not connected with one another by chance. They are logically united to form 
the one complete action of the plot. What Oedipus or Antigone do has to be 
represented as a necessary outcome of their specific character and their 
hamartia, as the action that the type of person they represent would probably 
do in the type of action they find and/or bring themselves into.  Everything that 
is not strictly motivated, is outside the drama. Chance solutions, says 
Aristotle, such as the deus ex machina are examples of a bad writer. In fact, 
as Dorothea Frede points out in ‘Necessity, Chance, and What Happens for 
the Most Part: 
 
Accidents are not the poet’s but rather the historian’s concern, as Aristotle decrees, 
since history is full of unrelated coincidences that have no place in tragedy. It is the 
possibility of depicting events undisturbed by accidents that establishes the 
superiority of tragedy over history and makes it a more philosophic enterprise, 
because it can depict the universal, i.e. what is not distorted by the incalculable 
vicissitudes of everyday life.24 
 
The plot centres on one unified action. Aristotle was opposed to the 
idea of a ‘double thread of thought’ in Poetics. He believed that the perfect 
plot must have a single, and not a ‘double issue’. Robert Altman’s Short Cuts 
(1993) or Quentin Tarantino’s Pulp Fiction (1994) combine a number of short 
stories with the characters appearing in more than one story and are therefore 
distinctly counter-Aristotelian.     
I have demonstrated so far that, according to the Poetics, there are 
four criteria for selecting a plot’s scenes, a) thematic resemblance between 
the scenes, b) the quality of each scene to impair the whole with its absence 
(criterion of scene indispensability), c) scenes causally connected/absence of 
the element of chance and d) scenes pertaining to one action/absence of 
subplots. If any of these criteria is missing then the unity of action is 
compromised.  
I will now discuss three of the most important elements of the 
Aristotelian plot structure: hamartia, peripeteia and anagnorisis (recognition). 
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After giving what I believe to be the proper reading of the concepts of 
hamartia, peripeteia and anagnorisis, I will discuss the misinterpretations that 
these two concepts have been subjected to and conclude as to their accurate 
application in a screenplay composed according to the Poetics.  
In simple plots, says Aristotle, the change in the hero’s fortune from 
misfortune to good fortune or vice versa takes place without the elements of 
peripeteia and anagnorisis. In Chapter IX Aristotle explains that there is a 
subspecies of simple plots, the episodic plots that are the worst kind of plots. 
An episodic plot lacks probability and necessity in the sequence of its 
episodes.    
The contrary of the simple plot is the complex plot, which involves 
either peripeteia or anagnorisis or both. The classical narrative structure is in 
most cases a variation of the Aristotelian complex plot adopting primarily the 
element of anagnorisis of an event that is, however, not the recognition of the 
hero’s hamartia. Counter-Aristotelian films often include the protagonist’s 
anagnorisis but not in the Aristotelian sense of it. Anagnorisis cannot be 
deemed Aristotelian unless it is combined with the protagonist’s hamartia, 
which is rarely the case in counter-Aristotelian narratives.    
In Chapter XI Aristotle gives a clear definition of the concept of 
peripeteia: 
 
A peripety is the change of the kind described (from misfortune to happiness or from 
happiness to misfortune) from one state of things within the play to its opposite, and 
that too in the way we are saying, in the probable or necessary sequence of events; 
as it is an instance for Oedipus: here the opposite state of things is produced by the 
Messenger, who, coming to gladden Oedipus and to remove his fears as to his 
mother, reveals the secret of his birth.25 
 
Aristotle gives another example of peripeteia from Lynceus:’And in 
Lynceus: just as he is being led off for execution, with Danaus at his side to 
put him to death, the incidents preceding this bring it about that he is saved 
and Danaus put to Death’.26 Aristotle goes on to explain that: 
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Anagnorisis is a change from ignorance to knowledge, and thus to love or hate, in the 
personages marked for good or evil fortune. The finest form, of anagnorisis is one 
attended by peripeties, like that which goes with anagnorisis in Oedipus. This 
(anagnorisis) with a peripety will arouse either pity or fear-actions of that nature being 
what tragedy is assumed to represent.27 
 
The concept of peripeteia, even though clearly defined in the beginning 
of Chapter XI has been many times misinterpreted by many of Aristotelian 
commentators.   
Peripeteia and anagnorisis are quite often in English rendered as 
reversal and recognition respectively. As Lucas points out, ‘the only reason for 
translating peripeteia by “reversal of fortune” is that it bears this sense in later 
Greek and in the modern languages that have adopted this word…But a very 
little study either of drama or of Aristotle would surely suggest that this sense 
of peripeteia makes nonsense of Aristotle. He [Aristotle] implies for example 
that there are no peripeteias in Homer’s Iliad: yet it is full of changes of 
fortune’.28 
Aristotle means just what he says. Paraphrasing the definition of 
peripeteia in Chapter XI would lead to the simple following statement: 
peripeteia occurs when the course of action intended to produce a result x, 
produces the reverse of x.  Oedipus is trying to escape his fortune and by 
doing so he fulfils it. Juliet is trying to consummate her love with Romeo and 
achieves the opposite – the metaphorical and physical death of both lovers. 
Nora in Henrik Ibsen’s A Doll House, intends to save her husband and in 
doing so, she breaks up with him.  
The difference between reversal of fortune (simple plot) and peripeteia 
(complex plot) is of crucial importance for the application of Poetics to 
screenwriting. Unless this misconception is clarified, the screenwriter fails to 
see that by using just reversal of fortune, he cannot produce the effect of 
tragic irony on the spectator which is achieved only with peripeteia, only by 
showing the hero achieving the exact opposite of his/her intentions.   
 109 
 Lucas’ way of describing the difference between a simple reversal and 
a peripeteia is accurate. He observes: 
 
The deepest tragedy of life is not when men are struck down by the blow of chance 
or fate, like Job or Maurya in Riders to the Sea, nor when they are destroyed by their 
enemies, like Polyxena, or Henry Vi; but when their destruction is the work of those 
that wish them well, or of their own unwitting hands. For it is the perpetual tragic irony 
of the Tragedy of Life that again and again men do thus laboriously contrive their own 
annihilation, or kill the thing they love.29 
 
When one realizes that peripeteia is the tragic situation where human 
beings manage to produce the opposite of what they have intended, the 
reasons why Aristotle’s peripeteia goes almost always as a pair with 
anagnorisis, become more clear. Peripeteia is the state where the hero’s 
ignorance drives him to bringing about the opposite of what he intended to do. 
Anagnorisis is the realization of the truth, the opening of the eyes, the true 
understanding of his/her hamartia.  
The concept of peripeteia, anagnorisis and pathos (tragic suffering) 
come as the conclusion of a long discussion about plot. Interestingly, 
regardless of the importance of peripeteia, Aristotle gives it only a brief 
definition followed by two examples. Pathos is defined in a single sentence. 
Anagnorisis, on the other hand, is referred to briefly in Chapter XI and then 
Aristotle devotes to it an entire Chapter (Chapter XVI).     
Anagnorisis in Greek has a strong association with the English word 
recognition. Ανα-γνωρίζω (ana-gnorezo) means re-cognize, not discover. 
Anagnorisis means regaining some lost knowledge or memory, recovering 
something once known. Anagnorisis, then, is not related to some sort of new 
knowledge, but to an uncovering of a hidden knowledge. Aristotle devotes an 
entire Chapter to explore the ways this knowledge can be regained by the 
hero.   
Anagnorisis, according to Chapter XI, is a change from ignorance to 
knowledge, and ‘thus to either love or hate in the personages marked for good 
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or evil fortune’. Anagnorisis, then, suggests a change not only in the state of 
the hero (change from ignorance to knowledge) but also – or at the same time 
– a change in the relationships within the action. There is thus a further 
particularization of the way in which anagnorisis may embrace peripeteia. The 
phrase ‘and thus a change to either love or hate’ leaves room to redefine the 
complex plot as  
 
one which contains an intrication built in, presumably, from the outset but revealing 
its necessary or probable consequence only at the end, that consequence being a 
reversal of the supposed relations. The plot is twisted, folded back on itself 
(peplegmenos), like an elegantly designed syllogism that proves the opposite of what 
the premises seemed to imply.30 
 
Peripeteia and anagnorisis cannot be viewed separately from hamartia. 
In fact, without hamartia there wouldn’t be a complex plot. Hamartia is the 
corner stone of tragedy and the reason it leads to peripeteia and anagnorisis. 
What produces the opposite effect to the hero’s intention is his/her own tragic 
error, his/her own hamartia. And what the hero later recognizes is exactly this, 
his/her hamartia. Yet, hamartia is a much more complicated term than it 
initially appears to be.  
To understand what hamartia means is vital to this study for two 
reasons. First, because it further weakens Augusto Boal’s argument regarding 
the repressive function of the Aristotelian katharsis as it has been discussed 
in the previous Chapter of this study. Proving that hamartia is not a moral flaw 
or a sign of an anti-constitutional behaviour, but a mistake in reasoning, leads 
to the conclusion that tragedy exercises the spectator’s process of reasoning, 
and thus it cannot be repressive. Secondly, a true understanding of the 
Aristotelian hamartia makes even more clear the distinction between 
Aristotelian and counter-Aristotelian films and shows that it has in fact been 
rarely, if ever, used in its pure Aristotelian sense in the classic narrative or any 
sort of narrative structure for that matter.      
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The differences in translations of hamartia reflect the great ambiguity 
and confusion regarding its true meaning. Butcher prefers the translation 
‘error or frailty’ while Potts translation remains simple: ‘some error’. D. S. 
Margoliouth prefers the word ‘mistake’, L. Cooper chooses the translation 
‘some error of judgement or shortcoming’, Kenneth A. Telford translated 
hamartia as ‘some mistake’ and so on.  
The majority of the commentators seem to prefer the idea of hamartia 
as a mistake. Lucas observes:  
 
The word he (Aristotle) uses means simply ‘a mistake’, though there have always 
been persistent attempts on the part of moralizing critics to make the hamartia much 
more definitely a moral weakness, a sin, than it really is. This false step may be 
either a crime, like Clytemnestra’s or a mere miscalculation like Dejanira’s. It is a 
distortion to read into this theory the moralist idea of tragic disaster as necessarily the 
punishment of sin.31 
 
Lucas concludes that, 
 
 
At its best, tragedy is a story of human blindness leading human effort to checkmate 
itself – a Tragedy of Error. The hamartia is the tragic error; the peripeteia, its fatal 
working to a result the opposite of that intended; the anagnorisis, the recognition of 
the truth. The error may or may not be moral.32 
 
But it is important to really know whether hamartia has a moral nuance 
to it or not, for a basic reason: hamartia is the causal link that moves the 
protagonist from ignorance to knowledge and from good fortune to misfortune. 
Hamartia is the mechanism that initiates the mechanisms of peripeteia and 
anagnorisis. Taking hamartia to be a moral error then the crucial element of 
the required empathy for the hero’s undeserved suffering could not be fulfilled. 
If the protagonist is morally responsible then he deserves his/her suffering 
and the spectator cannot feel pure pity and fear for a protagonist who 
deserves his/her misfortune. Without pity and fear katharsis is not possible. 
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Hamartia, then, cannot be a moral mistake. As N. Sherman points out in 
analysing Chapter XIII of the Poetics:  
 
The ruin of a very good person excites moral outrage; the downfall of someone evil 
evokes our sense of justice and human satisfaction (philanthropon) in witnessing 
deserved suffering; his rise again our sense of moral outrage and anger. To feel pity 
and fear, in contrast,  we need to see characters on stage who can err and suffer 
consequences without our being morally shocked by either their senselessness of 
the error or the disproportion between it and the calamity. And this requires 
characters who are more good than bad, but who nonetheless fall short of full 
perfection.33 
 
Much of the most significant scholarship on hamartia has sought to 
determine whether the protagonist’s lack of full perfection is an intellectual or 
moral phenomenon. Butcher identified hamartia with ‘a single great error, 
whether morally culpable or not’ or ‘a single great defect in character 
otherwise noble’. D. W. Lucas suggested that an imperfect understanding of 
Butcher may have led to the wide popularity of hamartia being understood as 
‘tragic flaw’. Also, scholars such as P. W. Harsh strongly supported the moral 
interpretation of hamartia. After his analysis of Oedipus Rex, Harsh asserted 
that ‘surely the pre-eminently good and just man does not fly into a fury when 
a carriage crowds him from the road, and he does not commit murder 
indiscriminately even when he is lashed by the driver’.34 
Harsh concludes that Aristotle judged the most effective tragic 
character to be ‘at least in part morally responsible for his fate’. Harsh 
believes that hamartia can be properly understood by the concept of tragic 
flaw and that this concept represents a moral failing, a weakness in the 
character of the hero.  
But, to take hamartia as a sin instead of a mistake of the intellect leads 
the screenwriter to a selection of one action that would revolve around this 
sin. This would in turn lead to a dead end, since if hamartia was a moral error 
then there wouldn’t be a proper peripeteia, anagnorisis and katharsis.   
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Van Braam was one of the scholars that pointed out the paralogism of 
taking hamartia as a moral flaw. He investigated five passages of the 
Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle employs the term hamartia and 
hamartema.30 He argued that in each of these instances hamartia and 
hamartema designate some type of intellectual mistake and not a moral 
defect of the character. 31 This seems to agree with Aristotle’s insistence on 
the protagonist’s undeserved suffering. As Van Braam observes: 
 
An essential characteristic of tragedy is the existence of suffering without moral guilt, 
but a suffering whose source, nevertheless, arises in the hero himself. The hero must 
be the agent of his own destruction from whose actions the tragic consequences 
arise by necessity and probability but he must not be morally culpable in regard to 
those tragic consequences. The hybris so commonly spoken of in regard to Greek 
tragedy is often the assumption by a character that he possesses greater wisdom 
and understanding than is actually the case. The whole concept of tragic irony is 
derived from our observation of a hero who commits ‘a fatal error of judgement at the 
very time he is relying on his intelligence to direct his actions’.35 
 
Braam notes that Oedipus’ hamartia can be ‘no specific sin attaching to 
him as an individual, but the universally human one of blindly following the 
light of one’s own intellect. As Teiresias, the wise old man, in Oedipus Rex 
says, “your enemy is yourself”.’36 
 
 
Hamartia is directly related to katharsis, then, since it is hamartia’s 
peculiar nature that creates the proper balances that permit the tragic emotion 
to occur. Hamartia is an amalgam of error and innocence that permeate a 
play’s soul, that is, its plot. Tragedy is the place where ‘a man is not suffering 
for his crimes, but for his ignorance. Ignorance, then becomes not the 
extenuatory, but the crime it self’.37  In a brilliant analysis of hamartia, 
Ramphos observes that: 
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Hamartia is not purely an error of judgement, but an error of impulsiveness produced 
under the unspecified nature of the hero’s practical aim. The ignorance inherent in 
the assigned action (goal) creates a gap, which is sometimes covered by illogical 
thinking having as its criterion the element of sorrow or pleasure.38 
 
 
Ramphos holds that this is where the hero’s guilty innocence lays: 
under illogical thinking, the hero acts in ignorance, confusing – due to sorrow 
or happiness – the logical with the illogical. Hamartia produces ‘the tragic 
emotion since it reveals the prevalence of ignorance while the character is in 
the certainty of logic, an ignorance corroding any hope of stability and 
certainty of human action’.39 
Hamartia, then, cannot be a moral error. Neither is it a simple error. It is 
not an error due to lack of information, which, if the hero knew he would have 
acted otherwise preventing hamartia.  The tragic ignorance is not related to 
simple lack of information. Hamartia is the arrogant certainty of knowledge. It 
is the process of ignoring of one’s ignorance. Hamartia then is not a crime 
committed in ignorance, hamartia is ignorance.  
In Citizen Kane (Orson Welles, 1941) Kane’s hamartia is the 
assumption that he possesses greater wisdom and understanding than is 
actually the case. Charles Forster Kane spent all his life going after the 
complete opposite of what he really needed.  What Kane truly needed was 
reflected in ‘Rosebud’ as a symbol of innocence and happiness. Instead of 
achieving true happiness, Kane dies alone in his vast palatial estate, Xanadu. 
Kane’s hamartia is not a sin or a moral mistake, but the intellectual mistake of 
overestimating his ability to buy happiness and to make others love him. The 
film Citizen Kane is one of the few existing film examples of a pure case of an 
Aristotelian hamartia.    
As I have noted earlier in this Chapter, reversal of fortune is ascribed to 
both complex and simple plot. All tragedies represent a reversal from good 
fortune to misfortune or vice versa. In the best kind of tragedy (complex plot), 
however, the reversal is actually a peripeteia and it is necessarily 
accompanied by anagnorisis. Reversal, then, is not synonymous with  
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peripeteia. Taking reversal of fortune as being the same with peripeteia is one 
of the greatest misconceptions about the Poetics. As Terence Cave observes 
in Recognitions: A Study in Poetics: 
 
In Aristotle’s account, peripeteia cannot be synonymous with metabasis (change of 
fortune): it is one of the ways in which the change of fortune may become manifest. 
Later readers – including modern ones – will, however, often level peripeteia down 
towards the sense change of fortune.40 
 
House also makes this observation:  
 
Peripeteia must not be translated or paraphrased ‘Reversal of Fortune’, for a 
Reversal of Fortune may well happen without it. If it is to be paraphrased at all, the 
phrase which fits best is reversal of intention. For that is what it is, from the point of 
view of the character involved. From the point of view of the spectator or reader it is, 
in the plot of the play as a whole, a reversal of the direction of action.41 
 
Requiem for a Dream (Darren Aronofsky, 2000) has a narrative that 
does not only present reversal of fortune, but also peripeteia. When Sara 
makes the wrong decision to take medications to lose weight and become 
beautiful, her life does not just change from happiness to unhappiness. Her 
decision produces the exact opposite effect of her intention (peripeteia): she 
becomes ill and uglier than she was before deciding to become more 
beautiful.    
 In Time Out (L’emploi du Temps, Laurent Cantet, 2001), Vincent 
makes the decision to lie to his family in order to maintain his dignity. By doing 
so, he not only becomes unhappy (reversal of fortune), but he throws himself 
into a vicious spiral of deceit and lies finally losing any dignity he could have 
had by telling the truth (peripeteia). By contrast, the classical narrative 
structure usually employs a reversal of fortune from good to bad forune and 
then from bad to good fortune with the element of peripeteia missing.  
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Many books that apply the Aristotelian narrative structure to 
screenwriting fail to show the crucial difference between reversal of fortune 
and peripeteia while other books do noteven mention peripeteia. In the book 
Aristotle in Hollywood, Hiltunen deals with the peripeteia, anagnorisis and 
hamartia only superficially:  
 
The third element of the plot is reversal (peripeteia), a sudden turn of action or 
change of fortune which is accompanied by a powerful emotional impact…In Oedipus 
Rex the reversal takes place when the messenger from Corinth comes to Thebes 
with the announcement that Oedipus’ father, King Polybus, is dead and that he, 
Oedipus, has succeeded to the throne. Recognition occurs at the same time as the 
change from good to bad fortune. In Iphigenia in Tauris the recognition happens 
between brother and sister and causes a change in action that is the opposite to that 
in Oedipus, that is, from good to bad.42 
 
In the above description, peripeteia is paralleled to reversal of fortune, 
a fact that completely alters the meaning of both peripeteia and reversal of 
fortune and possibly makes the whole Aristotelian triad hamartia-peripeteia-
anagnorisis incomprehensible. It is important for the screenwriter to 
understand that peripeteia produces the exact opposite outcome of that which 
was intended and brings the hero to the exact opposite state to that intended 
so that Oedipus turns from a respected and admired king to an incestuous 
blind murderer and so on.. Misinterpreting or failing to analyse in detail such 
central Aristotelian concepts deprives the Aristotelian method of its potential in 
screenwriting.  
In his article, Pathos in the Poetics of Aristotle, B. R. Rees comes to 
the inaccurate conclusion that ‘peripeteia is a change in the direction of the 
tragic action which is either a necessary result of previous events or, at least 
is not improbable in the light of what has already happened’.43 
Hamartia is also described in an obfuscatory manner. In Aristotle in 
Hollywood, Ari Hiltunen states that hamartia is ‘an error that frequently occurs 
in a good plot. Aristotle places value on hamartia probably because it is an 
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excellent means of achieving the state of undeserved suffering that in turn 
creates an intense emotional impact’.44  
This definition is also inaccurate and confusing and does not help the 
screenwriter understand the unique nature of the logical fallacy the 
protagonist commits. Inevitably, the screenwriter who wishes to apply the 
Aristotelian method cannot see the connection of hamartia-peripeteia-
anagnorisis as the three elements that lead to katharsis.   
Michael Tierno’s Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters, exemplifies the 
phenomenon of generalizing basic Aristotelian concepts to such an extent as 
to produce a chain of misunderstandings of the Poetics. Analysing the film 
Rosemary’s Baby (Roman Polanski, 1968) the writer says: 
 
In Rosemary’s Baby, Rosemany wanders into Minnie’s apartment and gets to see the 
little bundle of evil she has just given birth to. At this moment, a reversal of fortune 
occurs; Rosemary realises that her child has lived (she thought it had died) and the 
big surprise is that it’s the spawn of Satan.45   
  
            Whether the protagonist’s hamartia in the Aristotelian sense is 
apparent in the film is irrelevant at this point. What is striking is the use of the 
Aristotelian term reversal of fortune instead of the term anagnorisis. 
There are a few instances where writers of screenwriting textbooks 
have taken pains to comprehend and properly teach the Aristotelian method, 
such as Linda Seger. In Making a Good Script Great, she observes: 
 
A reversal changes the direction of the story 180 degrees. It makes a story move 
from a positive to a negative direction, or from a negative to a positive direction. It’s 
stronger than most turning points, which only turn the action in another direction, but 
do not reverse it. A reversal is a complete turnaround.46 
 
Seger accurately describes reversal of fortune, even if her book is not 
an application of the Poetics to screenwriting, as the other texts are.   
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As I have mentioned earlier, Aristotle devotes most of Chapter X, XI 
and XVI to clarify the basic concepts of a complex plot: peripeteia and 
anagnorisis. Even though Aristotle considers pathos an essential part of a 
complex plot he dedicates only a few lines for its analysis. 
 
...το δε πάθος είναι πράξις καταστρεπτική ή οδυνηρά, οιον η εν τω φανερώ θάνατοι 
και οι μεγάλοι σωματικοί πόνοι και οι τραυματισμοί και όσα είναι παρόμοια.47 
 
…A third part is Suffering, which we may be defined as an action of a destructive or 
painful nature, such as murders on the stage, tortures, woundings and the like.48 
 
 
The confusion regarding the meaning of pathos can be reflected in the 
variety of translations: ‘crisis of feeling’, ‘catastrophe’, ‘the moving accident’, 
‘the scene of suffering or calamity’ and so on. One of the reasons for the 
confusion is the phrase εν τω φανερώ and whether it can actually mean επί 
της σκηνής (on stage). Lucas rightly observes that many scholars are trying to 
evade the obvious meaning of the phrase. Indeed, what pathos refers to is the 
apparent, on the stage expression of suffering, and in Oedipus’ case the self-
blinding. This is yet one more case where Aristotle means just what he says.  
I have discussed the accurate meaning of the Aristotelian hamartia, 
anagnorisis and peripeteia in relation to the narrative structure of the 
screenplay. I have also argued that the concepts of hamartia, reversal of 
fortune and peripeteia have been misinterpreted by Aristotle’s commentators, 
but also by contemporary screenwriting scholars. I now wish to turn this 
discussion to the last misinterpretation analysed in this study: character 
versus plot.  
Aristotle has been criticised for favouring plot over character in his 
narrative method. However, the Aristotelian narrative is not character-centred, 
neither is it plot-centred. The proper Aristotelian narrative is centred on one 
unified action carried to its probable and necessary course by means of the 
plot and of the character that best fits this one action. 
 In Aspects of the Novel, E. M. Forster begins his analysis of the plot as 
follows: 
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‘Character, says Aristotle, gives us qualities, but it is in actions – what we do – that 
we are happy or the reverse.’ We have already decided that Aristotle is wrong, and 
now we must face the consequences of disagreeing with him. ‘All human happiness 
and misery’, says Aristotle, ‘take the form of action.’  We know better. We believe that 
happiness and misery exist in the secret life, which each of us leads privately and to 
which (in his characters) the novelist has access. And by the secret life we mean the 
life for which there is no external evidence, not, as is vulgarly supposed, that which is 
revealed by a chance word or a sigh. A chance word or a sigh are just as much 
evidence as a speech or a murder: the life they reveal ceases to be secret and enters 
the realm of action.49 
 
 
Forster opens his discussion with a clear opposition to the 
predominance of plot over character in what has come over the centuries to 
be a clear controversy: character versus action. Forster, nevertheless, makes 
a clear distinction between the criteria with which this controversy can be 
applied to the narrative structure of the novel in contrast to drama.  
 
There is, however, no occasion to be hard on Aristotle. He had read few novels and 
no modern ones – the Odyssey but not Ulysses – he was by temperament apathetic 
to secrecy, and indeed regarded the human mind as a sort of tube from which 
everything can finally be extracted; and when he wrote the words quoted above he 
had in view the drama, where no doubt they hold true. In the drama, all human 
happiness and misery does and must take the form of action. Otherwise its existence 
remains unknown and this is the great difference between the drama and the novel.50 
Although Forster makes the crucial distinction between novel and 
drama, he takes for a fact that Aristotle favoured plot over character. Forster 
and all the theorists that contend Aristotle favoured plot are basing their 
judgement on the following sentence from the second half of Chapter VI of the 
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Poetics which has produced a great deal of disagreement. Hamilton Fyfe 
translates:  
 
 
A tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without character.51 
 
 
Butcher’s translation does not differ: 
 
 
Again, without action there cannot be a tragedy; there may be without character.52 
 
 
Potts translation does not deviate greatly from the above: 
 
 
Also, without an action there could not be a tragedy, but without Character there 
could.53 
 
          It is uncertain whether Aristotle had a specific dramatist in mind when 
he said ‘A tragedy is impossible without action, but there may be one without 
character’. Sikoutris suggests that Aristotle might have been trying to criticise  
the practice of the dramatists of his time, such as Euripides, who paid specific 
attention to the analysis of the character violating thus the drama’s 
economy.54 
The confusion derives partly from the way the two concepts, ethos 
(character) and praxis (action) are presented by Aristotle in the statement ‘A 
tragedy is impossible without action, but there maybe one without character’55, 
a way that intensifies the already existing problem in the translation of ethos 
by the word character. Placing the word action close to the word character 
does give rise to a certain antithesis, which is nevertheless absent in the 
whole Aristotelian theory as presented in the Poetics. The words ethos and 
praxis in other passages of the Poetics not only are not in opposition, but 
inseparable.   
To shed light on any ostensible opposition, House turns to Ethics and 
tries to capture the essence of the Aristotelian notion of ethos:  
 
The virtues (and the vices) are acquired only in so far as we have acted well or badly. 
We learn to become good or bad by acting well or ill just as a builder learns to build 
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by building. By repeated acts of certain kind we acquire a habit or bent (εξις) of 
character.  We are not good or bad merely in respect of knowing what is good or bad. 
The guiding principle of ethics is not the Absolute good, but the practical good. In all 
ethical situations there is an element of desire which is the stimulus to decision and 
the determinant of direction. The action which is ethical [not in a moral connotation, 
but ethical in that it is proper to the ethos or character of a person] is a movement 
toward the desired end. The ‘character’ which a man acquires by acting is formed by 
the kind of ‘ends’ which he habitually proposes to himself as desirable. Character is 
only a tendency and it does not become fully ‘actual’ unless a particular end is 
desired and the movement is thus set on foot towards it.56 
 
Character, then is a tendency and the spectator can see the character 
realised only through action. The mere presentation of character qualities is 
something less than the fullness of character. In terms of drama, we cannot 
consider a character as ‘real’ unless we see him/her acting his/her qualities 
out.  
House’s analysis of the Ethics contributes a great deal to the 
illumination of the meaning of ethos and its relation to praxis, but Aristotle 
makes it quite clear in the Poetics itself. In the first half of Chapter VI he says 
that ‘Unhappiness is located in doings, and our end is a certain kind of doing, 
not a personal quality; it is their characters that give men their quality, but their 
doings that make them happy or the opposite’.57 
It is as though there are two different characters: one before the action 
and one after the action. Aristotle clearly states that what matters in drama is 
to see the character’s ethos in action, because only in this way can he be real. 
Moreover, Aristotle devotes Chapter XV in analysing the character that best 
fits the complexities of tragedy. Aristotle further clarifies his point by saying: 
 
And again: one may string together a series of characteristic speeches of the utmost 
finish as regards Diction and Thought, and yet fail to produce the true tragic effect; 
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But one will have much better success with a tragedy which, however inferior on 
these respects, has a Plot, a combination of incidents in it.58 
 
The well-structured plot in drama becomes the only vehicle of showing 
the hero’s ethos. Through the selection of the proper units of action, the 
character’s actions towards hamaria are clearly revealed, the spectator 
decides whether the character is worthy of pity and fear and finally, katharsis 
– the intellectual and emotional clarification of hamartia – can occur. 
In Story: Substance, Structure, Style and the Principles of 
Screenwriting McKee misinterprets Aristotle’s insistence on plot. He writes: 
 
As Aristotle observed, why a man does a thing is of little interest once we see 
the thing he does. A character is the choices he makes to take the actions he takes. 
Once the deed is done his reasons why begin to dissolve into irrelevancy’.59 
 
Aristotle insisted on action revealed by plot because this was the most 
effective and sure way of showing the reason behind this action, the seed of 
his/her hamartia.  
The line that separates plot from character becomes very thin and the 
division of character as a separate element from plot seems implausible. This 
division is sometimes a ‘tool’ used by critics in their attempt to analyse the 
degree in which a film fails or succeeds in showing those actions that are 
most appropriate for the film’s premise to be proven. Plot-centred screenplays 
and character-centred screenplays is an inaccurate distinction. A more logical 
distinction could be and has been made between the novel’s receptivity to a 
detailed characterization and the play’s or film’s receptivity to a tight structure 
of action. As Forster suggested, the narrative structure of the novel is open to 
a detailed characterization in contrast to the structure of the screenplay that 
has to be more careful in the time it allows for a character to be portrayed on 
the screen. It is the nature of theatre and film that permits the predominance 
of action over character.   
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Exceptional in all other aspects of his analysis of dramatic writing, 
Lajos Egri exemplifies this controversy. In The Art of Dramatic Writing, he 
states: 
 
‘The plot is the first consideration, and as it were, the soul of tragedy. Character 
holds the second place’, writes Aristotle in his Poetics…It is not difficult to understand 
why Aristotle thought of character as he did. When Sophocles wrote Oedipus Rex, 
when Aeschylus wrote Agamemnon, when Euripides wrote Medea, Fate was 
supposed to have played the chief role in the drama. The Gods spoke and men lived 
or died in accordance with what they said. ‘The structure of the incidents’ was 
obtained by the gods-the characters were merely men who did what have been 
prearranged for them. But while the audience believed this, and Aristotle based his 
theories upon it, it does not hold true in the plays themselves. In all important Greek 
plays, the characters create the action. Aristotle was mistaken in his time, and our 
scholars are mistaken today when they accept his rulings concerning character. 
Character was the great factor in Aristotle’s time, and no fine play ever was or ever 
will be written without it.60 
 
 McKee also seems to agree that Aristotle favored plot over character. 
He writes: 
 
Plot or character? Which is more important? This debate is as old as the art. Aristotle 
weighed each side and concluded that story is primary, character secondary. His 
view held sway until, with the evolution of the novel, the pendulum of opinion swung 
the other way.61 
 
 
 
In Aristotle’s Poetics for Screenwriters, Tierno writes: 
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Let me now explain more fully what I mean by action-idea. Aristotle teaches 
us to think of action as an idea of a story. In fact, he says that action is more 
important than people; that is, characters. Aristotle is fanatical about the need for our 
stories to be about action, about action that is larger than life itself and greater than 
the persons who partake in it…That is why we screenwriters build a dramatic story 
on a single action.62 
 
Aristotle never argued that action is more important than people or that 
action is greater than the people who partake it. Aristotle only insisted on the 
importance of plot because it is only by means of a good plot that character is 
revealed.    
However, Aristotle did not write ‘A tragedy is impossible without 
character, but there maybe one without action’. By this I mean that Aristotle’s 
examination of the function of the plot in relation to character makes it clear 
that the plot as action of the character is more essential than the mere 
delineation of character without a proper plot. It follows that a counter-
Aristotelian screenplay would not involve the hero’s ethos in action but just the 
hero’s ethos as loose strips of character study. Such films are Ulysses’ Gaze 
(Theo Angelopoulos, 1995) or Arizona Dream (Emir Kusturica, 1993).   
A long tradition of generalizations and misconceptions has led to the 
belief that the classical narrative of American films (Hollywood) is based on 
the Poetics. In this study, I have argued that the classical narrative has 
borrowed only a few of the Aristotelian elements. It is important to realise that 
the use of one Aristotelian element in a narrative does not make the narrative 
Aristotelian. For example, one cannot say that the film The Pursuit of 
Happiness is Aristotelian only because the protagonist has many Aristotelian 
elements. The protagonist has not committed an hamartia. Therefore, the 
triad hamartia-peripeteia-anagnorisis is not possible in this specific screenplay 
even though there are two reversals of fortune in the plot. On the other hand, 
many European films are presented as ‘alternatives’ of the Aristotelian 
narrative, where in reality they are ‘alternatives’ of the classical narrative 
structure.  
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The misconceptions related to the Poetics result in three main 
problems: a) the screenwriter who wishes to apply the method is confused 
and ends up with a mixture of classical narrative and Aristotelian narrative, b) 
a number of films are regarded Aristotelian whereas they are not and, c) a 
number of films are regarded counter-Aristotelian while, in reality, they are 
exploring and using Aristotelian methods as their basis.   
It is interesting to note that some films are Aristotelian in their narrative 
structure, but are using counter-Aristotelian filmic techniques. More often than 
not counter-Aristotelian narratives use the Aristotelian character model to 
make sure that they capture the audience’s interest and to ensure that they 
have a solid base where from they can later deviate. With this solid base they 
achieve empathy for the character and ensure the audience identification with 
the character. A film that has more elements of the Aristotelian method than 
initially appears is Wild Strawberries (Ingmar Bergman, 1957).  
The action in Wild Strawberries takes place over 24 hours. Bergman 
presents the life of seventy-eight year old doctor of medicine Isak Borg (Victor 
Sjostrom) by showing his stream of consciousness, creating an episodic 
narrative structure, which ostensibly makes the film counter-Aristotelian.  
The film’s plot is complex in a number of ways. On one level, the film’s 
structure proceeds horizontally. The horizontal narrative can be summarized  
in the sentence: Borg drives to his hometown to receive an honorary degree 
from the university. The structure of the film becomes vertical when the 
present time is ‘disturbed’ by past memories (flashbacks) and dreams. The 
vertical dimension of the film, though, is inserted in such a way as not only to 
disturb, but to supplement and enrich the flow of action of the horizontal 
narrative structure. The film starts with a dream sequence and ends with a 
dream sequence giving thus a circular structure to the narrative and also a 
sense of a proper beginning, middle and end. In this film, as Edward Murray, 
points out in his analysis of Wild Strawberries, there is ‘perfect unity of 
action’.63 
Wild Strawberries was considered to be one the films that 
characterized the end of neo-realism and a ‘remove from true-neorealist 
practice, because it contains flashback sequences’.64 But, the vertical 
structure of the film does not disturb the verisimilitude of the story and is, 
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therefore, in accordance with the basic Aristotelian rule of probability and 
necessity. The disturbance of the time sequence follows a ‘normal’ pattern. 
The verisimilitude of the plot is not harmed by the flashbacks or the dreams, 
not only because they are handled masterfully by Bergman, but also because 
these narrative devices are not alien to our everyday life patterns. For 
example, the audience might not identify with the narrative structure of a film 
like Run Lola Run, or Memento because such narrative structures completely 
contrast with a ‘realistic’ experience of time. It is more than often the case, 
nevertheless, that we day dream, go back to memories, or even doze for five 
minutes to travel the world of the past or to worlds completely unknown. The 
process of taking a break from everyday routine by dreaming has in fact a 
realistic and ‘true’ element in everyone’s life and it is therefore something 
believable, something probable or possible.   
The use of Borg’s point of view throughout the film advances the 
verisimilitude of the story and acts as ‘a unifying factor of the structure of 
events, something especially important in an episodic film which moves 
between inner and outer reality’.65 
Wild Strawberries might be considered episodic by modern film critics, 
but according to the Poetics, it is not. In Chapter IX Aristotle writes that a plot 
is episodic when ‘the episodes or acts succeed one another without probable 
or necessary sequence’.66 
Wild Strawberries’ narrative has unity of action with each scene 
connected with the rule of probability and necessity and cannot be considered 
episodic in the Aristotelian sense. Memento, Run Lola Run or Sliding Doors 
(Peter Howitt, 1998) on the other hand, have episodic narrative structures.  
Memento and Sliding Doors are composed of two realities and Run Lola Run 
has three realities.   
Borg is an Aristotelian character. He is a moderately good, but not an 
eminently good man. He has put his career first and he has committed an 
hamartia by deciding early in his life to be cold and unforgiving to people that 
loved him. Through the course of the narrative he progresses through an 
anagnorisis of his hamartia and a pathos (alienation from loved ones, torturing 
nightmares).   
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Despite the fact that Wild Strawberries has the typical happy ending of 
a classical narrative structure, the film borrows key Aristotelian elements and 
cannot be considered as counter-Aristotelian.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
In its pure form, the Poetics has not been yet applied to the narrative structure 
of screenplay. Through a discussion of central Aristotelian concepts and a 
clarification of the main Aristotelian misinterpretations, I have tried to show 
that the use of the Aristotelian method to date cannot be a criterion for limiting 
the possibilities of the method and that one of the most widely accepted ideas 
about the Poetics – that the Aristotelian narrative structure is closely 
associated with the classical or restorative narrative structure of the American 
mainstream cinema – is incorrect. To reach this conclusion, I have traced 
specific misinterpretations of the Poetics from Aristotelian scholars as well as 
contemporary screenwriting theorists.  Meanwhile, I have tried to define 
mimesis, katharsis, hamartia, anagnorisis and peripeteia in relation to the 
ways that they can be applied more correctly to the narrative structure of 
screenplays.    
In Chapter I of this study, I have looked at the way major literary and 
film theories have viewed the Aristotelian mimesis in relation to reality. This 
has revealed some inaccuracies arising from centuries of interpreting the 
Aristotelian mimesis as a means of representation. I have then argued that 
the Aristotelian mimesis is not related to a photographic realism or the 
idealistic realism of the classical narrative structure. Through a detailed 
analysis of the concepts of ‘probability’ I have come to the conclusion that 
logical believability, verisimilitude, or simply what could happen – not what 
actually happens or should happen – is the object of the Aristotelian mimesis 
(logical mimesis). To achieve logical mimesis, the Aristotelian poetic structure 
involves selecting a part of reality and not the whole of it. Therefore it is not 
and it does not aspire to be a ‘true’ or accurate representation of raw reality.  I 
have also looked at the relationship between mimesis and plot and concluded 
that to achieve logical mimesis, the Aristotelian poetic structure involves 
selecting a part of reality and not the whole of it. Only by a proper plot can the 
Aristotelian mimesis be realised. That is why the plot has the primary role in 
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the Aristotelian method. In this chapter I have also looked at the interpretation 
of mimesis as it is found in contemporary screenwriting texts.  
In Chapter II, I have tried to describe the true function of katharsis in an 
Aristotelian narrative as opposed to the classical and counter-Aristotelian 
narrative structures. I have looked at the two major misinterpretations of 
katharsis, the purgation and purification theories. I tried to show that to 
experience the Aristotelian katharsis the spectator needs firstly to be 
intellectually involved and secondly to be emotionally involved. Mental 
involvement is a precondition for emotional involvement and for katharsis to 
be achieved. I concluded that katharsis is related to an emotional relief 
derived from the intellectual clarification of the hero’s hamartia. To prove that 
katharsis is related to the spectators’ intellectual engagement was the first 
step in showing that one of Aristotle’s strongest opponents, Augusto Boal, 
was false in alleging that katharsis functions a means to repress the 
spectator. If katharsis satisfies and mitigates the spectators’ need for action, 
as Boal asserts, his narrative system would be even more dangerous. Then I 
looked at the various misconceptions of katharsis as it is interpreted by 
screenwriting theorists, in order to show how the Aristotelian katharsis would 
work for the specific needs of a screenplay’s narrative.   
In Chapter III have investigated two widely spread misinterpretations of 
the Poetics, a) the Aristotelian rule for the beginning, middle and end of a 
narrative and, b) the so-called rule of the three unities. I have also argued that 
the polemic the Poetics has received on the grounds that Aristotle favoured 
plot over character is unfounded. Chapter III was also devoted to a detailed 
discussion and clarification of the central Aristotelian plot construction 
elements hamartia, peripeteia and anagnorisis. I looked at the way these 
three terms were interpreted and misinterpreted by literary scholars as well as 
screenwriting theorists in order to offer a more accurate way of applying these 
Aristotelian concepts to screenwriting.  
Throughout this study I have tried to discuss the most important 
misinterpretations regarding the Poetics. By referring to specific screenwriting 
texts that draw on the Poetics, I have demonstrated that the process of 
applying the Poetics in screenwriting has not always been accurate, which 
deprives the Aristotelian narrative method of its potential. A key objective of 
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this study was also to investigate the differences between the Aristotelian 
narrative structure and the classical narrative structure and show that these 
differences make the Poetics a unique method the potential of which is far 
from exhausted in screenwriting. By showing a number of inaccuracies of the 
Poetics in screenwriting texts, by clarifying the meaning of katharsis and 
mimesis and by discussing key Aristotelian plot structure elements I hope to 
have contributed with this study to a clearer understanding of the potential 
Poetics has for the prospective screenwriter or screenwriting analyst.  
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